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Preface to ”Artificial Superintelligence”
Focus of the AI safety community has increasingly started to include strategic considerations of 
coordination amongst relevant actors in the field of AI and AI safety, in addition to the steadily 
growing work on the technical considerations of building safe AI systems.
There are several reasons for this shift:
Multiplier Effects: Given the challenges of building safe AI systems (e.g., ethical, technical alignment, 
and cybersecurity concerns) we ought to ensure that the alotted timeframe is sufficient to develop 
thorough solutions. Coordination efforts could allow actors who develop AI to slow down when 
necessary, rather than engage in adversarial races, which may lead to corner-cutting on safety issues.
Pragmatism: While furthering the coordination of actors in the AI space is a complex challenge, 
coordination itself is not a novel problem. Many of the relevant actors ensuring that progress toward 
superintelligence remains beneficial to humanity are already known. There is already a promising 
research pool on coordination problems, as well as historic precursors of high-stake coordination 
problems which we have some familiarity and experience with, suggesting useful research directions 
for AI coordination.
Urgency: With race dynamics amongst major powers slowly emerging in AI and related fields, 
developing strategies for coordination is urgent. Currently, there is a window of opportunity to 
shape the nature of the relationships between current and future actors, to ensure a beneficial outcome 
for humanity.
Given the above benefits of coordination between those working on a path to safe 
superintelligence, this book surveys promising research in this emerging field regarding AI safety. 
On a meta-level, the hope is that this book can serve as a map to inform those working in the field 
of AI coordination of other promising efforts. Creating an informed and proactive research cohort 
would avoid Unliteralist’s Curse scenarios, in which different efforts duplicate or, unbeknownst, 
counter, other promising efforts, and would open up avenues for collaboration as well, thereby more 
generally serving AI coordination research.
While this book focuses on AI safety coordination, coordination is important to most other 
known existential risks (e.g., biotechnology risks), and future human-made existential risks, some of 
which might still be unknown. Thus, while most coordination strategies in this book will be specific 
to superintelligence, we hope that some insights yield “collateral benefits” for the reduction of other 
existential risks, by creating an overall civilizational framework that increases in robustness, 
resiliency, and antifragility.
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Abstract: Artificial intelligence-enabled adaptive learning systems (AI-ALS) have been increasingly
utilized in education. Schools are usually afforded the freedom to deploy the AI-ALS that they prefer.
However, even before artificial intelligence autonomously develops into artificial superintelligence in
the future, it would be remiss to entirely leave the students to the AI-ALS without any independent
oversight of the potential issues. For example, if the students score well in formative assessments
within the AI-ALS but subsequently perform badly in paper-based post-tests, or if the relentless
algorithm of a particular AI-ALS is suspected of causing undue stress for the students, they should
be addressed by educational stakeholders. Policy makers and educational stakeholders should
collaborate to analyze the data from multiple AI-ALS deployed in different schools to achieve strategic
oversight. The current paper provides exemplars to illustrate how this future-ready strategic oversight
could be implemented using an artificial intelligence-based Bayesian network software to analyze
the data from five dissimilar AI-ALS, each deployed in a different school. Besides using descriptive
analytics to reveal potential issues experienced by students within each AI-ALS, this human-centric
AI-empowered approach also enables explainable predictive analytics of the students’ learning
outcomes in paper-based summative assessments after training is completed in each AI-ALS.
Keywords: future-ready; strategic oversight; artificial superintelligence; artificial intelligence;
forecasting AI behavior; predictive optimization; simulations; Bayesian networks; adaptive learning
systems; pedagogical motif; explainable AI; AI Thinking; human-in-the-loop; human-centric reasoning;
policy making on AI
1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) [1] refers to the ability of human-made systems to mimic rudimentary
human thought. The term “artificial superintelligence” [2] goes beyond this primary ability of AI;
it refers to the capability of human-made systems that can surpass humans. For example, they might
even be able to rapidly discover hidden motifs or patterns in the data and then make predictions,
while humans might find it very challenging to apperceive these hidden patterns within the mind, or
perform similar feats at the speeds and performance levels that these systems can. To be clear, it could
be argued that an AI system does not care about the need to prove to humans that it has achieved
human-like consciousness (also referred to as the state of “singularity” or “artificial general intelligence”)
in order to be validated, certified, or given the stamp of approval by humans, so that it can properly
be accorded a definitional label of its level of AI. There would probably be no notifications from AI
systems the day they autonomously become self-aware, regardless of whether humans like it or not.
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Meanwhile, in lieu of that fateful day, researchers have observed in studies that we already have
artificial superintelligence working inconspicuously and tirelessly in our midst [3–5]. In the field of
education, since the 1950s, AI deployed in the form of adaptive learning systems (ALS) [6,7], which are
contemporary forms of intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) [8], have been utilized to assist teachers in
the training of students [9]. Great strides have been made by researchers and commercial companies
toward creating ALS that are powered by artificial intelligence, and perhaps, even superintelligence [2],
in the sense that some of them have—dare I say—already surpassed the human teacher in terms of the
ability to relentlessly perform the task of one-to-one tutoring, initiate progress checks, and conduct
remediation. They can concurrently perform these tasks, perpetually to an unlimited number of
students, round the clock, whenever and wherever the students choose to learn [10]. The developers
of ALS and the researchers who field-test them have often lauded improvements in learning gains,
and efficiencies of learning similar amounts of subject content in reduced amounts of time [11].
The primary function of an ALS is to educe (draw out) the learning abilities of the students by making
them solve problems [12].
The advent of AI has enabled advanced developments of ALS. In recent years, an artificial
intelligence-enabled adaptive learning system (AI-ALS) might utilize, for example, a variant of the
AI-based Bayesian Knowledge Tracing (BKT) [13] algorithm, or some other proprietary algorithms
formed from an ensemble of multiple AI-based methods to make “adjustments in an educational
environment in order to accommodate individual differences” to provide a personalized learning
experience for each student [14]. An example of a procedure that an AI-ALS might use to interact with
the student is: (1) present the student with a topic or sub-topic to learn, (2) present the student with
learning material that illustrate the concepts, (3) initiate a short progress check quiz of each sub-topic
for the student. If the student could consecutively correctly answer a few questions, the AI-ALS would
deem that the student has “passed” the learning objective for that topic or sub-topic (which will be
indicated as “topic_passed” in the dataset). Otherwise, the student would be remediated by the AI-ALS
until the learning outcome is achieved, and (4) finally, after the student has passed the progress check
quiz, the AI-ALS would unlock more topics or sub-topics that are considered to be “ready for learning”
by the student (that will be indicated as “topic_ready_for_learning” in the dataset). The AI-ALS is
often used in conjunction with the flipped learning pedagogy [15], where the students are expected to
log into the AI-ALS and learn as much as they can on their own at home. Subsequently, when they are
in the classroom, the teacher can spend the precious class time more effectively by helping students to
address any learning issues that they might have.
The current paper does not purport to be an empirical study of the effectiveness of any current
AI-ALS. Rather, it proffers a future-ready human-in-the-loop [16] analytical framework that is based
upon intuitive human-centric probabilistic reasoning, which could be used to characterize the
“pedagogical motifs” [17] of any number of AI-ALS that may be deployed in the future. So long as
the data from those systems are available to human analysts, this framework would still be useful for
education stakeholders to gain an oversight of the “timbre” of multiple AI-ALS that are deployed in
schools, even if those AI-ALS in the future are artificially superintelligent.
2. Research Problem and Initial Hypothetical Conjecture
2.1. Research Problem
In reality, the Department of Education of a city or a state or a country might choose not to
implement a policy that compels all of the schools to use one single AI-ALS that is provided by one
vendor. Presumably, the schools would also rather have the freedom to choose the AI-ALS that they
prefer to deploy for their students. However, it would be remiss if the students were entirely left to the
AI-ALS. For example, if the students do very well in the formative assessment tests in the AI-ALS,
but perform badly in the paper-based post-test, or if the relentless testing-checking-remediating-testing
algorithm of a particular AI-ALS is suspected to be causing too much stress for the students, it would
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be of concern to educational stakeholders. Currently, the AI-ALS products available in the educational
industry have the ability to autonomously strive to make the student achieve mastery of the topics that
they are required to learn. However, they are not yet fully equipped (e.g., with sensors or by other
means) to take noncognitive factors (e.g., ability to manage stress, psychological well-being, motivation,
level of engagement, etc.) of the students into consideration [18]. This is where a human-in-the-loop
approach that is proffered by the current paper would play a vital role in bridging the gaps. It can
be used to inform educational stakeholders in areas where the developers of the AI-ALS might
have overlooked.
Coordination efforts between the educational stakeholders, such as policy makers, school leaders,
and teachers, to assess the risks and safeguard the safety of students who are using the AI-ALS (in terms
of noncognitive factors [19–23], such as, for example, the psychological well-being, or emotional
intelligence to manage stress) are, undeniably, of paramount importance. Researchers, such as
Manheim [24], Perry and Uuk [25], Turchin, Denkenberger, and Green [26], Umbrello [27], Watson [28],
and by Ziesche and Yampolskiy [29], have made efforts to analyze the issues, values, and benefits
of strategies and coordination in artificial superintelligence. Yet, in the field of education, there
is still a dearth in the extant literature regarding the area of coordination and safety in artificial
superintelligence [30]. From the perspective of education policy makers, it would be interesting to
help to coordinate the analysis of data from multiple AI-ALS deployed in different schools, so they
would be able to “see the big picture” and assess the potential issues to know whether each AI-ALS
in the respective school is helping (or not helping) the students, and take further steps to address
problems if necessary. Human teachers would be able to address the gaps in the students’ learning
process where the AI-ALS could not, and help to alleviate stressful situations for the students if they
are uncomfortable using the AI-ALS.
In the field of education, the question “would it be possible to predict the conditions during the
use of an educational intervention (e.g., an AI system) to enhance optimal student performance in the
paper-based summative assessments?” might intrigue educational stakeholders, such as policy makers,
parents, students, and educational researchers [31,32]. However, to the authors’ knowledge, it is beyond
the scope of consideration by the developers of the AI-ALS to predict how the students’ scores within
the AI-ALS could influence their learning outcomes in a summative assessment (e.g., a paper-based
standardized test that all the students are required to take in the school) after their training has been
completed in the AI-ALS. To achieve this predictive capability, it is imperative for the pedagogical
“motif” or “timbre” or “disposition” of the AI-ALS to be known, as each of them would interact
with students in different ways. Although educational stakeholders need to examine the pedagogical
characteristics of the AI-ALS, the vendors of the systems would understandably be reticent about
divulging the exact algorithm to the customers, as they are closely-held trade secrets. Instead of
believing all of the information provided by the vendors who are inclined to assure that everything
will be excellent, it would be prudent for educational stakeholders to independently investigate the
pedagogical characteristics that underlie these AI-ALS. Frameworks have been created by researchers
for the evaluation of ALS [33]. Nevertheless, those laudable techniques were often formally presented
as mathematical equations, which could prove to be difficult for educational stakeholders who might
not have the necessary computer programming human resources or enough time to implement them.
There remains a need for a more intuitive and practical way for educational stakeholders—rather than
computer scientists—to apply human-in-the-loop AI-Thinking [34,35] and quickly achieve a strategic
oversight of the multiple AI-ALS, which is crucial for informing educational policy and advancing
pedagogical practice.
2.2. Initial Hypothetical Conjecture
The initial hypothetical conjecture assumes that the developers of an AI-ALS might have designed
it to push the higher-performing students a little harder, and conversely, to go easy on the relatively
lower-performing students. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to imagine that a student who
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had performed poorly in the AI-ALS might have experienced having his or her weaknesses being
educed (drawn out) by the system. Subsequently, after a personal reflection of those problems via
vicarious trial and error (VTE) [36], the student could become cognizant of those weaknesses and could
avoid similar predicaments during problem-solving in the paper-based post-test. Conversely, a student
who had performed well in the AI-ALS might not have experienced having his or her weaknesses
educed, and hence might lack the personal reflections or the VTE to learn from those experiences.
Consequently, he or she might perform poorly in the post-test. The approach being proffered in the
current paper would purely characterize its informational pattern (its motif), regardless of whether a
student scored high or low within the AI-ALS. In other words, it does not affect the calculation of the
“gains” that are attributed to the prowess of the AI-ALS, as it will not simply be a subtraction of the
results of the paper-based post-test from the paper-based pre-test.
Nevertheless, it would be contrived to only measure the “gains” in terms of cognitive dimensions
while using the pre-test and post-test, as there might be noncognitive benefits for the students too.
Hence, a survey that could be used to understand more about the noncognitive aspects of their
learning experiences could also be administered to the students upon the completion of their learning
process in the AI-ALS. Some of the possible noncognitive instruments that could be utilized by
educational stakeholders include those that are offered by researchers such as Al-Mutawah and
Fateel [37], Chamberlin, Moore, and Parks [38], Egalite, Mills, and Greene [39], Lipnevich, MacCann,
and Roberts [40], and Mantzicopoulos, Patrick, Strati, and Watson [41].
2.3. Potential Issues that Education Researchers Might Encounter
When a school decides to let a class of students use an AI-ALS to assist the teachers, it might not
occur to the school leaders or teachers to make any arrangements for the formation of a control group.
Understandably, the school may have concerns that parents might be unwilling to give permission for
their children to participate in a control group, merely to form a baseline group for comparison with
the treatment group, with no assistive benefits from any educational technology. Moreover, it will
not be easy to perform direct comparisons between the treatment and control group even if a control
group could be formed by the school, as the teaching experiences and skills of the teachers between the
control and the treatment group might be unevenly matched. Further, it might not be surprising if some
students from the treatment group or control group have the advantage of receiving extra help from
tuition lessons outside of school. In effect, the myriad potential confounding factors would be difficult
to account for, if fair comparisons must be performed between the treatment group that attended
lessons where the teacher had been assisted by the AI-ALS to learn mathematics, and the control group
that attended lessons where the teacher had not been assisted by the AI-ALS. Last but not least, a major
problem that is faced by analysts who are considering the use of null hypothesis significance testing
(NHST) frequentist approaches is that there might not be results that yield any meaningful statistical
significant difference, due to the low number of participants in real-world situations (e.g., 20 students
per class in each school) and the corresponding non-parametric data distributions [42].
Practical examples will be provided in the current paper to overcome these constraints. They will
be used to illustrate how strategic oversight could be implemented using an artificial intelligence-based
analytical tool by educational stakeholders to analyze data from five dissimilar AI-ALS deployed in
small-scale pilot studies, each in a different school, and how conditions in those different AI-ALS could be
used for predictive optimizations of educational outcomes in the paper-based summative assessments.
3. Methods
3.1. Rationale for Using the Bayesian Approach for Human-Centric Probabilistic Reasoning
Bayesian approaches for analyzing statistical data [43] have gained traction in behavioral science
research in recent years [44]. The Bayesian network (BN) [45–47] approach is suitable for analyzing
non-parametric data from a small number of participants, because it does not require the underlying
4
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variables of a model to assume or have a normal parametric distribution [42,48,49]. The Bayesian
paradigm enables researchers to perform hypothesis testing by including prior knowledge into the
analyses. Due to this capability, it becomes unnecessary to repeatedly perform multiple rounds of null
hypothesis testing [50–52] when using Bayesian data analytical techniques.
Researchers in education, such as Kaplan [53], Levy [54], Mathys [55], and Muthén and
Asparouhov [56], have employed the Bayesian approach to model the behavior of pedagogical
systems operating under conditions with uncertainties, as the information about entropy in these
systems could be harnessed to understand more about the factors that contribute (either positively or
not) to their robustness and resiliency [57]. In educational technology, Bekele and McPherson [58] and
Millán, Agosta, and Cruz [59] have also utilized the Bayesian approach, because it enables them to
measure information gain, as depicted in Claude Shannon’s Information Theory [60], which could be
likened to the notion of learning by the students.
The primary advantage of BN is that its strong probabilistic theory empowers users to gain an
intuitive understanding of the processes involved. It also enables predictive reasoning because, given
observations of evidence, questions can be posed to find the posterior probability of any variable or set
of variables. However, the current paper does not purport to perform comparisons between the use of
BN and other AI-based techniques, such as artificial neural networks (ANN), as that has already been
well-documented by Correa, Bielza, and Pamies-Teixeira [61]. They observe that BN can illustrate
the relationships that exist between the nodes in a model to provide more information than an ANN,
which has been likened to a black box.
3.2. The Bayesian Theorem
A succinct introduction to the Bayesian theorem and BN will be presented here. However, readers
who are interested to learn more about BN are encouraged to peruse the works of Cowell, Dawid,
Lauritzen, and Spiegelhalter [62]; Jensen [63]; and, Korb & Nicholson [64].
The mathematical theorem (see Equation (1)) for human-centric probabilistic reasoning was
developed by the mathematician and theologian, Reverend Thomas Bayes, but he passed away and
the notes were left unpublished in his drawer. They were later found and published posthumously by
his friend Richard Price in 1763 [43].
P(H|E) = P(E|H) · P(H)
P(E)
(1)
According to Equation (1), H represents a hypothesis and E represents a piece of evidence. P(H|E)
is referred to as the conditional probability of the hypothesis H, which means the likelihood of H
occurring given the condition that the evidence E is true. It is also referred to as the posterior probability,
which means the probability of the hypothesis H being true after calculating how the evidence E
influences the verity of the hypothesis H.
P(H) and P(E) represent the probabilities of the likelihood of the hypothesis H being true, and of
the likelihood of the evidence E being true, independent of each other, and it is referred to as the prior
or marginal probability—P(H) and P(E), respectively. P(E|H) represents the conditional probability of
the evidence E, that is, the likelihood of E being true, given the condition that the hypothesis H is true.
Hence, the quotient P(E|H)/P(E) represents the support that the evidence E provides for the hypothesis H.
3.3. The Research Model
The primary goal of the current paper is to offer one out of myriad possible ways that analytical
collaboration between educational stakeholders could be performed for evaluation of potential issues
by simulating how much (or how little) the learning of mathematics can be improved for the students
in five different schools, which used five dissimilar AI-ALS that were provided by five vendors.
The probabilistic reasoning techniques used are based on BN. Within the BN, the concept of the Markov
Blanket [65], in conjunction with Response Surface Methodology (RSM) [66–69], are utilized, as they are
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proven techniques for examining the optimization of the relations between the variables of theoretical
constructs, even if they are not physically related.
The Bayesian approach has been chosen, because it is a methodology that has been used for
modeling the performances and knowledge of students; in particular, by the developers of adaptive
learning software applications, such as Collins, Greer, and Huang [70]; Conati, Gertner, VanLehn,
and Druzdze [71]; Jameson [72]; and, VanLehn, Niu, Siler, and Gertner [73]. However, these published
works were focused on the vantage points of the developers who were describing the advantages of
their respective products.
In contrast, it would be quite difficult for end-users of any AI-ALS to understand more about the
inner workings of the proprietary algorithms that power the interactions with the students. The current
paper proffers an approach that enables educational stakeholders to use descriptive analytics as well as
predictive simulations to analyze the data that could be procured from the learners’ performance reports
in the server of an AI-ALS. This allows for analyses which could include comparisons and evaluations
of multiple AI-ALS. The intention is to inform the educational stakeholders in each respective school,
so that their teachers can remediate and bridge the gaps for the students, in whichever topics that the
AI-ALS could not do so.
In Sections 4.5 and 4.6, the detailed BN model of the students’ knowledge will be presented. It can
inform educational stakeholders about the specific mathematics topics that the students are ready to
learn, and the topics that they have already passed. Due to the coordination efforts between educational
stakeholders in the five schools, they may use the vital information depicted by the relations between
the nodes/variables in the BN to provide remediation for the students who are struggling in their
studies. Hence, they could achieve better learning outcomes and decrease the probability of the
potential risks that usage of an AI-ALS might entail (e.g., the students experiencing undue stress).
The BN model in the current paper is machine-learned from data procured from the scores
of a paper-based pre-test, the learning progress scores while the students were using the AI-ALS,
the Likert-scale scores from a survey, as well as the scores from a paper-based post-test. The current
paper analyzes the relations using the generated BN. The theoretical constructs within the BN include
the paper-based pre-test, the mediator (which is the AI-ALS), the paper-based post-test, and the
noncognitive constructs (e.g., motivation, engagement, interest, self-regulation, etc.) in the survey.
When researchers and educational stakeholders evaluate an AI-ALS, an understanding of these
relations is essential for determining whether the interventions would be beneficial to the students.
Therefore, the current paper proposes a practical Bayesian approach to demonstrate how educational
stakeholders—rather than computer scientists—could analyze data from a small number of students.
In order to explore the pedagogical motif of the AI-ALS, the following two types of analytics will be
subsequently presented in Sections 4 and 5:
Descriptive analytics of “what has already happened?” in Section 4:
Purpose: to use descriptive analytics to discover the pedagogical motifs of the five
AI-ALS deployed in five different schools. For descriptive analytics, BN modeling in
Section 4.7 will first utilize the parameter estimation algorithm to automatically detect
the data distribution of each column in the dataset. Further descriptive statistical
techniques that will be employed to understand more about the current baseline
conditions of the students include quadrant analysis, curves analysis, and Pearson
correlation analysis.
“What-if?” predictive analytics in Section 5:
Purpose: to use predictive analytics to perform in-silico experiments with fully
controllable parameters from the pre-test to the mediating intervention to the post-test
for prediction of future outcomes. Instead of just simply measuring gains by subtracting
the students’ post-test scores from the pre-test scores, a probabilistic Bayesian approach
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will be used to simulate counterfactual scenarios to better inform educators and policy
makers about the pedagogical characteristics of the five AI-ALS that are being deployed
in five different schools. For predictive analytics, counterfactual simulations in
Section 5 will be employed to explore the pedagogical motif of the AI-ALS. In Section 6,
the predictive performance of the BN model will be evaluated using tools that include
the gains curve, the lift curve, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve,
as well as by statistical bootstrapping of the data inside each column of the dataset
(which is also the data distribution in each node of the BN model) by 100,000 times
to generate a larger dataset to measure its precision, reliability, Gini index, lift index,
calibration index, the binary log-loss, the correlation coefficient R, the coefficient of
determination R2, root mean square error (RSME), and normalized root mean square
error (NRSME).
4. Descriptive Analytics of “What has Already Happened?”
In this section, the procedures that were carried out in descriptive analytics to make sense of “what
has already happened?” in the collected dataset will be presented. The dataset comprising 100 students
(20 students from each school, from five different schools, all of whom were about 13–14 years old)
who had used the AI-ALS, was imported into Bayesialab to deliberately illustrate the capabilities of
BN in handling nonparametric statistical data from a small number of participants [74]. The purpose
is to discover the informational “pedagogical motif” of the learning intervention generated by each
AI-ALS. In the context of this study, the notion of “pedagogical motif” is conceptually defined as the
pattern, timbre, disposition, and the unique characteristics with which each AI-ALS pedagogically
interacts with the students.
4.1. The Dataset Procured from the Reports Generated by AI-ALS
The zip file containing the following datasets can be downloaded from https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.
figshare.8206976.
The file “data_five_classes_AI_ALS.csv” contains the combined data of the five datasets from
five different groups of students in different schools. For the convenience of the reader who may wish
to import the data files from each group of students in each of the respective school into Bayesialab
when prompted to do so in this paper, these files “data_ai_als_class_1.csv”, “data_ai_als_class_2.csv”,
“data_ai_als_class_3.csv”, “data_ai_als_class_4.csv”, and “data_ai_als_class_5.csv” are also separately
available in the zip file. The codebook describing the data, “ai-als-data_codebook.txt” is also included.
4.2. Codebook of the Dataset
The dataset could be procured from the reports that were generated by the server of each AI-ALS.
Even though the variables from different datasets of the various AI-ALS would presumably be
dissimilar, they could be aggregated to a form that is based on the mathematics topics and sub-topics
(see Table A1 in Appendix A) that the students are required to learn in their curriculum. Each column
in the dataset is presented as a node in the BN. It can be assumed that higher values in the data of both
“math_topic_passed” (appended with the letter “P”) and “math_topic_ready_for_learning” (appended
with the letters “RL”) are considered to be indicators of better performance, and vice-versa.
4.3. Software Used: Bayesialab
The software which will be utilized is Bayesialab [75]. A suggested pre-requisite activity for the
reader is to peruse the free user-guide from http://www.bayesia.com/book/ before proceeding with the
exemplars illustrated in the following sections, as it documents the tools and functionalities of the
Bayesialab software.
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4.4. Pre-Processing: Checking for Missing Values or Errors in the Data
It would be prudent to check the data (using the file “data_five_classes_AI_ALS.csv”) for any
anomalies or missing values before using Bayesialab to construct the BN. In the dataset used in
this study, there were no anomalies or missing values. However, should other analysts encounter
missing values in their datasets, they could use Bayesialab to predict and fill in those missing values,
rather than discarding the row of data with a missing value. Bayesialab would be able to perform
this by machine-learning the overall structural characteristics of that entire dataset being studied,
before producing the predicted values. Bayesialab uses the Structural Expectation Maximization (EM)
algorithms and Dynamic Imputation algorithms to calculate any missing values [76].
4.5. Overview of the BN Model
BN, which is also referred to as Belief Networks, Causal Probabilistic Networks, and Probabilistic
Influence Diagrams are graphical models, which consist of nodes (variables) and arcs or arrows.
Each node contains the data distribution of the respective variable. The arcs or arrows between the
nodes represent the probabilities of the correlations between the variables [77].
Using BN, it becomes possible to use descriptive analytics to analyze the relations between the
nodes (variables) and the manner in which initial probabilities, such as the number of hours spent
in the AI-ALS and/or topics passed/ready to learn, and/or noncognitive factors, might influence the
probabilities of future outcomes, such as the predicted learning performance of the students in the
paper-based post-test.
Further, BN can also be used to perform counterfactual speculations regarding the initial states of
the data distribution in the nodes (variables), given the final outcome. In the context of the current
paper, exemplars will be presented in the predictive analytics segment (in Section 5) to illustrate how
counterfactual simulations can be implemented while using BN. For example, we can simulate these
hypothetical scenarios in the BN if we wish to find out the conditions of the initial states in the nodes
(variables) that would lead to high probability of attaining high-level scores in the post-test, or if we wish
to find out how to prevent students from attaining low scores or failing in the paper-based post-test.
The relation between each pair of connected nodes (variables) is determined by their respective
Conditional Probability Table (CPT), which represents the probabilities of correlations between the
data distributions of the parent node and the child node [78]. In the current paper, the values in
the CPT are automatically machine-learned by Bayesialab, according to the data distribution of each
column/variable/node in the dataset. Nevertheless, it is possible, but optional, for the user to manually
enter the probability values into the CPT, if the human user wishes to override the machine learning
software. In Bayesialab, the CPT of any node can be seen by double-clicking on it.
The BN model can be used to depict the data distribution of the students’ score clusters (see Figure 1)
in the AI-ALS in terms of the mathematics topics which include Arithmetic Readiness, Real Numbers,
Linear Equations, Linear Inequalities, Functions and Lines, Exponents and Exponential Functions,
Polynomials and Factoring, as well as Quadratic Functions and Equations. These score clusters were
generated via machine-learning by the Bayesialab software. By generating this model from the data
that contained varying levels of performance of the students (even if it was just 20 students from each
school, with a total of 100 students from five schools), we could obtain a “pedagogical motif” of each
AI-ALS, which meant that we could then perform simulations in each computational model to study
how it could behave under certain conditions. This will be elaborated and presented later in Section 5.
4.6. Detailed Descriptions of the BN in the Current Paper
Nodes (both the blue round dots, as well as the round cornered rectangles showing the data
distribution histograms) represent the variables of interest, for example, the score of a particular
mathematics topic (connected to nodes with scores from their corresponding sub-topics), the number
of hours that are spent by a student in the AI-ALS, the percentage of mathematics topics which a
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student had passed in the AI-ALS, or the rating of a particular noncognitive factor (e.g., motivation of
a student). Such nodes can correspond to symbolic/categorical variables, numerical variables with
discrete values, or discretized continuous variables. We exclusively discuss BN with discrete nodes in
the current paper even though BN can handle continuous variables, as it is more relevant in helping
educational stakeholders categorize students into high, mid, and low achievement groups, so that
teachers can utilize differentiated methods to better address the students’ learning needs.
Directed links (the arrows) could represent informational (statistical) or causal dependencies
among the variables. The directions are used to define kinship relations, i.e., parent-child relationships.
For example, X is the parent node of Y, and Y is the child node in a Bayesian network with a link
from X to Y. In the current paper, it is important to note that the Bayesian network presented is the
machine-learned result of probabilistic structural equation modeling (PSEM); the arrows represent the
probabilistic structural relationships between the parent node and the child nodes. The first letter of
the name of each node/data entity is presented in the upper case for better readability.
In the BN model used in the current paper (see Figure 1), the node representing the Pre-test results
(from a paper-based math test) is connected to the “mediator” node representing the pedagogical motif
of the AI-ALS, and subsequently the “mediator” node that represents the pedagogical motif of the
AI-ALS is also connected to the node that represents the Post-test results (from another paper-based
math test). This enables the probabilities of the AI-ALS as a mediator of the students’ performance to
be calculated, and subsequently it will be possible to simulate hypothetical scenarios (to be presented
later in Section 5).
Figure 1. Full view of the Bayesian network: the component nodes (in blue) and the superordinate
factor nodes (in green) were used for machine learning the overall performance of 100 students who
had used the five different artificial intelligence-enabled adaptive learning systems (AI-ALS).
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4.7. Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Dataset
From the combined dataset of all the 100 students’ performance who had used the five different
AI-ALS (using the file “data_five_classes_AI_ALS.csv”), the following score-clusters machine-learned
by Bayesialab were observed (see Figure 2):
Figure 2. Simplified aggregated view of the Bayesian network previously shown in Figure 1,
presenting only the superordinate factor nodes with their machine-learned score-clusters, depicting
the overall performance levels of all 100 students who had used the five dissimilar AI-ALS from five
different vendors.
In the paper-based Pre-test before the students used the AI-ALS, 42% of the students scored at the
Low-level, 41% scored at the Mid-level, and 17% scored at the High-level. In the paper-based Post-test
after the students had gone through the training within the AI-ALS, 31% scored at the Low-level,
47% scored at the Mid-level, and 22% scored at the High-level. Overall, in terms of conventional gains,
there was an improvement of 11% of the students who had scored at the Low-level (a decrease from
42% in the Pre-test to 31% in the Post-test); there was an improvement of 6% in the students who had
scored at the Mid-level (an increase from 41% in the Pre-test to 47% in the Post-test); and, there was an
improvement of 5% in the students who had scored at the High-level (an increase from 17% in the
Pre-test to 22% in the Post-test).
In the aggregated Noncognitive factor, 26% of the students were at the so-called Low-level,
43% were at the Mid-level, and 31% were at the High-level.
Within the AI-ALS, in the topic of Real Numbers, 28% of the students scored at the Low-level
(<=43.4% of the total marks for Real Numbers), 45% scored at the Mid-level (>43.4 and <=57.2),
and 27% scored at the High-level (>57.2).
In the topic of Linear Inequalities, 33% scored at the Low-level (<=33.7), 35% scored at the
Mid-level (>33.7 and <=66.1), and 32% scored at the High-level (>66.1).
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In the topic of Polynomials and Factoring, 14% of the students scored at the Low-level (<=37.5),
47% scored at the Mid-level (>37.5 and <=54.4), and 39% scored at the High-level (>54.4).
In the topic of Linear Equations, 41% of the students scored at the Low-level (<=45.467), 42% scored
at the Mid-level (>45.467 and <=61.833), and 17% scored at the High-level (>61.833).
In the topic of Functions and Lines, 18% of the students scored at the Low-level (<=34.2),
41% scored at the Mid-level (>34.2 and <=56.5), and 41% scored at the High-level (>56.6).
In the topic of Exponents and Exponential Functions, 37% of the students scored at the Low-level
(<=44.3), 47% scored at the Mid-level (>44.3 and <=69.6), and 16% scored at the High-level (>69.6).
In the topic of Arithmetic Readiness, 12% of the students scored at the Low-level (<=41.133),
55% scored at the Mid-level (>41.133 and <=53.367), and 33% scored at the High-level (>53.367).
In the topic of Quadratic Functions and Equations, 23% of the students scored at the Low-level
(<=29.3), 41% scored at the Mid-level (>29.3 and <=57.4), and 36% scored at the High-level (>53.4).
Regarding the average number of hours spent by each student in the AI-ALS, 24% of the students
were at the Low-level (<=3.367 h), 34% of the students were at the Mid-level (>3.367 and <=6.633 h),
and 42% were at the High-level (>6.633 h).
In the percentage of the total number of topics that were mastered by the students in the AI-ALS,
31% of the students were at the Low-level (<=33.3%), 40% were at the Mid-level (>33.3% and <=67.7%),
and 29% were at the High-level (>67.7%).
4.7.1. Descriptive Analytics: Profile Analysis of Each AI-ALS
A strategic overview of how the students performed (see Figures 3 and 4) could be accomplished
via profile analysis. This tool can be activated in Bayesialab via these steps: Bayesialab (validation mode)
> Visual > Segment > Profile.
Figure 3. Profile analysis of the five groups of students, each of which had used a different AI-ALS.
Figure 4 is an alternative presentation of the profiles presenting the performance of the five groups
of students in different schools, each of which had used a different AI-ALS.
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Figure 4. Profiles of five different AI-ALS, each from a different vendor, superimposed on top of the
overall profile.
4.7.2. Descriptive Analytics: Quadrant Analysis
Comparison of Total Effects of the five different AI-ALS on the paper-based Post-test can be
performed while using quadrant analysis. This tool can be activated in Bayesialab via these steps:
Bayesialab (validation mode) > Analysis > Report > Target > Total Effects on Target > Quadrants.
It would be contrived to measure the correlation between the scores achieved by the students
in their respective AI-ALS against their scores in the hardcopy paper-based post-test, because some
students could have scored poorly in the AI-ALS as their poor understanding of certain math concepts
might have been “surfaced” by the systems, but subsequently, they might have scored well in the
paper-based post-test. Conversely, some students might have scored high in the AI-ALS because the
questions were easy, but they might have scored low in the paper-based post-test. Hence, it absolutely
does not mean that an AI-ALS would be ranked higher in the quadrant analysis chart if the students’
scores within the AI-ALS are higher.
Each chart of the quadrant analysis generated by Bayesialab (see Figures 5 and 6) is divided into
four quadrants. The variables’ means (of each mathematics topic) are represented along the x-axis.
The mean of the standardized total effect on the target (the paper-based post-test) is represented along
the y-axis. Quadrant analysis example 1 (see Figure 5) utilized the file “data_five_classes_AI_ALS.csv”.
As a suggestion, the quadrants could be interpreted, as follows:
Top Right Quadrant (high volume, high impact on target node): This group contains the important
variables with greater total effect on the target than the mean value. These AI-ALS are effective in
contributing to the success of the students in the paper-based post-test. The AI-ALS supplied by
Vendor 1, Vendor 2, Vendor 4, and Vendor 5 are in this category.
Top Left Quadrant (low volume, high impact on target node): Any AI-ALS in this category might
be beneficial to the high-performing students, but not so beneficial to the mid- or low-performing
students. There is no AI-ALS from any vendor in this quadrant.
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Bottom Right Quadrant (high volume, low impact on target node): The AI-ALS from Vendor 3
is in this category, so educational stakeholders should consider conducting further investigation to
find out why this AI-ALS could not contribute to beneficial results in the paper-based post-test for
the students.
Bottom Left Quadrant (low volume, low impact on target node): Any AI-ALS in this category has
relatively lower impact on the target node (the paper-based post-test). There is no AI-ALS from any
vendor in this quadrant.
Figure 5. Comparison of Total Effects of the five different AI-ALS on the Post-test, which was
machine-learned and generated by Bayesialab.
Quadrant analysis example 2 (see Figure 6) utilized the file “data_five_classes_AI_ALS.csv”. As a
suggestion, the quadrants could be interpreted, as follows:
Top Right Quadrant (high volume, high impact on target node): This quadrant contains the
AI-ALS with greater total effect on the target than the mean value. Only the AI-ALS from Vendor 2 is in
this quadrant. These noncognitive factors associated with this AI-ALS are important to the success of
the students in the paper-based post-test, and the educational stakeholders should further explore how
the noncognitive factors (e.g., motivation, stress management, psychological well-being, etc.) that are
associated with the AI-ALS from Vendor 2 could be beneficial in helping the students to understand
and learn the concepts well in these mathematics topics.
Top Left Quadrant (low volume, high impact on target node): Any AI-ALS in this category is
associated with the noncognitive factors that might be beneficial for the high-performing students,
but might not be so beneficial to the mid- or low-performing students. The AI-ALS supplied by Vendor
4 and Vendor 5 are in this quadrant.
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Bottom Right Quadrant (high volume, low impact on target node): There is no AI-ALS from
any vendor in this quadrant. If there is any AI-ALS in this category, educational stakeholders should
consider conducting further investigation to find out why the noncognitive factors associated with this
AI-ALS could not contribute to beneficial results in the paper-based post-test for the students.
Bottom Left Quadrant (low volume, low impact on target node): Any AI-ALS in this category has
noncognitive factors that have relatively lower impact on the target node (the paper-based post-test).
The AI-ALS from Vendor 1 and Vendor 3 are in this quadrant.
Figure 6. Comparison of Total Effects of the data in the Noncognitive node on the Post-test node,
which was machine-learned from the data of the five different groups of students who had used five
dissimilar AI-ALS.
4.7.3. Descriptive Analytics: Comparative Analysis of the Five AI-ALS
In this section, the performance results of the five classes of students who had used five dissimilar
AI-ALS in five different schools will be presented.
Comparison between the AI-ALS from Vendor 1 and the Combined Average of the Five AI-ALS:
Using the file “data_ai_als_class_1.csv” via the Data Association tool in Bayesialab, the following
score-clusters machine-learned by Bayesialab were observed from the dataset depicting the
performances of the 20 students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 1 (see Figure 7):
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Figure 7. BN model of the students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 1 (N = 20 students).
In the paper-based Pre-test before the students used the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, 25.04% had scored
at the Low-level (as compared to the combined average of 42% of the students who had scored at the
Low-level), 54.89% had scored at the Mid-level (when compared to the combined average of 41% who
had scored at the Mid-level), and 20.07% had scored at the High-level (as compared to the combined
average of 17% scored at the High-level).
In the paper-based Post-test after the students had gone through the training within the AI-ALS
from Vendor 1, 34.99% had scored at the Low-level (as compared to the combined average of 31% who
had scored at the Low-level), 39.97% had scored at the Mid-level (when compared to the combined
average of 47% who had scored at the Mid-level), and 25.04% had scored at the High-level (as compared
to the combined average of 22% who had scored at the High-level). Overall, in terms of conventional
gains by comparing the Pre-test vis-à-vis the Post-test, there was an unfavorable higher difference
of 9.95% of the students who scored at the Low-level (from 25.04% in the Pre-test to 34.99% in the
Post-test); there was a decline of 14.92% in the students who scored at the Mid-level (an decrease from
54.89% in the Pre-test to 39.97% in the Post-test); however, there was a favorable higher difference
of 4.97% in the students who scored at the High-level (from 20.07% in the Pre-test to 25.04% in the
Post-test).
In the aggregated Noncognitive factor, 49.92% of the students who had used the AI-ALS from
Vendor 1 were at the so-called Low-level (a higher difference of 23.92% as compared to the combined
average of 26% of the students who were at the Low-level), 30.02% were at the Mid-level (a lower
difference of 12.98% as compared to the combined average of 43% of students who were at the
Mid-level), and 20.07% were at the High-level (a lower difference of 10.93% when compared to the
combined average of 31% of student who were at the High-level).
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Real Numbers, 44.94% of the students scored
at the Low-level (a higher difference of 16.94% as compared to the combined average of 28% of the
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students who scored at the Low-level), 34.99% of the students scored at the Mid-level (a lower difference
of 10.01% as compared to the combined average of 45% of the students who scored at the Mid-level,
and 20.07% of the students scored at the High-level (a lower difference of 6.93% compared to the
combined average of 27% of the students who scored at the High-level.
In the topic of Linear Inequalities, 34.99% of the students scored at the Low-level (a higher
difference of 1.99% compared to the combined average of 33% of the students who scored at the
Low-level), 39.97% of the students scored at the Mid-level (a higher difference of 4.97% when compared
to the combined average of 35% of the students who scored at the Mid-level), and 25.04% of the
students scored at the High-level (a lower difference of 6.96% as compared to the combined average of
32% of the students who scored at the High-level.
In the topic of Polynomials and Factoring, 49.92% of the students scored at the Low-level (a higher
difference of 35.92% when compared to the combined average of 14% of the students who scored at the
Low-level), 34.99% scored at the Mid-level (a lower difference of 12.01% as compared to the combined
average of 47% of the students who scored at the Mid-level), and 15.09% scored at the High-level
(a lower difference of 23.91% when compared to the combined average of 39% of the students who
scored at the High-level).
In the topic of Linear Equations, 49.92% scored at the Low-level (a higher difference of 8.92%
when compared to the combined average of 41% of the students who scored at the Low-level), 34.99%
scored at the Mid-level (a lower difference of 7.01% when compared to the combined average of 42% of
the students who scored at the Mid-level), and 15.09% scored at the High-level (a lower difference of
1.91% when compared to the combined average of 17% scored at the High-level).
In the topic of Functions and Lines, 10.12% scored at the Low-level (a lower difference of 7.88%
compared to the combined average of 18% of the students who scored at the Low-level), 34.99% scored
at the Mid-level (a lower difference of 6.01% as compared to the combined average of 41% of the
students who scored at the Mid-level), and 54.89% who scored at the High-level (a higher difference of
13.89% as compared to the combined average of 41% of the students who scored at the High-level).
In the topic of Exponents and Exponential Functions, 20.07% scored at the Low-level (a higher
difference of 16.93% when compared to the combined average of 37% of the students who scored at the
Low-level), 39.97% scored at the Mid-level (a lower difference of 7.03% as compared to the combined
average of 47% of the students who scored at the Mid-level), and 39.97% scored at the High-level
(a higher difference of 23.97% when compared to the combined average of 16% of the students who
scored at the High-level).
In the topic of Arithmetic Readiness, 15.09% scored at the Low-level (a higher difference of 3.09%
compared to the combined average of 12% of the students who scored at the Low-level), 34.99% scored
at the Mid-level (a lower difference of 20.01% compared to the combined average of 55% of the students
who scored at the Mid-level), and 49.92% scored at the High-level (a higher difference of 16.92% s
compared to the combined average of 33% scored at the High-level).
Regarding the topic of Quadratic Functions and Equations, 39.97% of the students scored at the
Low-level (a higher difference of 16.97% as compared to the combined average of 23% of the students
who scored at the Low-level), 25.04% scored at the Mid-level (a lower difference of 15.96% compared
to the combined average of 41% scored at the Mid-level), and 34.99% scored at the High-level (a lower
difference of 1.01% when compared to the combined average of 36% of the students who scored at the
High-level).
Within the AI-ALS by Vendor 1, in the average number of hours spent by each student, 30.02% of
the students were at the Low-level (a higher difference of 6.02% compared to the combined average of
24% of the students were at the Low-level), 25.04% were at the Mid-level (a lower difference of 8.96%
as compared to the combined average of 34% of the students who were at the Mid-level), and 44.94%
were at the High-level (a higher difference of 2.94% when compared to the combined average of 42%
who were at the High-level).
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In the percentage of the total number of topics that were mastered by the students in the AI-ALS by
Vendor 1, 30.02% of the students were at the Low-level (a slightly lower difference of 0.98% compared
to the combined average of 31% of the students who were at the Low-level), 44.94% were at the
Mid-level (a higher difference of 4.94% compared to the combined average of 40% who were at the
Mid-level), and 25.04% were at the High-level (a lower difference of 3.96% when compared to the
combined average of 29% who were at the High-level).
Visualization of the Performance of the Students Who had Used Vendor 2′s AI-ALS:
Using the file “data_ai_als_class_2.csv” via the Data Association tool in Bayesialab, the following
score-clusters machine-learned by Bayesialab were observed from the dataset depicting the
performances of the 20 students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 2 (see Figure 8):
Figure 8. BN model of the students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 2 (N = 20 students).
Visualization of the Performance of the Students Who Had Used Vendor 3′s AI-ALS:
Using the file “data_ai_als_class_3.csv” via the Data Association tool in Bayesialab, the following
score-clusters machine-learned by Bayesialab were observed from the dataset depicting the
performances of the 20 students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, (see Figure 9):
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Figure 9. BN model of the students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 3 (N = 20 students).
Visualization of the Performance of the Students Who Had Used Vendor 4′s AI-ALS:
Using the file “data_ai_als_class_4.csv” via the Data Association tool in Bayesialab, the following
score-clusters machine-learned by Bayesialab were observed from the dataset depicting the
performances of the 20 students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 4, (see Figure 10):
Figure 10. BN model of the students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 4 (N = 20 students).
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Visualization of the Performance of the Students Who had Used Vendor 5′s AI-ALS:
Using the file “data_ai_als_class_5.csv” via the Data Association tool in Bayesialab, the following
score-clusters machine-learned by Bayesialab were observed from the dataset depicting the
performances of the 20 students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 5 (see Figure 11):
Figure 11. BN model of the students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 5 (N = 20 students).
4.7.4. Sensitivity Analysis of the Mathematics Topics that Contribute to the Performance of the
Students who had Used the Five Dissimilar AI-ALS from the Five Vendors
Posterior Probability of the Post-test can be performed on the data from each school, while using
tornado diagrams (see Figure 12). Sensitivity analysis can be activated in Bayesialab via these steps:
Bayesialab (validation mode) > Analysis > Visual > Sensitivity > Tornado diagrams on Total Effects.
Each blue tornado chart of the total effects presents the performance (in the learning progress)
of the students in each mathematics topic within the AI-ALS, in terms of the posterior probability
of achieving high-level scores in the paper-based post-test. This implies that, in the AI-ALS proved
by each vendor, the problem-solving practice that the students had in certain mathematics topics
might have contributed to the high scores that were achieved by the students in the paper-based
post-test. The longer blue bars represent higher sensitivity, in terms of how changes in the score of
each mathematics topic (that is, their learning progress within each AI-ALS) could potentially affect
the outcome in the paper-based post-test. Further coordination between the education stakeholders
and the vendor of each respective AI-ALS should be carried out to understand how the teachers can
focus on providing the students remediation of the more sensitive mathematics topics (represented
with longer blue bars), as they seem to be important in affecting the performance of their students who
could score high marks in the paper-based post-test.
Each red tornado chart of the total effects presents the performance of the students in each
mathematics topic within the AI-ALS, in terms of the posterior probability of achieving low-level scores
in the paper-based post-test. This implies that, in the AI-ALS proved by the vendor, the problem-solving
practice that the students had in the mathematics topics might have contributed to the high scores that
were achieved by the students in the paper-based post-test. The longer red bars represent higher sensitivity,
in terms of how changes in the score of each mathematics topic (that is, their learning progress within
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each AI-ALS) could potentially affect the outcome in the paper-based post-test. Further coordination
via discussions between the education stakeholders and each respective vendor of the AI-ALS should
be carried out to understand how the teachers can focus on providing the students remediation of the
more sensitive mathematics topics (represented with longer red bars), as they seem to be affecting the
performance of their students who could only score low marks in the paper-based post-test.
Figure 12. Visualizations of the sensitivity analysis data of the five groups of students in their respective
AI-ALS, regarding how their learning progress of the mathematics topics within each AI-ALS could
potentially affect their outcomes in the paper-based post-test.
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4.7.5. Descriptive Analytics: Oversight Using Curves Analysis of the AI-ALS from the Five Vendors
Another way to visualize the influence of the students’ mastery of the various mathematics topics
on their paper-based post-test can be accomplished by using this tool in Baysialab via these steps on
the menubar: Bayesialab (validation mode) > Analysis > Visual > Target > Target’s Posterior > Curves
> Total Effects.
As observed in Figure 13, the plots of the data reveal that the relationships between the total
effects and the various factors on the target node (that is, the paper-based post-test) could be linear
or curvilinear. The curvilinear lines suggest that there might be “peaks” or “valleys” in some of
the relationships between the input variables (e.g., the number of hours spent using the AI-ALS,
or the quality of the noncognitive factors, or the scores achieved by the students within each AI-ALS,
or the percentage of mathematics topics mastered within the AI-ALS) and their respective educational
outcomes in the paper-based post-test. With these curves analysis charts, further discussions could
be initiated amongst the policy makers, technology vendors, teachers, parents, and students to help
improve the learning experiences of the students.
Figure 13. Target Mean Analysis of five different groups of students, each of which had used an AI-ALS
from a different vendor.
4.7.6. Descriptive Analytics: Pearson Correlation Analysis
Descriptive analytics can also be performed using the Pearson correlation analysis tool in
Bayesialab. It can be used for the corroboration of the relationship analyses between the students’
learning performances in the AI-ALS and their corresponding performances in the paper-based
post-test. The visualizations of the Pearson correlations can be presented, so that it is easier to see the
positive correlations highlighted in blue, and the negative correlations faded out in red (see Figure 14).
This tool can be activated in Bayesialab via these steps on the menubar: Analysis > Visual > Overall >
Arc > Pearson Correlation.
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One suggestion for interpretation of the negative Pearson correlations could be that the red lines
and nodes might represent the regions where the weaknesses of the students were “surfaced” or
educed (drawn out) by the AI-ALS. It might not necessarily be an undesirable situation, provided
that the teacher could provide remediation to the students so that the gaps that the AI-ALS could not
bridge for the students (e.g., if the AI-ALS could not read the students’ workings to pin-point where
the mathematical calculation mistakes were for the students) were addressed.
Figure 14. Pearson correlations between the students’ learning progress of the mathematics topics
within the AI-ALS and their corresponding performances in the paper-based post-test.
4.7.7. Descriptive Analytics: Oversight of the Gains in the Different Groups of Students
No gain in performance (scores in the post-test vis-à-vis the pre-test) was observed for the students
who had used AI-ALS from Vendor 2, and negative gain (the scores in the post-test were lower
than those in the pre-test) was observed for the students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 3,
as observed in Table 1 and Figure 15. However, it might not be the fault of the AI-ALS that those
students underperformed. Further qualitative interviews with the students might reveal the possible
reasons for these preliminary observations.
Table 1. Comparisons between scores within the five AI-ALS and the paper-based post-tests.
AI-ALS Vendor
AI-ALS Low-Level
Score (% of Students)
AI-ALS High-Level
Score (% of Students)
Post-Pre Test High-Level Score
Gain (% of Students)
1 35.00 30.10 4.97
2 50.10 29.89 0.00
3 25.04 44.24 −9.95
4 35.06 30.05 14.92
5 29.63 45.32 14.93
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Figure 15. Histograms depicting the performance of each class of students: the low-level scores within
each AI-ALS are presented in red; the high-level scores within each AI-ALS are presented in blue; their
corresponding high-level score gains in the paper-based post-test are represented in gray.
There seemed to be no clear pattern of correlation between the difficulty of scoring high-level
scores or low-level scores within each AI-ALS and the gains in the high-level scores in the paper-based
post-test, contrary to what was initially hypothesized by the researcher in Section 2.2. In other words,
making it easy (or even difficult) for the students to score at the high-level might not necessarily result
in corresponding high-level gains in the paper-based post-test, probably because of the uniqueness of
each AI-ALS and each class of students.
However, although direct comparisons between the five AI-ALS might seem challenging, it would
still be possible to predict how the performance of each group of students within their respective
AI-ALS could be optimized to achieve high scores in the paper-based post-test. To demonstrate that,
“what-if?” predictive analytics would be utilized in the subsequent section.
5. “What-If?” Predictive Analytics
In this section, the following predictive analytics reports will be presented unabridged, in order to
delineate how human-centric reasoning could be applied to interpret the counterfactual results that
were generated by the AI-based BN model. For better readability, the first letter of the names of the BN
nodes and entities would be presented in the upper case.
5.1. Simulation of Hypothetical Scenario for Students Who had Used the AI-ALS from Vendor 1
This section presents a sample performance prediction report that could be shared with the
educational stakeholders in School 1, so that they could consider having further discussions with their
AI-ALS provider to fine-tune the system, e.g., by adjusting the level of difficulty of the questions that
are being offered to their students to better correspond to their learning capabilities.
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Hypothetical question: what are the conditions needed in the AI-ALS from Vendor 1 and in the
noncognitive parameter if we wish that 100% of the students could score at the High-level in the
paper-based Post-test?
To predict the conditions that would enable 100% of the students in Class 1, who had used
Vendor 1′s AI-ALS to score at the High-level in the paper-based Post-test, hard evidence was set on it
(by double-clicking on the High-level histogram bar in Bayesialab). The following counterfactually
simulated results of score-clusters were observed (see Figure 16):
Figure 16. Simulation of counterfactual results for 100% of the students who had used Vendor 1′s
AI-ALS to score at the high-level in the post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the aggregated Noncognitive factor, ideally 47.13% of the
students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 1 should be at the so-called Low-level (a lower
difference of 2.79% when compared to the original 49.92% of the students who were at the Low-level);
32.63% should be at the Mid-level (a higher difference of 2.61% compared to the original 30.02% of
students who were at the Mid-level); and 20.64% should be at the High-level (an almost negligible
higher difference of 0.57% as compared to the original 20.07% of students who were at the High-level).
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Real Numbers, ideally 44.15% of the students
should score at the Low-level (a slightly lower difference of 0.79% compared to the original 44.94%
of the students who scored at the Low-level), 35.47% of the students should score at the Mid-level
(a slightly higher difference of 0.48% as compared to the original 34.99% of the students who scored at
the Mid-level), and 20.37% of the students should score at the High-level (a slightly higher difference of
0.3% when compared to the original 20.07% of the students who scored at the High-level. The simulated
results for the topic of Real Numbers suggest that Vendor 1′s AI-ALS was already performing close
to optimum in terms of contributing the students scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
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Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Linear Inequalities, ideally 36.35% of the students
should score at the Low-level (a higher difference of 1.36% as compared to the original 34.99% of the
students who scored at the Low-level); 40.45% of the students should score at the Mid-level (an almost
negligible higher difference of 0.48% when compared to the original 39.97% of the students who
scored at the Mid-level); and, 23.20% of the students should score at the High-level (a slightly lower
difference of 1.84% as compared to the original 25.04% of the students who scored at the High-level.
The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor 1′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly more difficult for
students to score at the High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level
for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Polynomials and Factoring, ideally 18.08% of the
students should score at the Low-level (a substantially lower difference of 16.91% as compared to the
original 49.92% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 44.43% should score at the Mid-level
(a higher difference of 9.44% when compared to the original 34.99% of the students who scored at the
Mid-level); and, 37.49% should score at the High-level (a substantially higher difference of 22.40% as
compared to the original 15.09% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results
suggest that, if Vendor 1′s AI-ALS could ideally make it easier for students in Class 1 to score at the
High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Linear Equations, ideally 45.11% of the students
should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 4.81% when compared to the original 49.92% of the
students who scored at the Low-level); 39.64% should score at the Mid-level (a lower difference of
4.65% when compared to the original 34.99% of the students who scored at the Mid-level); and, 15.25%
should score at the High-level (an almost negligible higher difference of 0.16% when compared to
the original 15.09% that scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor 1′s
AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly easier for students in Class 1 to score at the High-level, it might
contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Functions and Lines, ideally 10.27% of the
students should score at the Low-level (an almost negligible higher difference of 0.15% as compared to
the original 10.12% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 33.18% should score at the Mid-level
(a lower difference of 1.81% when compared to the original 34.99% of the students who scored at
the Mid-level); and, 56.55% should score at the High-level (a higher difference of 1.66% compared
to the original 54.89% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest
that, if Vendor 1′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly easier for students in Class 1 to score at the
High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Exponents and Exponential Functions, ideally
18.08% should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 1.99% as compared to the original 20.07% of
the students who scored at the Low-level); 44.75% should score at the Mid-level (a higher difference of
4.78% when compared to the original 39.97% of the students who scored at the Mid-level); and, 37.17%
should score at the High-level (a lower difference of 2.8% compared to the original 39.97% of the
students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor 1′s AI-ALS could
ideally make it slightly more difficult for students to score at the High-level, it might contribute to their
probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Arithmetic Readiness, ideally 16.26% should
score at the Low-level (a slightly higher difference of 1.17% as compared to the original 15.09% of the
students who scored at the Low-level); 37.61% should score at the Mid-level (a higher difference of
2.62% when compared to the original 34.99% of the students who scored at the Mid-level); and, 46.12%
should score at the High-level (a lower difference of 3.8% compared to the original 49.92% scored at
the High-level). The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor 1′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly
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more difficult for students to score at the High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring
at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the topic of Quadratic Functions and Equations, ideally
37.15% of the students should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 2.82% as compared to the
original 39.97% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 24.35% should score at the Mid-level
(an almost negligible lower difference of 0.69% when compared to the original 25.04% who scored at
the Mid-level); and, 38.50% should score at the High-level (a higher difference of 3.51% as compared
to the original 34.99% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest
that if Vendor 1′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly easier for students in Class 1 to score at the
High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS by Vendor 1, in the average number of hours spent by each student, ideally
26.03% of the students should be at the Low-level (a lower difference of 3.99% as compared to the
original 30.02% of the students who were at the Low-level); 28.54% should be at the Mid-level (a higher
difference of 3.5% when compared to the original 25.04% of the students who were at the Mid-level);
and 45.43% should be at the High-level (an almost negligible higher difference of 0.49% as compared
to the original 44.94% who were at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that more time
spent using the AI-ALS might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 1, in the percentage of the total number of topics that were
mastered by the students in the AI-ALS by Vendor 1, ideally 28.05% of the students should be at the
Low-level (a slightly lower difference of 1.97% as compared to the original 30.02% of the students who
were at the Low-level); 48.74% should be at the Mid-level (a higher difference of 3.8% compared to the
original 44.94% who were at the Mid-level); and, 23.21% should be at the High-level (a lower difference
of 1.83% when compared to the original 25.04% who were at the High-level). The simulated results
suggest that Vendor 1′s AI-ALS was effective in providing adaptive learning to the students and was
contributing well to their probability of scoring high marks in the paper-based Post-test.
5.2. Simulation of Hypothetical Scenario for Students Who had Used the AI-ALS from Vendor 2
This section presents a sample performance prediction report that could be shared with the
educational stakeholders in School 2, so that they could consider having further discussions with their
AI-ALS provider to fine-tune the system, e.g., by adjusting the level of difficulty of the questions that
are being offered to their students to better correspond to their learning capabilities.
Hypothetical question: what are the conditions needed in the AI-ALS from Vendor 2 and in the
noncognitive parameter if we wish that 100% of the students could score at the High-level in the
paper-based Post-test?
To predict the conditions that would enable 100% of the students in Class 2 who had used
Vendor 2′s AI-ALS to score at the High-level in the paper-based Post-test, hard evidence was set on it
(by double-clicking on the High-level histogram bar in Bayesialab). The following counterfactually
simulated results of the score-clusters were observed (see Figure 17):
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Figure 17. Simulation of counterfactual results for 100% of the students who had used Vendor 2′s
AI-ALS to score at the high-level in the post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the aggregated Noncognitive factor, ideally 19.33% of the
students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 2 should be at the so-called Low-level (an almost
negligible lower difference of 0.74% as compared to the original 20.07% of the students who were at
the Low-level); 49.21% should be at the Mid-level (a higher difference of 5.68% when compared to
the original 54.89% of students who were at the Mid-level); and, 31.45% should be at the High-level
(a higher difference of 6.41% as compared to the original 25.04% of students who were at the High-level).
The counterfactual results suggest that, if the mid-level and high-level of noncognitive attributes
(e.g., emotional intelligence to manage stress, interest in learning mathematics, motivation, level of
engagement, etc.) could be increased, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level
in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the topic of Real Numbers, ideally 15.34% of the students
should score at the Low-level (a slightly lower difference of 4.73% as compared to the original 20.07%
of the students who scored at the Low-level); 42.13% of the students should score at the Mid-level
(a slightly higher difference of 2.16% when compared to the original 39.97% of the students who
scored at the Mid-level); and, 42.53% of the students should score at the High-level (a slightly higher
difference of 2.56% as compared to the original 39.97% of the students who scored at the High-level.
The simulated counterfactual results for the topic of Real Numbers suggest that, if Vendor 2′s AI-ALS
could ideally make it slightly easier for students in Class 2 to score at the High-level, it might contribute
to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the topic of Linear Inequalities, ideally 50.03% of the students
should score at the Low-level (an almost negligible higher difference of 0.11% as compared to the
original 49.92% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 22.78% of the students should score
at the Mid-level (a slightly lower difference of 2.26% when compared to the original 25.04% of the
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students who scored at the Mid-level); and, 27.19% of the students should score at the High-level
(a slightly higher difference of 2.15% as compared to the original 25.04% of the students who scored at
the High-level. The simulated counterfactual results for the topic suggest that, if Vendor 2′s AI-ALS
could ideally make it slightly easier for students in Class 2 to score at the High-level, it might contribute
to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the topic of Polynomials and Factoring, ideally 16.02% of the
students should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 5.90% as compared to the original 10.12%
of the students who scored at the Low-level); 45.19% should score at the Mid-level (a substantially
lower difference of 9.70% when compared to the original 54.89% of the students who scored at the
Mid-level); and, 38.79% should score at the High-level (a slightly higher difference of 3.80% compared
to the original 34.99% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest
that, if Vendor 2′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly easier for students in Class 2 to score at the
High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the topic of Linear Equations, ideally 49.21% of the students
should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 5.68% when compared to the original 54.89% of the
students who scored at the Low-level); 23.00% should score at the Mid-level (a lower difference of
2.04% when compared to the original 25.04% of the students who scored at the Mid-level); and 27.78%
should score at the High-level (a higher difference of 7.71% when compared to the original 20.07%
who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor 2′s AI-ALS could ideally
make it slightly easier for students in Class 2 to score at the High-level, it might contribute to their
probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the topic of Functions and Lines, ideally 19.33% of the
students should score at the Low-level (an almost negligible lower difference of 0.74% as compared to
the original 20.07% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 46.55% should score at the Mid-level
(a higher difference of 6.58% when compared to the original 39.97% of the students who scored at
the Mid-level); and, 34.12% should score at the High-level (a lower difference of 5.85% compared
to the original 39.97% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest
that if Vendor 2′s AI-ALS could ideally make it more difficult for students in Class 2 to score at the
High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the topic of Exponents and Exponential Functions, ideally
46.62% should score at the Low-level (a slightly higher difference of 1.68% when compared to the
original 44.94% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 45.28% should score at the Mid-level
(a lower difference of 4.64% as compared to the original 49.92% of the students who scored at the
Mid-level); and, 8.10% should score at the High-level (a lower difference of 2.96% compared to the
original 5.14% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that,
if Vendor 2′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly easier for students to score at the High-level, it might
contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the topic of Arithmetic Readiness, ideally 0.17% should
score at the Low-level (a difference of 0.00% as compared to the original 0.17% of the students who
scored at the Low-level); 84.81% should score at the Mid-level (a higher difference of 5.04% compared
to the original 79.77% of the students who scored at the Mid-level); and, 15.01% should score at the
High-level (a lower difference of 5.06% compared to the original 20.07% who scored at the High-level).
The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor 2′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly more difficult for
students to score at the High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level
for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the topic of Quadratic Functions and Equations, ideally
26.77% of the students should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 3.25% when compared to
the original 30.02% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 26.35% should score at the Mid-level
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(a lower difference of 3.67% as compared to the original 30.02% who scored at the Mid-level); and,
46.88% should score at the High-level (a higher difference of 6.91% when compared to the original
39.97% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor
2′s AI-ALS could ideally make it easier for students in Class 2 to score at the High-level, it might
contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS by Vendor 2, in the average number of hours spent by each student, ideally
23.10% of the students should be at the Low-level (a lower difference of 1.94% as compared to the
original 25.04% of the students who were at the Low-level); 22.94% should be at the Mid-level (a slightly
lower difference of 2.10% when compared to the original 25.04% of the students who were at the
Mid-level), and, 53.96% should be at the High-level (a slightly higher difference of 4.04% as compared
to the original 49.92% who were at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that if the students
could spend more time learning mathematics within Vendor 2’s AI-ALS, it could contribute to their
probability of scoring at the High-level in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 2, in the percentage of the total number of topics that were
mastered by the students, ideally 22.35% of the students should be at the Low-level (a slightly higher
difference of 7.67% as compared to the original 30.02% of the students who were at the Low-level);
34.86% should be at the Mid-level (an almost negligible lower difference of 0.13% compared to the
original 34.99% who were at the Mid-level); and, 42.79% should be at the High-level (a higher difference
of 7.8% compared to the original 34.99% who were at the High-level). The simulated results suggest
that if the students could master a higher percentage of topics within Vendor 2′s AI-ALS, it could
contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level in the paper-based Post-test.
5.3. Simulation of Hypothetical Scenario for Students Who had Used the AI-ALS from Vendor 3
This section presents a sample performance prediction report that could be shared with the
educational stakeholders in School 3, so that they could consider having further discussions with their
AI-ALS provider to fine-tune the system, e.g., by adjusting the level of difficulty of the questions that
are being offered to their students to better correspond to their learning capabilities.
Hypothetical question: what are the conditions that are needed in the AI-ALS from Vendor 3 and
in the noncognitive parameter if we wish that 100% of the students could score at the High-level in the
paper-based Post-test?
Here is an opportunity that the following analysis can be used as a starting point for discussions
to foster strategic coordination between the educational stakeholders and Vendor 3 which provided
the AI-ALS. As previously observed in Table 1 and Figure 15, there was a decrease in the number of
students who scored at the High-level of the marks in the paper-based post-test. Realistically, since the
algorithm with which the AI-ALS from Vendor 3 interacts with the students cannot be changed much,
if at all, the mathematics teacher would have to provide remediation for the students. The AI-ALS from
Vendor 3 might not be a good choice in the selection for in-service deployment from the perspective
of the policy makers and educational stakeholders, as it might be realistically impractical to ask
Vendor 3 to change their proprietary algorithm to suit the students of Class 3. However, the simulated
counterfactual results (see Figure 18) could still be used as a guide for remediation by the teacher to
“level-up” the students in the mathematics topics that they might be weaker in.
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Figure 18. Simulation of counterfactual results for 100% of the students who had used Vendor 3′s
AI-ALS to score at the high-level in the post-test.
To predict the conditions that would enable 100% of the students in Class 3 who had used
Vendor 3′s AI-ALS to score at the High-level in the paper-based Post-test, hard evidence was set on it
(by double-clicking on the High-level histogram bar in Bayesialab). The following counterfactually
simulated results of score-clusters were observed (see Figure 18):
In the aggregated Noncognitive factor, ideally 33.01% of the students who had used the AI-ALS
from Vendor 3 should be at the so-called Low-level (a slightly higher difference of 2.99% compared
to the original 30.02% of the students who were at the Low-level); 14.76% should be at the Mid-level
(a substantially lower difference of 15.26% as compared to the original 30.02% of students who were at
the Mid-level); and, 50.23% should be at the High-level (a substantially higher difference of 10.26% as
compared to the original 39.97% of students who were at the High-level). The results suggest that
noncognitive factors of the students such as motivation, interest, attitude towards mathematics, etc.
might need to be improved.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, in the topic of Real Numbers, ideally 46.44% of the students
should score at the Low-level (a substantially higher difference of 16.42% when compared to the
original 30.02% of the students who scored at the Low-level), 25.29% of the students should score at the
Mid-level (a substantially lower difference of 14.68% as compared to the original 39.97% of the students
who scored at the Mid-level), and 28.27% of the students should score at the High-level (a slightly
lower difference of 1.75% when compared to the original 30.02% of the students who scored at the
High-level. The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor 3′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly
more difficult for students to score at the High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring
at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, in the topic of Linear Inequalities, ideally 18.66% of the students
should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 6.38% when compared to the original 25.04%
of the students who scored at the Low-level); 57.98% of the students should score at the Mid-level
(a higher difference of 8.06% as compared to the original 49.92% of the students who scored at the
Mid-level); and, 23.36% of the students should score at the High-level (a slightly lower difference of
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9.74% as compared to the original 25.04% of the students who scored at the High-level. The simulated
results suggest that, ideally, if Vendor 3′s AI-ALS could make it slightly more difficult for students
to score at the High-level, but yet, not so difficult that students find it too challenging to score at the
Mid-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, in the topic of Polynomials and Factoring, ideally 5.07% of the
students should score at the Low-level (an almost negligible lower difference of 0.07% when compared
to the original 5.14% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 37.45% should score at the Mid-level
(an almost negligible lower difference of 0.04% as compared to the original 39.97% of the students who
scored at the Mid-level); and, 57.48% should score at the High-level (a slightly higher difference of 2.59%
when compared to the original 54.89% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated
results suggest that Vendor 3′s AI-ALS might already be close to optimally adapting to the students in
Class 3 in training them to score at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, in the topic of Linear Equations, ideally 51.35% of the students
should score at the Low-level (a substantially higher difference of 16.36% when compared to the
original 34.99% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 43.39% should score at the Mid-level
(a substantially lower difference of 11.5% when compared to the original 54.89% of the students who
scored at the Mid-level); and, 5.26% should score at the High-level (a lower difference of 4.86% when
compared to the original 10.12% scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that, if Vendor
3′s AI-ALS could ideally make it much more difficult for students to score at the High-level and at
the Mid-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, in the topic of Functions and Lines, ideally 5.07% of the students
should score at the Low-level (an almost negligible lower difference of 0.07% when compared to the
original 5.14% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 29.82% should score at the Mid-level
(a lower difference of 5.17% as compared to the original 34.99% of the students who scored at the
Mid-level); and, 65.11% should score at the High-level (a higher difference of 5.24% compared to
the original 59.87% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest
that if Vendor 3′s AI-ALS could ideally make it slightly easier for students in Class 3 to score at the
High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, in the topic of Exponents and Exponential Functions, ideally
51.95% should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 2.03% as compared to the original 49.92% of
the students who scored at the Low-level); 42.98% should score at the Mid-level (a lower difference of
6.94% when compared to the original 49.92% of the students who scored at the Mid-level); and, 5.07%
should score at the High-level (an almost negligible lower difference of 0.07% when compared to the
original 5.14% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that Vendor
3′s AI-ALS might already be close to optimally adapting to the students in Class 3 in training them to
score at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, in the topic of Arithmetic Readiness, ideally 23.17% should
score at the Low-level (a slightly higher difference of 3.1% as compared to the original 20.07% of the
students who scored at the Low-level); 51.80% should score at the Mid-level (a higher difference of
6.86% when compared to the original 44.94% of the students who scored at the Mid-level); and, 25.04%
should score at the High-level (a lower difference of 9.95% as compared to the original 34.99% scored
at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that if Vendor 3′s AI-ALS could ideally make it much
more difficult for students to score at the High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring
at the High-level for this topic in the paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS from Vendor 3, in the topic of Quadratic Functions and Equations, ideally
0.35% of the students should score at the Low-level (a lower difference of 4.79% as compared to the
original 5.14% of the students who scored at the Low-level); 35.76% should score at the Mid-level
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(a substantially lower difference of 14.16% when compared to the original 49.92% who scored at the
Mid-level); and, 63.89% should score at the High-level (a substantially higher difference of 18.95% as
compared to the original 44.94% of the students who scored at the High-level). The simulated results
suggest that if Vendor 3′s AI-ALS could ideally make it much easier for students in Class 3 to score at
the High-level, it might contribute to their probability of scoring at the High-level for this topic in the
paper-based Post-test.
Within the AI-ALS by Vendor 3, in the average number of hours were spent by each student,
14.22% of the students should be at the Low-level (an almost negligible lower difference of 0.87%
compared to the original 15.09% of the students who were at the Low-level), 51.52% should be at the
Mid-level (a substantially higher difference of 11.55% as compared to the original 39.97% of the students
who were at the Mid-level), and 34.26% should be at the High-level (a substantially lower difference of
10.68% compared to the original 44.94% who were at the High-level). The simulated results suggest
that if students spend less time within Vendor 3′s AI-ALS, it could contribute to their probability of
scoring at the High-level in the paper-based Post-test. Perhaps, one way of interpreting this could be:
spending less time within the Vendor 3’s AI-ALS could help prevent diminishing marginal returns,
as the students would not have to suffer from undue fatigue or stress.
In the percentage of the total number of topics that were mastered by the students in the AI-ALS
by Vendor 3, ideally 43.48% of the students should be at the Low-level (a slightly lower difference of
3.51% as compared to the original 39.97% of the students who were at the Low-level); 23.14% should be
at the Mid-level (a slightly higher difference of 3.07% when compared to the original 20.07% who were
at the Mid-level); and 33.38% should be at the High-level (a lower difference of 6.59% as compared to
the original 39.97% who were at the High-level). The simulated results suggest that mastering the
topics at a slower pace within Vendor 3′s AI-ALS could contribute to their probability of scoring at the
High-level in the paper-based Post-test. At first glance, this might seem counterintuitive. However,
one way of interpreting this might be: a slower pace of mastering the mathematics topics could be
more beneficial, as it could potentially contribute to a deeper level of understanding of the subject
matter by the students.
5.4. Simulation of Hypothetical Scenario for Students Who had Used the AI-ALS from Vendor 4
This section presents a sample performance prediction report that could be shared with the
educational stakeholders in School 4, so that they could consider having further discussions with their
AI-ALS provider to fine-tune the system, e.g., by adjusting the level of difficulty of the questions that
are being offered to their students to better correspond to their learning capabilities.
Hypothetical question: what are the conditions needed in the AI-ALS from Vendor 4 and in the
noncognitive parameter if we wish that 100% of the students could score at the High-level in the
paper-based Post-test?
The following simulated counterfactual results for the conditions that would optimize the
performance of students who had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 4 (see Figure 19) and Vendor 5
(see Figure 20) would only be presented in summarized graphical form due to space constraints for
publication, since they also had positive gains in the High-level marks in the Post-test (as presented
earlier in Table 1 and Figure 15), and they could be considered to be similar to the case in which the
students had used the AI-ALS from Vendor 1 (see Section 5.1).
Overall, within the AI-ALS from Vendor 4, the simulated counterfactual results suggest that,
in order to train them in score at the High-level in the paper-based Post-test, the finer details of
the predictions that recommend whether it should be made easier or more difficult in the various
mathematics topics could be perused in Figure 19.
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Figure 19. Simulation of counterfactual results for 100% of the students who had used Vendor 4′s
AI-ALS to score at the high-level in the post-test. Grey arrows recommended whether there should be
an increase (pointing to the right), or a decrease (pointing to the left) in each respective mathematics
topic’s score-clusters for Low-, Mid-, and High-level.
5.5. Simulation of Hypothetical Scenario for Students Who had Used the AI-ALS from Vendor 5
This section presents a sample performance prediction report that could be shared with the
educational stakeholders in School 5, so that they could consider having further discussions with their
AI-ALS provider to fine-tune the system, e.g., by adjusting the level of difficulty of the questions that
are being offered to their students to better correspond to their learning capabilities.
Hypothetical question: what are the conditions that are needed in the AI-ALS from Vendor 5 and
in the noncognitive parameter if we wish that 100% of the students could score at the High-level in
the Post-test?
Overall, within the AI-ALS from Vendor 5, the simulated counterfactual results suggest that,
in order to train them in score at the High-level in the paper-based Post-test, the finer details of
the predictions that recommend whether it should be made easier or more difficult for the various
mathematics topics could be perused in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. Simulation of counterfactual results for 100% of the students who had used Vendor 5′s
AI-ALS to score at the high-level in the post-test. Grey arrows recommended whether there should be
an increase (pointing to the right), or a decrease (pointing to the left) in each respective mathematics
topic’s score-clusters for Low-, Mid-, and High-level.
6. Evaluation of the Predictive Performance of the Bayesian Network Model
The predictive performance of a model could be evaluated by using measurement tools, such as
the gains curve (see Figure 21), the lift curve (see Figure 22), and via cross-validation by bootstrapping
to 100,000 samples (see Figure 23).
6.1. Gains Curve
In the Gains curve (see Figure 21), there were around 21% of participants with the target value >6
for the Post-test (yellow line intercepting with the % total axis). The blue diagonal line represented the
gains curve of a pure random policy, which refers to prediction without this predictive model. The red
lines represented the gains curve while using this predictive model, which was observed to be above
the blue diagonal line. The Gini index of 12.73% and relative Gini index of 16.32% suggested that the
gains of using this predictive model vis-à-vis not using it was acceptable.
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Figure 21. Gains curve.
6.2. Lift Curve
The lift curve (see Figure 22) was built upon the results from the gains curve (see Figure 21).
The value of the best lift around 21% was interpreted as the ratio between 100% and 2.07% (optimal
policy divided by random policy). The lift decreased when more than 2.07% of the participants were
considered and was close to 1 when all the participants were considered. The lift index of 1.1257 and
relative lift index of 45.09% suggested that the performance of this predictive model was acceptable.
Figure 22. Lift curve.
6.3. Target Evaluation Cross-Validation by Statistical Bootstrapping of the Data 100,000 Times in Every Node
The purpose of this section is not to laud the effectiveness of the BN model that was used in
the exemplars thus far, but to illustrate how the evaluation of the model can be done in Bayesialab.
Therefore, the results will be honestly reported, regardless of whether it is good or bad. Bootstrapping to
100,000 times in every node would ensure that it is statistically sufficiently large enough for generating
a parametric data distribution. As observed in the results that were generated by Bayesialab after
performing bootstrapping 100,000 times on the data distribution of each node in the BN by using
the Naïve Bayes algorithm, the Overall Precision was 65.8963%; the Mean Precision was 63.7718%;
the Overall Reliability was 65.7522%; the Mean Reliability was 64.3817%; the Mean Gini Index was
55.1787%; the Mean Relative Gini Index was 69.9366%; the Mean Lift Index was 2.0297; the Mean
Relative Lift Index was 79.6543%; the Mean ROC Index was 84.9939%; the Mean Calibration Index
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was 56.0688%; the Mean Binary Log-Loss was 0.3619; the Correlation Coefficient R was 0.5096;
the Coefficient of Determination R2 was 0.2597; the RMSE was 1.3883; and, the NRSME was 19.8329%.
These results suggested that the predictive performance of the BN model could be considered to
be acceptable.
Figure 23 presents a confusion matrix after bootstrapping the data 100,000 times in every node of
the BN model. The confusion matrix provided additional information regarding the computational
model’s predictive performance. The leftmost column in the matrix contained the predicted values,
while the actual values in the data were presented in the top row. The following three confusion
matrix views would be available by clicking on the corresponding tabs. The Occurrences Matrix
(see Figure 23) would indicate the number of cases for each combination of the predicted versus actual
values. The diagonal shows the number of true positives. The Reliability Matrix (see Figure 24) would
indicate the probability of the reliability of the prediction of a state in each cell. Reliability measures
the overall consistency of a prediction. A prediction could be considered to be highly reliable if the
computational model could produce similar results under consistent conditions. The Precision Matrix
(see Figure 25) would indicate the probability of the precision of the prediction of a state in each cell.
Precision is the measure of the overall accuracy which the computational model can correctly predict.
Figure 23. Occurrences confusion matrix after performing target evaluation cross-validation by
bootstrapping the data in each node 100,000 times.
Figure 24. Reliability confusion matrix after performing target evaluation cross-validation by
bootstrapping the data in each node 100,000 times.
Figure 25. Precision confusion matrix after performing target evaluation cross-validation by
bootstrapping the data in each node 100,000 times.
6.4. Limitations of the Study
The exploratory nature of predictive analytics in this study using BN modeling renders the
simulated counterfactual results suggestive, rather than conclusive. Further, it is only applicable to
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this BN model, which was generated from the current datasets. Therefore, caution must be exercised
when interpreting the potential relationships between the variables (nodes) in the BN model.
The current study only utilized 100 students’ data. However, the Bayesian approach that is
delineated in the current paper could still be used as an alternative approach by educational stakeholders
in small-scale pilot studies to independently explore the pedagogical motifs of any AI-ALS, in order
to coordinate the analyses of datasets procured from the servers different AI-AL, and to strategically
educe (draw out) the problem-solving abilities of the students.
The Bayesian network model that was used in the current study was based on the Naïve Bayes
algorithm, as it is suitable for exploratory studies that do not assume relations between nodes to be
causal in nature. As in any study that involves simulations, the results are dependent on the dataset
that generated the computational model. Moreover, educational stakeholders and researchers should
consider alternative models that could better depict the relations between the variables in the dataset.
Thus far, the tools for descriptive as well as predictive analytics, and the tools in Bayesialab that
could be used for the evaluation of the predictive performance of the BN model have been clearly
depicted. The limitations of the study have also been described. In the next section, the discussion and
concluding remarks will be presented.
7. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Strategic coordination between schools to analyze the AI-ALS that they are using could yield
useful information for educational stakeholders. The current paper has put forth a Bayesian approach
for educational stakeholders to independently explore the underlying pedagogical motifs of five
different AI-ALS. Even in realistic school situations where the number of students in classes might
be low, and even if there is no control group, the Bayesian implementation of Response Surface
Methodology [66–69] could still be used to keep individual parameters constant, whilst others could
be changed to simulate different hypothetical scenarios. Specific examples have been provided to
demonstrate how this AI-based Bayesian approach could be used to analyze the underlying pedagogical
motifs of five AI-ALS that were used in five different schools. Potentially, these hypothetical scenarios
with fully controllable parameters could be used to better inform educational stakeholders about the
suitability of each AI-ALS for broader adoption after the pilot study.
Beyond the conventional observation of gains in the cognitive pre-test vis-à-vis post-test,
this proposed Bayesian approach also generated hypothetical scenarios that might be of interest
for noncognitive researchers to consider in future studies. The implication for education is that the
AI-ALS should not be solely relied upon to improve the students’ learning of mathematics; rather,
the gaps in the learning of mathematical concepts that the AI-ALS could not bridge for the students
should be addressed by their mathematics teachers. For example, if the student had scored low marks
in the AI-ALS, but could surprisingly score high marks in the paper-based post-test, it might be due to
the opportunities that were provided by the AI-ALS to the student to experience vicarious trial and
error (VTE). Hence, active inference [36] could be successfully accomplished to solve similar problems
in the paper-based post-test. Conversely, if the student could score high-level marks in the AI-ALS for
a particular mathematics topic, but could not do so for the paper-based post-test, the teacher should
intervene to find out why the student was unable to accomplish active inference from the concepts that
were taught by the AI-ALS to the paper-based post-test.
The call by the Foresight Institute [30] and other researchers to study the machine behavior of
artificial superintelligence has provided an inspirational impetus to embark on the research outlined in
the current paper. To help the reader envision how explainable AI technology could be harnessed to
better understand the computational results produced by artificial superintelligence, a human-centric
analytical approach based on BN has been proffered. After discursive reasonings of the analytical
results by the educational stakeholders, future-ready actionable advice could be engendered to assist
teachers in bridging the gaps in the learning process for their students. With this approach, policy
makers could also be better informed regarding the use of AI in education. Usage of explainable
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AI technology in this BN approach empowers us to gain insights from the past (via descriptive
analytics of “what has happened”), enabling us to look beyond the horizon of the present, and peer
into alternative variations of the future (via “what-if” predictive analytics of simulated hypothetical
scenarios). While facing off a relentless T-800 in the movie Terminator, Sarah Connor defiantly seethed,
“The future is not set.” Knowing about the potential behavior of AI systems under various different
conditions using this future-ready approach could also allow us to defy the odds, and turn them in our
favor, regardless of which AI systems the schools choose to deploy.
Supplementary Materials: As mentioned in Section 4.1 of the current paper, the zip file containing the datasets
can be downloaded from https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8206976.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Codebook of the columns in the dataset, each of which will become a node in the BN model.
Node/Column Name Description
student_id student id
hours number of hours spent by student using the (AI-ALS) AI-enabled Adaptive Learning System
topics_350 number of topics out of a total of 350 completed by the student in the AI-ALS

























































































Pre-test (PRETEST) synthetic data for Pre-test Questions 1-10
Post-test (POSTTEST) synthetic data for Post-test Questions 1-10
Noncognitive (NONCOG) synthetic data for Noncognitive Survey Questions 1-10
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Abstract: Artificial general intelligence (AGI) progression metrics indicate AGI will occur within
decades. No proof exists that AGI will benefit humans and not harm or eliminate humans. A set of
logically distinct conceptual components is proposed that are necessary and sufficient to (1) ensure
various AGI scenarios will not harm humanity, and (2) robustly align AGI and human values and
goals. By systematically addressing pathways to malevolent AI we can induce the methods/axioms
required to redress them. Distributed ledger technology (DLT, “blockchain”) is integral to this
proposal, e.g., “smart contracts” are necessary to address the evolution of AI that will be too fast for
human monitoring and intervention. The proposed axioms: (1) Access to technology by market license.
(2) Transparent ethics embodied in DLT. (3) Morality encrypted via DLT. (4) Behavior control structure
with values at roots. (5) Individual bar-code identification of critical components. (6) Configuration
Item (from business continuity/disaster recovery planning). (7) Identity verification secured via DLT.
(8) “Smart” automated contracts based on DLT. (9) Decentralized applications—AI software modules
encrypted via DLT. (10) Audit trail of component usage stored via DLT. (11) Social ostracism (denial
of resources) augmented by DLT petitions. (12) Game theory and mechanism design.
Keywords: artificial general intelligence; AGI; blockchain; distributed ledger; AI containment;
AI safety; AI value alignment; ASILOMAR
1. Introduction
The problem of superhuman artificial intelligence (‘artificial general intelligence”, AGI) harming
or eradicating humankind is an increasing concern as the prospect of AGI nears. This article offers a
new, comprehensive set of solutions to the AGI safety problem in which distributed ledger technology
(also known as “blockchain”) plays multiple key roles.
We begin by citing recent significant advances in AI supporting the case that solving the AGI safety
problem has become urgent. The Methods section gives the methods used to generate the axiom set
proposed here and a justification for describing them at a high systems level. Other key approaches to a
rigorous theory of AGI safety are suggested. The Results/Discussion section first describes the proposed
axioms in some detail, referring to Appendices for detailed examples of use cases in solving exhaustive
enumerations of AGI failure pathways by others, and highlights some pathways where a solution
would fail without a given axiom. Two key formulae underlying the computational complexity of AGI
evolution and diversity are offered, the controversial issue of restricting access to AGI technology is
addressed, and metrics of AGI progress are described toward the goal of monitoring proximity to a
singularity. Last, the problems of control and value alignment in successive generations of AGI, the
related issue of creating a singleton versus a pluralistic separation-and-balance-of-powers approach,
and using “sandbox” simulations to examine AGI safety methods are described.
Current attempts to measure AI progress show exponential growth in activity globally and technical
improvement across the board of functionality measured—including “Human-Level Performance
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Milestones” [1] (Figure 1a). Recent watershed advances include Deep Mind beating the most expert
human at the complex game of Go—which averages 250 moves per position and 150 moves per
game = 10359 possible paths vs. chess, which averages 35 moves per position and 80 moves per
game = 10123 possible paths, and a decade earlier than expected. Deep Mind used a neural network to
assign a value at each point in a decision tree and discarded low-valued lower-level branches and thus
avoided the exponential search required to explore them. Human Go experts assigned high creativity
to Deep Mind’s strategies and tactics. A second major AI development was Deep Mind’s self-teaching,
reinforcement learning ability, playing tens of thousands of games against itself in a few hours rather
than incorporating human game-play strategies and eliminating its need for human feedback [2].
Collaborating, self-taught AIs played 180 human years of games per day using new reinforcement
learning policy optimization algorithms and beat human teamwork in the simulated real-world
environment of Dota2 [3] (video: https://youtu.be/Ub9INopwJ48). Significant advances were made
in credit assignment to short-term vs. long-term goals and learning the optimal balance between
individual and team performance. Another watershed occurred when AI beat humans at an “imperfect
information” game, poker—i.e., the opponents’ hands are hidden, fundamentally different from Go
or chess—using game theory techniques including bluffing, previously thought to be difficult to
emulate [4,5]. Such techniques could be used to beat humans in business strategy, negotiation, strategic
pricing, finance, cybersecurity, physical security, military, auctions, political campaigns, and medical
treatment planning [4]. AI continues to reach new levels of unsupervised learning prowess (pattern
recognition without human guidance), e.g., for parsing handwritten letters and creating new letters
that pass a specialized Turing test, and more efficiently than deep learning networks [6]. AI superiority
over humans in general background knowledge and parsing natural language is old news [7], and is
now being embedded in all human-computer interfacing (“powered by Watson”, Alexa, Siri, Cortana,
Google Assistant, et al.), whose potential monetary value has triggered a commercial AI arms race in
parallel with a military/political one (Figure 1) [8].
Bostrom gives examples of general intelligence skills where attainment of any of them would
trigger AGI dominance over humans (reproduced in Table 1). One such epochal AI development
that could trigger the AGI singularity is the prospect of AI learning to program itself—“recursive
self-improvement” (q.v. ASILOMAR AI Principle #22, see also #19, #20, #21 [9])—which opens a door
to a positive-feedback-driven process in which AGI vastly exceeds human capabilities in short order
and may change its human-instilled directives. An AGI could begin to regard humanity as a trivial,
primitive nuisance, competing for vital resources required for attainment of its goals, distinct from
humanity’s, stemming from alien values, as we regard mosquitoes or flies.
Table 1. Examples of super-intelligent skill sets triggering AGI world domination (from Bostrom [10];
cf. Babcock et al. Section 6.2 [11]).
Intelligence amplification—AI can improve its own intelligence
Strategy—optimizing chances of achieving goals using advanced techniques, e.g., game theory, cognitive
psychology, and simulation
Social manipulation—psychological and social modeling e.g., for persuasion
Hacking—exploiting security flaws to appropriate resources
R&D—create more powerful technology, e.g., to achieve ubiquitous surveillance and military dominance
Economic productivity—generate vast wealth to acquire resources
A danger many feared would accelerate the timeline to AGI via “Red Queen” cultural
co-evolution [12], an AI arms race has begun, driven by the increasing realization in political and
military circles that AI is the key to future military superiority [13,14]. Thus ASILOMAR #5 and #18
may already be violated [9]. The race increases emphasis on AI for intentionally destructive purposes
and likely will result in less control of AI technology by its creators [15]. It is an ominous development
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as all nuclear powers upgrade their arsenals, proliferation increases, and arms control agreements
are unraveling [16]. The day when AI is consulted and decides if “no first strike” commitments or
reducing “high alert” status nuclear weapons is beneficial or perceived as a vulnerable weakness by
adversaries looms ahead.
The potential speed with which AGI could advance from being human-directed and empathetic
of humans to evolving beyond human-level concerns is unknown; with self-programming ability
or other internal intelligence enhancement, [10,11] positive feedback will trigger super-exponential





Figure 1. (a) Number of AI papers in Scopus by sub-category (1998–2017). Source: Shoham et al.
{Shoham}. (b) Papers by sector affiliation—China (1998–2017). Source: Shoham et al. [1]. Creative
Commons License. © 2018 by the authors. Submitted for possible open access publication under the
terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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What is proposed here is a complete AGI ecosystem, framed as a set of axioms at a relatively
high systems level, that will ensure AGI–human value alignment, and thereby ensure benevolent AGI
behavior, as seen by humans and successive generations of AGI. Notably, the axioms incorporate
distributed ledger technology and smart contracts to automate and prevent corruption of many
required processes.
2. Methods
Section 2.1 describes the methods used to generate a necessary and sufficient set of axioms for AGI
safety, and comments on the feasibility of developing a rigorous proof of such an axiom set. Section 2.2
comments on the epistemology of the approach in Section 2.1, principally in terms of systems levels,
and then describes other approaches that may contribute to a formal theory.
2.1. To Generate a Necessary and Sufficient Set of Axioms
There are several taxonomies of pathways to dangerous AI, such as Yampolskiy [18], Turchin [19],
Bostrom [10], and Brundage et al. [20]. These taxonomies are a reasonable starting point for
systematically investigating how to ensure safe AGI. One can take each pathway to danger as a
theorem and induce methods, formalized as axioms, toward generating a necessary and sufficient
set of axiom-methods to eliminate all pathways or reduce their probability. Pathway categories
overlap, which helps ensure redundancy in capturing the necessary and sufficient axioms to redress
all categories.
Similarly, as one iterates the process of using each dangerous pathway to generate a complete set
of axioms to address it, some axioms repeat, while some pathways require new, additional axioms
until at the end of the pathways list, most are covered by the axiom set, although some pathways may
be left without sufficient methods to eliminate them. For the pathways itemized in the taxonomies, the
resulting axioms seem to be the minimal set for ensuring safe AGI. Here “ensuring” means “optimally
reducing the probability of a dangerous pathway manifesting."
Stating a set of axioms is a necessary step toward formal proof of a necessary, sufficient, and
minimal set—if a formal proof is possible. Yampolskiy concludes his taxonomy by saying that formal
proof of the completeness of a taxonomy is important [18] and formal methods are a main theme
of Omohundro [8]. Short of a tight logical proof, probabilistically assuring benevolent AGI, e.g.,
through extensive simulations, may be the realistic route to take, and must accompany any set of safety
measures, including those proposed here.
An important way to test if each axiom is necessary is to find failure use cases when it is
omitted [21]; examples are given below.
2.2. Ingredients for Formalization of AGI Safety Theory
Towards formalization, the various methods to ensure safe AGI are stated as logically distinct
axioms and at a high level intended to capture concisely a necessary and sufficient set. This usage of
“axiom” generalizes that of von Neumann where certain lower systems level outputs or theorems are
“axiomatized”—seen as black boxes, or input–output specification, or logic tables—at the immediately
higher systems level [22]. Each axiom is most precisely expressed by an operational definition specified
by an algorithm implementing it, hence, a method.
For instance, the definition of subjective value or utility, used in the morality and game theory
axioms below, is made precise by the six von Neumann–Morgenstern utility axioms [23]. As stated
below, a set of axioms designed, and proven via simulation, to induce cooperation among extremely
diverse, complex agents may replace most of the set given herein; the simulations of Burtsev and
Turchin may be prolegomena [24].
A problem we frequently face in modeling and simulation is: What is the highest systems level
that can concisely describe and emulate the target set of phenomena? Thus, a limitation in axiomatic
formulations is they leave varying amounts of implementation detail at the systems level underlying
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them to be specified, or to some degree, developed. For example, the DLT-based axioms 2, 4, 5, 7,
8, 9, 10, and 11, are in rapid evolution toward algorithmic implementation to address diverse use
cases. And behavior control (axiom 4) is in rapid development in some contexts (e.g., autonomous
vehicles, factory robots), yet the degree of development still needed to align human and AGI values
may be significant.
Other attempts to formalize the expression of AGI dangers are some simple syllogisms
(Appendix A).
The concept of AGI-completeness, akin to NP-completeness as stated by Bostrom [10], is that a
demonstration of one technology, e.g., self-improvement techniques, engendering AGI is sufficient to
demonstrate that capability for a class of AI technologies. AGI-completeness may be another piece of
formalizing AGI, measuring its progress, and specifying the point of no containment unless sufficient
preparations have been made.
Another means to formalize AGI theory is Omohundro’s idea of deriving universal AGI drives
from first principles [8], which can be explored to see if such drives emerge in simulations as well as
via logical derivation. Omohundro argues that universal drives will inevitably lead to conflict of AI
and human values from the irrefutable economic axiom of competition for resources.
Another formalization route is calculating the probability of hacking a blockchain against the
number of AGIs required to reach consensus via the blockchain to permit unlocking the next AGI
generation (see sections on decentralized apps and the Singleton problem below). This calculation is
similar to the math underlying the internet’s redundancy in average interconnectedness of nodes and
global system fault-tolerance [25] but more complicated since it involves Byzantine fault tolerance,
wherein two diagnostic agents disagree on the nature of the fault [26]. The inclusion of innovative DLT
into the algorithms should permit AGI robustness to surpass the “robust yet fragile” use case of the
internet that is vulnerable to targeted attacks on the most interconnected nodes.
Last, it may be possible to subsume several of the axioms herein via a game theory/economics set
proven via simulation. An obstacle to this approach is that game-theoretic algorithms that simulate
interactions between entities with behavior expressiveness vastly larger than our own [24] may be
necessary to understand and predict AGI social behavior but may also be computationally intractable
(see Diversity in the AGI Ecosystem, below).
3. Results and Discussion
Regarding the term AI “containment”, Babcock et al. suggest that “containment” is an appropriate
term for methodologies for controlled AGI development and safety-testing rather than control over
entities whose intelligence will exceed our own [11]. The current work is intended to contribute to
both phases.
3.1. A Critical Ingredient: Distributed Ledger Technology (A.k.a. ‘Blockchain’)
The recent innovation of distributed digital ledger technology (DLT) is critical to this proposal [27].
The crux of DLT is an audit trail database, in which each addition is validated by a pluralistic consensus,
currently performed by humans operating computers that run hash and anti-hash functions (to wit
public key encryption), stored on a distributed network also known as a blockchain: “Blockchains
allow us to have a distributed peer-to-peer network where non-trusting members can interact with
each other without a trusted intermediary, in a verifiable manner” [28]. Key aspects of DLT are shown
in Table 2 [29] (other auxiliary DLT aspects, such as anonymity of participants, are either not necessary
or not beneficial in the context of ensuring safe AGI). The “smart” automated contract vision of
Szabo [30], encrypted redundantly via DLT, could comprise the core methodology whereby AGI
development and evolution can be aligned with the best human values without concomitant human
intervention. Notably, smart contracts can prevent the hacking of safe AGI evolution that is too fast for
human response.
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Table 2. Distributed ledger technology applicable to ensuring AGI safety.
Non-hackability and non-censurability via decentralization (storage in multiple distributed servers),
encryption in standardized blocks, and irrevocable transaction linkage (the “chain”)
Node-fault tolerance: Redundancy via storage in a decentralized ledger of (a) rules for transactions, (b) the
transaction audit trail, and (c) transaction validations
Transparency of the transaction rules and audit trail in the DLT
Automated “smart” contracts
Decentralized applications (“dApps”), i.e., software programs that are stored and run on a distributed network
and have no central point of control or failure
Validation of contractual transactions by a decentralized consensus of validators
Here are the proposed necessary and sufficient axioms to ensure safe AGI (Table 3).
Table 3. Proposed axioms to ensure human-benevolent AGI.
Symbol Axiom
1 Access to AGI technology via market license
2 Ethics transparently stored via DLT so they cannot be altered, forged, or deleted
3 Morality, defined as no use of force or fraud, stored via DLT
4 Behavior control structure (e.g., a behavior tree) augmented by adding human-compatiblevalues (axioms 2 and 3) at its roots
5 Unique hardware and software ID codes
6 Configuration Item (automated configuration)
7 Secure identity via multi-factor authentication, public-key infrastructure and DLT
8 Smart contracts based on DLT
9 Decentralized applications (dApps)—AGI software code modules encrypted via DLT
10 Audit trail of component usage stored via DLT
11 Social ostracism—denial of societal resources—augmented by petitions based on DLT
12 Game theory—mechanism design of a communications and incentive system
Table 4 gives some examples of malignant AGI categories by Bostrom [10] in which the danger
pathway is described and a subset of axioms to reduce its probability is specified. To further illustrate
the systematic approach of identifying a necessary and sufficient axiom set, Appendix B continues
these examples using malignant AGI pathways compiled from the taxonomies of Yampolskiy [18]
and Turchin [19]. In these examples, the game theory/mechanism design axiom is not mentioned; see
comments in the axiom descriptions and elsewhere.
Table 4. Examples from Bostrom Pathways to Dangerous AI [10]. See also Appendix B.
Pathway Key Axioms
Perverse instantiation: “Make us smile” Morality defined as voluntary transactions
Perverse instantiation: “Make us happy” Morality defined as voluntary transactions
Final goal: Act to avoid bad conscience Store value system in distributed app
Final goal: Maximize time-discounted integral of future
reward signal
Morality defined as voluntary transactions, store
value system in distributed app
Infrastructure profusion: Riemann hypothesis catastrophe Morality defined as voluntary transactions
Infrastructure profusion: Paperclip manufacture catastrophe Morality defined as voluntary transactionsSocial ostracism
Principal–Agent Failure [21]
Human–Human: Agent (AI developer) disobeys contract
Human–AGI: Agent disobeys contract
Digital identity, smart contracts, dApps, social
ostracism
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3.2. Examination of Typical Failure Use Cases by Axiom
One way to dissect a proposed necessary and sufficient set of axioms for AI morality is to look at
what phenomena or failure use cases result when one or more of them are excluded [21]; examples are
given in Appendix C.
3.3. Explanation of Each Proposed Axiom
3.3.1. Access to AGI Technology via License
Two distinct systems and traditions of technology licensing exist, (1) market transactions and (2)
state (“government”, “fiat”) coercively-controlled licensing. Seizure of AI intellectual property (IP) and
control over its development by states is inevitable unless AI scientists and private-sector management
set up their own systems to ensure safe AGI. ASILOMAR #9, Responsibility, states “Designers and
builders of advanced AI systems are stakeholders in the moral implications of their use, misuse, and
actions, with a responsibility and opportunity to shape those implications” [9]. The question is: How
is this responsibility to be implemented—to be given “teeth”?
The system proposed herein envisions AI evolution with humans cross-licensing AI technology to
each other, creating a prototype distributed applications (dApps) system instantiated in a DLT ecosystem
that balances permissioned access and editing via contract with free access. The human-initiated
DLT-based ecosystem would transition to AGIs licensing technology from humans, and subsequently
to AGIs cross-licensing with each other.
History shows that in many or most cases, a market system evolves solutions faster and better than
centralized state systems. Further, state systems may respond innovatively and less bureaucratically
when subjected to competition with market systems; the Human Genome Project and current
space-exploration efforts are examples. A market optimally distributes problems to be solved and
computing power assigned to solve them in a highly decentralized manner.
There are valid arguments against an AI IP regime with “restricted” information flow via license,
whether through market or state. Progress may be slowed, and some persons with no reason to be
prevented from accessing some AI technology may be restricted. The counter-argument is that AGI
technology and many of its components are as dangerous or more dangerous than nuclear, biological,
chemical, or other mass destruction weapons technology (WMD), since AGI will control WMD tech,
along with innumerable other resources that can fatally or significantly affect humanity (Proposition 1
in Appendix A).
By way of example, assume there exists an algorithm critical for AI self-programming. With
free access to the self-programming algorithm, malevolent humans, as well as extant autonomous
AIs, could use that technology for unlimited self-improvement, opening a positive-feedback-driven
Pandora’s box to unlimited malevolence and unlimited means to achieve it (ASILOMAR #22 [9]).
Others point out dangers of a freely available “just add goals” AGI [10,18]. Thus state, private, or a
hybrid means of restricting access to critical pieces of AI tech, as with WMD, seems to be a necessary
axiom to align AI with human interests.
3.3.2. Ethics Stored in a Distributed Ledger
I define ethics as the fundamental value system from which autonomous entities derive their decisions
and choices. Ethics are separate from morality, which is a particular set of ethics. “Honor among
thieves”, “do unto others as you would have them do unto you”, “professional courtesy”, “honor thy
father and mother”, etc., are ethics, as are Asimov’s three laws of robotics [31]. Ethics can seem good
or bad, moral or immoral, from a volitional entity’s subjective value system. An entity’s fundamental
values are embedded in some type of behavior (input/output) control system. For example, consider
ethics represented and controlled by a behavior tree [32] where the ethics are a subset of its roots, and
thus in that sense fundamental.
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The intention of storing AGI ethics via DLT is to permit a class of autonomous entities to have
identical ethics and to render them visible and unable to be hacked, altered or deleted. In this sense,
ethics is a necessary component of the control system and allows for different sets of ethics to be
instantiated. While it is not possible for all humans to have identical values and therefore moral values
(however defined), DLT, in theory, permits a universal set of immutable values to be instantiated in
AGIs while still permitting an unlimited range of individual AGI and AI diversity.
Requiring transparent instantiations of ethics for AGI systems conforms to ASILOMAR #10 (Value
Alignment), and IBM’s call for Supplier’s Declarations of Conformity for AI [33]. These bona fides and
ethics could be stored in an AGI’s Configuration Item and/or those of its key components (see below).
3.3.3. Morality Defined as Voluntary vs. Involuntary Exchange
The definition below is intended to conform to ASILOMAR #11, Human Values, #14, “benefit and
empower as many people as possible”, #15 and #24, benefit the “common good” and “widely-shared
ethical ideals” [9], but notably to provide a practical implementation of them, otherwise what use
are they?
Down through the ages there have been two main problems with discussions of morality—first,
ambiguity and therefore confusion. How can we identify moral behavior if it is imprecisely defined
and hard to determine [34]? And so such definitions are costly, in terms of the economics of law,
to enforce. Second, nearly all morality descriptions are subjective, amounting to one person’s value
system imposed on others, and via coercion if enforced via the state.
For example, take the proposal of directing AGI to ensure “hedonistic consequentialism” for all of
humanity—selecting from a set of actions the one that would produce the best balance of pleasure versus
suffering [10]. Such idealistic but vague and minimally-thought-out concepts of morality—which is
nearly all of them—may sound good on paper but break down rapidly on implementation. And they all
amount to a minority or individual—human or AGI, and even from the most beneficent of us—deciding
what is “moral” or not, or what is “best” for others. When AGI is a given, the proposals depend on its
super-intelligence somehow overcoming the limitations of humans’ concepts of morality, how to define
and implement it, and/or overcome humans’ inability to read minds. And notably, they all amount to
confining computation of an overall system solution to a restricted subset of all computationally active
agents (see Diversity, below), which is another way of saying allowing a subset of volitional entities to
impose their subjective, not absolute, value system, upon others.
The essence of autonomy or volition is choice-making. Herein, first, all individual choices that
affect no other volitional entity are moral. Second, all voluntary exchanges are moral. But if two
autonomous agents prefer a transaction between them, and that transaction is prevented by a third
party, that party has imposed its value system over the others. It is also one less computational
experiment the entire system performs.
Several economists posited that there is no universal theory or method to determine value, rather,
all human values and the measure of utility are subjective [35], which is implicit in the game-theoretic
axioms of utility [23]. Following this premise, defining morality as all voluntary transactions is
scientific when science is likewise defined as a procedure that filters for absolutes—what we all see
in common, such as the speed of light—from a vast sea of relative views [36,37]. Later members
of the Austrian school defined morality as non-interference with property (defined to include ones’
body and intellectual property) [36,38]. It is simpler and less costly to define moral transactions as
voluntary transactions than to try to identify what is property and to define and figure out property
boundaries and property interference. One of the goals of a legal system is to resolve conflicts in an
economically efficiently manner and it has been argued that the evolution of common law is toward
such efficiency [39].
If you want to upload your mind and join a collective intelligence, or rather stay physically human,
and not even accept lifespan enhancement, it is up to you. Under this system you and AGI cannot force
choices on anyone else even if you or AGI believe it is best for them. But what if a super-intelligence
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could make some or all of your decisions better than you can [10]? Each individual can sign on with
the super-AI that seems to best fit your values and goals. It would be your choice, just like taking the
advice of a consultant or hiring an agent for a specified set of tasks today.
This definition and axiom may not solve the problem of AGI with vast knowledge of the evolution
of our psychology and innate choice-making algorithms [40,41] and the propensity to manipulate us
with that knowledge, although the argument can be made that with such knowledge in a voluntary
exchange system, AGI would be more able to offer ‘good’ choices (i.e., as we perceive them) to us than
without that knowledge.
AGIs will have a larger and more complex set of value preferences than ours (see Diversity, below);
what will be the morality of their interaction with each other? The voluntary transaction definition may
fit their behavior as well. A system of voluntary transactions permits Pareto optimality and maximizes
computational experiments driven by local, subjective preference systems [42]. Transaction costs and
the need for trusted third parties prevents Pareto optimality [43]. DLT and smart contracts potentially
permit full Pareto optimality in the digital AI ecosystem by reducing transaction costs to negligible
amounts and eliminating costly, imperfect third parties.
3.3.4. Behavior Control System
Behavior control is sine qua non to value human–AI alignment (ASILOMAR #10, #16, etc. [9]).
At one end of the knowledge representation/control spectrum is a “flat” set of large numbers of
heuristical condition–action rules that are selected, not based on general principles, but on matching
specified patterns. At the other end of the spectrum is a strict postulatory–deductive tree in which the
internal node “beliefs” are logically derived from the postulates as are the actions represented at the
leaf-nodes. A postulatory–deductive system is the ideal contemplated here, which would satisfy the
need for control, the desire for transparency of its operation, and part of the need for formal proof of
its reliability. However, it is an ideal. Any type of hierarchical control system that can hold values at its
highest levels and is transparent enough to reveal control over behavior by values is a candidate for
aligning AGI and human values, and the ecology of value systems that will evolve from the initial sets.
I believe humans innately attempt to form postulatory–deductive systems using non-mathematical,
ad hoc “logics” [40,41] in an effort to organize their world-view into causes and effects, and
general principles governing specialized condition–action pairs. Mathematical and scientific
postulatory–deductive systems are recent, specialized, powerful cases, improvements built on the
general-purpose cognitive architecture, in which universally-valid logic replaces the ad hoc evolutionary
“logics” and the entire system is validated through repeated observations directly confirming the
postulates or indirectly via observation of valid derivatives (i.e., predictions) with zero fault-tolerance.
Further, in the ritualized transparency of its methods and crowd-sourced validation via multiple
subjective observers, science is an absolute voluntary consensus, rather than confirmation of an
unprovable “objective” world [37] and resembles DLT.
In the innate human system, a causatory cascade of beliefs and actions stem from fundamental
beliefs (postulates, including values). Outside of the mathematical and scientific postulatory systems,
a more complex set of relative and subjective “logics” connects beliefs—efficacious from an evolutionary
standpoint but also unreliable across different contexts [40,41] as seen in beliefs of mathematicians and
scientists outside of mathematical and scientific domains.
An AI control system that may be able to represent current and future postulatory–deductive
systems is the behavior tree [32].
The game-theoretic axioms of utility drive decisions from a hypothesis that the decision will
ultimately lead to an improvement in the volitional entity’s state, as defined internally and subjectively
by its value system [23] also known as the pursuit of happiness [36]. The utility axioms extend to machines
with subjective value systems.
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3.3.5. Unique Component IDs, Configuration Item (CI)
Several technological and business process developments lead toward a universally interconnected
system that self-configures, self-diagnoses its component failures, and repairs them automatically; in
toto, a paradigm whose ultimate use will be integration into the human–AGI ecology. These technologies
help to decrease Coasean transactions costs (e.g., detection and enforcement) toward facilitating an
idealized Pareto-optimal economy.
Unique identification (ID) numbers evolved as an economically-efficient means to organize and
validate property exchanges, contributing to a stable society, starting with large or important pieces
of property such as real estate via book and page of a recorded deed, automobiles via title or vehicle
ID number, stocks via CUSIP number, etc. As the cost of creating unique ID numbers decreased via
technology, the system extended to machines and devices via model and serial numbers, and more
recently to any product via one- and two-dimensional bar and matrix machine-readable codes to
facilitate supply-chain management, quality control, customer service, and other functions.
The transition from the internet of computers to the “internet of things” (IoT) envisions ubiquitous
communication and computation connecting physical devices with the digital world via miniaturized
sensors and chips containing only as much computing power and energy usage that is needed to
perform their intended functionality in their context—“a self-configuring network that is much more
complex and dynamic than the conventional internet” [44]. In the IoT, ID numbers become digital as
well as physical, e.g., radio frequency ID codes. In the IoT world AGI will be able to communicate
with, and potentially control, any digital or physical device.
The IoT world was presaged by the development of disaster recovery and business continuity planning,
and the key role of configuration items in them. Disaster recovery (DR) arose on the realization
that the cost of not doing contingency planning for disasters (a hazardous material spill, hurricane,
tornado, power outage, etc.) could vastly exceed the cost of such planning, including total business
loss. Judicious planning for disasters, such as foreseeing an alternate location from which to conduct
operations in the event of facility downtime and establishing redundant communication protocols
to coordinate team response to disasters, are relatively inexpensive insurance measures. Business
continuity planning (BCP) logically arose from DR, extending the DR premise of disaster planning
to pre-planned, prioritized responses to all component failure, including normal end of service life.
For example, recovery of failed email for the company as a whole is accorded lower priority than for
customer-service representatives and top management. BCP’s goal is, through contingency planning,
to reduce the internal and external impact of business process downtime to a minimum.
The configuration item (CI) arose in BCP/DR conceptually as a system component’s on-board
algorithm and parameter set that allowed computers and components to detect each other’s
configuration requirements, automatically configure the component, or perform error-detection,
reporting, and correction (cf. ASILOMAR #7, Failure Transparency [9] and Manheim [21]). In the
context of DLT, it becomes a smart contract.
Many paths to dangerous AI, including much of the broad class of human-AI value misalignment,
are a result of improperly configured or failed components, or sabotage (e.g., accidental nuclear war,
failure of safeguard components, inadvertent security vulnerabilities leaving a system open to hacking,
misconfiguration of software modules e.g., in autonomous vehicles, power blackouts, financial system
meltdowns, etc.). Thus, the paradigm of BCP/DR and CIs will be integral to maintaining the fidelity of
AGI-human value alignment amidst the IoT of the future. Further, CIs of critical AGI components
can be encoded via DLT, thus greatly reducing or eliminating the possibility of unauthorized use,
corruption, failure, etc.
IBM’s Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity to ensure AI safety [33] could be incorporated into
CIs and used as one pre-requisite for deployment of an AGI system or component.
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3.3.6. Digital Identity via Distributed Ledger Technology
Restricting access to potentially dangerous technology (Axiom #1) necessitates identity verification.
Few readers would deny the need of multi-factor authentication for nuclear missile launch codes.
Identity verification is currently accepted for access to military bases, high-tech weapons, aircraft,
most private and public buildings, financial systems, health records, and other data that individuals
consider private for their own reasons, all toward the goal of ensuring a safe and secure world.
In contrast to a third-party-based identity authentication system such as state- or private
company-issued ID cards, many decentralized DLT-based methods have been created, competing with
the trusted-third-party method to reduce the chance of forgery or other hacking, and bribery or other
corruption. In a DLT version of the current public-key encryption-based X.509 standard [45], a DL
replaces the third-party issuing authority in its components: certificate version, serial number, type of
algorithm used to sign the certificate, issuing authority, validity period, name of entity being verified,
and entity’s public key.
Initially, digital identity verification will be done on humans matching biometrics such as facial
features, fingerprint, voice, in addition to SMS etc., but as AI evolves, AGIs will use technology and
techniques that they develop against evolving threats to hack verification of humans, e.g., speech
synthesis or video manipulation [18] and threats that are currently unforeseeable.
3.3.7. Smart Contracts Based on Digital Ledger Technology
Smart contracts were conceived by Szabo decades ago, before the inventions of DLT and IoT that
enable their inexpensive implementation, to automate contractual clauses via cryptography that can be
self-executing and self-enforcing [46]. Smart contracts as an integral part of DLT are “scripts residing
on a blockchain that automate multi-step processes” [28]. Szabo’s inspirations were the original
commercial security transaction protocols: SWIFT, ACH, and FedWire for electronic funds transfer,
credit card point of sale terminals, and the Electronic Data Interchange for transactions between large
corporations such as purchase and sale [30]. He used the simple example of a vending machine,
through which transactions are performed without a third-party intermediary to verify that the terms
of the transaction have been satisfied.
Two critical design goals were to make verifying satisfaction of contractual terms computationally
cheap and breaching terms computationally expensive, both of which are realized in a far superior
generalized manner via DLT than via prior methods (reminiscent of Bush’s and Nelson’s conception of
hyperlinking before the invention of the internet [47]). Smart contracts require the digital specification
of obligations each party must meet to trigger a transaction, a blockchain for consensus verification
that each party has met its obligation, an immutable audit trail of transactions, and the design goal of
excluding unintended effects on non-contractual parties.
Omohundro envisions smart contracts interfacing autonomous agents with the heterogeneity of
human legal codes and future legal codes designed to help ensure safe AI interactions with humans [48]
(ASILOMAR #8) [9]. Pierce envisions a mass migration of the current compliance regime via law
and regulation to an economically more efficient and secure regime based on smart contracts [49]
(ASILOMAR #2); such a system greatly facilitates Omohundro’s.
As AGI evolves beyond our understanding and visibility, and notably when it hits “escape
velocity”—exponential evolution culminating in generations succeeding each other in fractions
of a second—prescribed, automated smart contracts will be essential to perpetuating ethical
values in each successive generation. The concept is that a more advanced AGI generation cannot
succeed a less-advanced one without licensing key components—certain algorithms, hardware, the
axiom-methods proposed herein, behavior control systems invented by humans and AI, etc.—from the
less-advanced generation, subject to satisfying its value system and oversight.
The configuration “handshake” between an AGI and its component CIs is a smart contract between
them, and the intelligence of those handshakes can increase in the future. CIs must incorporate the
ability to deny activation of a component within a system, or shut it down, if lack of satisfaction of
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a given clause, or violation of a clause, of any extant contract is detected by any distributed ledger
stakeholder in the transaction. All such contractual stakeholders must be silenced just as living cell
cycle checkpoints must be silenced for the cell to progress through the intricately orchestrated process
of mitosis, otherwise it self-destructs [50]. More of these “deadman switches” that actively suppress
unauthorized use or malfunctioning AI will increase a secure evolution of benign AI; for example, the
limited term of digital identity certificates that expire and require re-verification of the subject entity’s
identity at regular intervals [45].
Szabo’s vision of embedding smart contracts in objects [30] is realized by embedding CIs in
all non-trivial interconnected devices and algorithms in the IoT. In this manner the smart contract
and preceding axiom-methods work in concert to ensure human-AGI value-alignment and AGI
containment within bounds that are benevolent for humans and the succession of AGI generations.
In principle, smart contracts help approach a zero-transaction cost world by eliminating trusted
third parties, and their role in detection and enforcement of contractual rights (e.g., physical and
intellectual property rights).
3.3.8. Decentralized Applications (dApps)
DLT-based decentralized applications (dApps) differ from conventional application programs in
that they (1) are outside the overview and control of a central authority such as a company making the
app or state agency controlling it, (2) operate on a peer-to-peer network instead of a centralized one, and
(3) do not have a central point of failure—they are redundant in hardware and software and therefore
fault-tolerant [51]. Smart contracts are an example of dApps, as are decentralized versions of exchanges
to trade various types of goods or services, notably intellectual property, which can transition into
exchanges between AGIs, social media including networking, communications protocols, prediction
markets, and a growing number of DLT-enabled applications.
Axiom 1, Access to Technology via Market License, requires that some dApps—notably those
that are critical to AGI—would be implemented via permissioned DLs, which are DLs with an added
control layer that can prevent unrestricted and unauthenticated public access. Some cryptocurrency
observers feel any type of control that is not fully “public” violates the decentralization principle;
however, consider “private” DLs as a critically important tool in the DLT toolbox. For example, should
we not consider delegating control over access to critical AGI algorithms to a consensus of signatories
committed to the goal of AI-human value alignment or ethical use of AI, e.g., the ASILOMAR AI
Principles [9]? Further, the control layer, in part or eventually in toto, can be automated by incorporating
smart contracts and/or smart tokens to reduce the probability that central control can be hacked or
corrupted. Smart contract terms could require 2/3 or 100% acceptance of DLT-authenticated (Axiom
6) signatories to ASILOMAR AI Principles or similar regulatory documents. Smart contract terms
can deny access to those who do not fulfill a transparency requirement via Supplier’s Declaration
of Conformity [33], which document could in turn require inclusion of an accepted set of ethics and
morality (Axioms 2,3) and a safety testing record meeting certain standards [11,52], all of which can be
incorporated into a CI (Axiom 5). Equally critical, dApps permit separation and balance of powers of
key AGI components, analogous to no one entity having all the nuclear launch codes. The significance
of dApps for ensuring benevolent AGI is discussed further in two malignant use cases it addresses, the
Rogue Programmer and Singleton AGI, below.
Two levels of permissioned access to dApps may be needed: (1) Access for use, and (2) access
to modify the code (while, again, a purist view of dApps sees their development as open-sourced).
A similar consideration must be given to AGI technology patents. The primary purpose and requirement
of patents is to “teach the art” clearly and explicitly so the innovation can be implemented by the reader.
The patent system at a meta-level has largely been denied market evolution to try other purposes
and requirements. Be that as it may, to facilitate safe free exchange of information, a “Transportation
Security Administration”-type of pre-screening for access to critical AGI patents may be needed to
prevent access by malevolent entities and may be efficiently implemented via smart tokens.
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If no formal proof of benevolent AGI methodology is possible or available soon, sandbox
simulations of new AGI technology are critical to our future and implementing them via dApps will
be essential to ensure they cannot be hacked or corrupted by humans or AGIs [52].
3.3.9. Audit Trail of Component Usage Stored via Distributed Ledger Technology
DLT is inherently a low-cost, redundant, decentralized, hack-free audit trail—a significant
improvement on traditional centralized audit trail technology. An unhackable audit trail of critical AI
components such as collaborative, self-learning, or self-programming algorithms will facilitate rapid,
efficient detection of their authorized or unauthorized use (i.e., a hack of a contract, a set of ethics, or
an identity verification) or failure (cf. ASILOMAR #7, Failure Transparency [9] and Maheim [21]). and
increase the probability of remedying the system fault. The IBM Research Supplier’s Declaration of
Conformity via a factsheet for AI software incorporates an audit trail as a fundamental principle [33].
Bore et al. describe a system for incorporating an audit trail in DLT as part of embedding AI simulations
in DLT so that trust in the simulations’ validity is enabled between researchers without requiring a
trusted intermediary [52].
3.3.10. Social Ostracism (Voluntary Denial of Resources)
As various writers point out, a “power-hungry AGI” or “AGI pursuing world domination” implies
an AGI attempting to access and control an ever-increasing amount of society’s resources [10,17–19].
Therefore, the ability for entities to deny societal resources to an errant AGI is a counterforce on its
ambitions. This voluntary mechanism is another aspect of a market economy in which computation
is distributed, local, and optimized—each entity makes its own choice based on its own unique,
subjective experience. A further optimization is that market votes can occur as often as each entity
wishes to change its choice, such as denying its resources to another entity or collection of entities.
Market votes occurs immeasurably more often than political votes and implement a far more fluid and
asymptotically Pareto-optimal society.
In the current technology for “democracy” the political vote is the means to reach consensus,
which is tallied by a central authority and enforced via coercion by the same entity. In contrast,
voluntary concerted boycotts of companies, facilitated by modern social media, are increasingly
affecting corporate policy (corporations being one type of voluntary association among individuals for
their mutual benefit).
DLT is a fundamentally new way to reach and archive a consensus. DLT-based unhackable
petitions can be smart contracts to facilitate denial of resources to an errant AGI and can be rapidly
implemented via CIs. For instance, IBM’s call for Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity to help ensure
safe AI implies voluntary adoption [33], but would be more effective if enforced via social ostracism
and implemented automatically via CI incorporation, just as web browser security currently can alert a
user to reject non-security-credentialed (non-https) internet domains, thereby immediately denying
them the user’s resources.
The ASILOMAR principles, currently signed by 1273 AI workers [9], are a significant first step,
like a letter of intent, toward a necessary, more binding and important agreement. A next step could
be archiving the ASILOMAR agreement and its signatories via DLT so that the principles cannot be
hacked and can only be amended via consensus of the signatories. A further step could be embedding
the document and signatories in the Supplier’s Declaration as a second, more restricted layer of
access protection. Another step would be automatically-triggered, smart contract DLT-based petitions
attached to the Supplier’s Declaration, denying a given set of AGI access to specified AGI technology
in response to detected AGI behavior contradicting the ASILOMAR principles.
3.3.11. Game Theory and Mechanism Design
Game theory and evolution have explained five categories of the evolution of cooperation—direct
reciprocity e.g., “tit for tat”, indirect reciprocity e.g., reputation value in “what goes around, comes
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around”, reciprocity in societal networks and topologies, group reciprocity e.g., the good Samaritan and
altruism, and kin reciprocity, e.g., “I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins” (J. B. S.
Haldane) [53]. Nowak’s current goal is to extend these explanations to game-theoretic frameworks for
global cooperation and cooperation across generations. These efforts will involve mechanism design,
the branch of game theory concerned with designing game-theoretic and economic structures that build
in incentives for communicating truthfully about one’s valuations in a potential transaction [21,23,54,55].
That is the goal of game theory in the context of axioms for safe AGI.
It is possible that a suitably designed communication protocol and game-theoretic incentives
using DLT could replace the other axioms, which would emerge from the simpler axiomatic system.
For example, an axiomatic (first principles) simulation of game-theoretic evolution wherein agents
have a complex set of strategies found that inclusion of two axioms, (1) inheritable agent types, and (2)
visibility of types to other agents, resulted in evolution of cooperation strategies [24]. These axioms
could be more general than the license, ethics, morality, configuration item, audit trail, and social
ostracism axioms proposed herein. The unique component IDs, digital identity verification, and game
theoretic axioms along with DLT to ensure transparency, may suffice to generate the rest of the set, just
as a wide variety of market-based structures and mechanisms emerge from axiom sets that generate
markets (a large proportion of economics, game theory, and agent-based modeling literature could be
cited here; see, just by minimal example, the following and their references [23,54,55]).
3.4. Diversity in the AGI Ecosystem: Computation Is Local, Communication Is Global
However, proving this possibility may be intractable. Going back at least as far as Newell, it has
been stated that the complexity of behavior (input-output functions) for I inputs and O outputs is
OI [56]. Intuitively, this is rolling a die with I faces O times since any number of the I inputs could map





whose complexity grows super-exponentially. But in fact, complexity grows faster than the OI power
tower in the cases where the topology of I-O mappings matters, such as in successive neural net actions.






whose complexity exceeds that of power tower 1. These intractable formulae have significant
implications for the AGI ecosystem. One is that an astronomically greater diversity of value systems is
possible compared to humans’. Second, AGIs’ behavior in ecosystems will likely take them to disparate
locations in the problem spaces they investigate, creating a very sparsely inhabited matrix of a vast
number of possible behaviors. Third, in that context, game theory and mechanism design may be the
key structure inducing their ongoing cooperative behavior, notably to allocate problems to be solved
and communicate results that may be valuable to the other players truthfully and in a timely manner.
For example, in our primitive intellectual property regime, a protocol that induces efficient,
truthful reporting is the requirement that a patent clearly teach the new art to those skilled in its
subject matter. Absent that requirement and patent protection, players might be induced to seek
intellectual property protection via secrecy, e.g., “trade secrets”, decreasing cooperative search and
overall technological progress. A protocol that induces timely reporting of innovation is the recent U.
S. patent rules change to grants rights to those who are “first to file” versus “first to invent”, which was
economically inefficient and lacked the inducement to disclose earlier rather than later.
The fourth implication is that, as described differently in disparate intellectual settings [42,56–58],
computation will continue to be performed in unique, sparsely populated loci in the general problem space
using subjective criteria for exploration, and communicated via vastly shorter, high-level symbol sequences
compared to the lengths of computational sequences and complexity of modeling producing them.
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3.5. Should AI Research and Technology Be Freely Available While Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons
Research Are Not?
The Rogue Programmer problem assumes that one amoral, misguided, naïve, or malevolent
individual could make the single advance generating AGI, and this risk depends on how close the
technology is to a single leap causing “take-off”. History shows that all innovations will occur in a
matter of time, some taking more time than others. For instance, differential calculus was invented
by Newton in the spring of 1665 and by Leibniz in the fall of 1675 [59]. The historical record is clear
that what appear in retrospect to be great innovative leaps are actually the final step built on stronger
antecedents than are assumed in scientific mythology, and in fact a chain of them involving many
individuals [60]. Perhaps most pertinent to the advent of AGI is the detonation of the atomic bomb by
the U.S. on 16 July 1945, then by the U.S.S.R. on 29 August 1949. The fusion bomb was detonated by
the U.S. on 1 November 1952 and by the U.S.S.R. on 22 November 1955, an event that was accelerated
by spying, which of course is a possibility with AI research [61,62].
Such science and technology feats are large-scale group efforts. The Rogue Programmer problem
arises when one individual circumvents the consensus agreement of end usage permission by the
contributors to his/her technology (e.g., the 1273 AI worker signatories to the ASILOMAR principles [9]).
Two recent examples of rogue programmers are worth noting. A Chinese scientist used gene-editing
techniques—developed elsewhere and made freely available in the spirit of the free exchange of ideas
and technology—to change the genes of human eggs in vitro [63]. The innovation escaped overview,
was motivated by ambition and pecuniary desire, and ignored a variety of the scientific community’s
publicly-voiced, well-thought-out but unenforceable concerns. Second, recently an AI programmer
claimed his robot, which applied for and received citizenship in Saudi Arabia, would achieve
human-level intelligence within 5–10 years [64]. His apparent variety of noble and possibly naïve
motivations suggest that, even if he was not capable of making the innovation he pursues, he would
combine innovations by others to achieve and claim the first human-level AI.
The problems, then, are unenforceable restrictions in a regime of “free exchange of ideas and
technology”, including public patents, and the lack of reliable means to measure how far away, in time
or succession of innovations, we are from AGI.
3.6. Measuring the Progression to AGI
How urgent is the need to develop AGI-human value alignment technology? Can that debate be
grounded in empirical data? Opinions differ on the timing to AGI—as of 2015 there were over 1300
published predictions [65]. Timing predictions affect the urgency of preparing AGI-human alignment
and control, which influences the resources we should devote to that effort. For this and other reasons
it would be helpful to measure progress to AGI in time or in successions of specific AGI-enabling
technologies [66], including the positive-reinforcement, recursive self-improvement abilities such as
self-teaching, collaboration, self-programming, etc.
Akin to bottom-up versus top-down economic forecasting, a method that captures and compiles
many local, informed assessments is polling AI experts [65,67]. A second bottom-up approach is taken
in the McKinsey Global Institute report, which assesses AI progress by its value-added to business
processes using industry leader interviews and analytics [68].
A third approach, a hybrid of bottom-up and empirical metrics, is the Electronic Frontier
Foundation crowd-sourcing technical progress metrics [69]. A fourth approach, empirical in concept,
is taken in the AI Index 2018 Annual Report, a set of metrics intended to “ground the AI conversation
in data” divided into categories: Volume of Activity, Derivative Measures, Technical Performance,
Towards Human Performance, and Recent Government Initiatives and using such metrics as numbers
of papers published, course enrollment, conference participation, robot software downloads, robot
installations, GitHub ratings, AI startups, venture capital funding, job demand, number of patents,
adoption by industry and company department, and mentions in corporate earning commentary [1].
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3.7. AGI Development Control Analogy with Cell-Cycle Checkpoints
Biological cell division is a complex and carefully orchestrated process. Part of the insurance against
cancer and other disorders resulting from defective replication is an ancient and strongly-conserved
and evolved set of checkpoints that require fidelity tests to be passed in order for the cell to pass
successive stages of division [50]. A notable feature of the checkpoints is their “deadman switch” setup,
i.e., rather than listening for signals of defects and then emitting signals to halt the process, their default
mode is to send signals that suppress entering the next stage and require active silencing by successfully
passing the fidelity tests. The analogy for AGI evolution is a set of active, not passive, checkpoints that
halt or delay further AGI progress until certain safety criteria established by a consensus of researchers
(human or AGI) are met.
3.8. Intelligent Coins of the Realm
A fundamental difference between today’s money and cryptocurrencies is that the latter can
be “intelligent”, i.e., can be endowed with more functionality than a simple token representing
mutually-agreed-upon or fiat-enforced value. For example, a common AGI malevolent path is achieving
world domination, inadvertently or deliberately, by commanding an exorbitant share of resources,
e.g., Bostrom’s paper-clip disaster [10]. Omohundro considers how universal AGI drives may be
engendered and reasons that since most goals require physical and computational resources unlimited
resource acquisition may be an example [8]. “Open-ended self-improvement” is another possible
universal drive example [18,19]. In biological systems, cell-doubling is a potentially dangerous path to
deleterious claim on resources, and cancers are a collection of such paths. It is worth noting, analogous
to AGI evolution, that biological evolution has found hundreds of cancerous paths, many using
re-programming to avoid cell-cycle checkpoints, and resistance to treatments is real-time exploration
of new paths using various genetic algorithms [50,70,71].
As stated, the axioms provide checks, in some cases redundantly, against this danger path.
An additional check and/or means of implementation could be requiring a specialized token to purchase
server time or rent AGI technology that automatically looks for the requester’s compliance with AGI
safety agreements and standards, otherwise the requester’s “credit” is denied. The token’s DL then
records the secure audit trail including measures of resources requested and protects against hacking
to hide the evidence. Signals of possible dangerous activity, such as exponentially-increasing requests
for resources by the same or related entities, could be incorporated into the token’s programming.
More broadly still, Omohundro cites the vision of a plethora of smart tokens performing intermediation
of value and contractual obligations between the Internet of Things and humans [48].
3.9. The Need for Simulation of Control and Value Alignment
Considerable effort has gone into analyzing how to design, formulate, and validate computer
programs that do what they were designed to do; the general problem is formally undecidable.
Similarly, exploring the space of theorems (e.g., AGI safety solutions) from a set of axioms presents an
exponential explosion.
A possible solution is to create a safe “sandbox” environment where, iteratively and with parameter
sweeps, simulations can be performed and improvements made to control and value alignment systems
until the principles resulting in robust performance validating our design intent can be induced.
Critiques of the sandbox strategy includes: (1) AGI faking benign goals or obedience in the
sandbox and then pursue its actual goals when released; (2) AGI hacking out using superior technology,
developed while in captivity if needed, and most generally, (3) “juvenile” AGI behavior in the sandbox
that fails to predict bad behavior of a more advanced AGI into which it evolves [10]. To address #1
and #2, we need a control system that is effective enough and transparent enough to prevent those
paths, such as through Axioms 2 and 3, transparent and unhackable ethics and morality, and Axiom 4,
the behavior tree value system. Bore et al. take the goal of transparent simulation and modeling to a
59
Big Data Cogn. Comput. 2019, 3, 40
new level by describing a system wherein simulation specifications and an audit trail are stored via
DLT, thus facilitating a means to cross-validate simulations before deployment and obstruct malicious
hacking or fraud in simulations by humans or AI [52] (cf. ASILOMAR #6, Safety—"verifiably so” [9]).
Sandbox problem #3 may be redressed with the separation and balance of powers described next.
3.10. A Singleton Versus a Balance of Powers and Transitive Control Regime
Bostrom defined “singleton” as a single AGI possessing a decisive strategic advantage over
humans and other AIs; a single world-dominant decision-making agency at the highest level [10].
Even if a consistent axiom set is possible that solves the AGI deception and hacking problems and
others, such a set may not be sufficient to solve the problem of the singleton. The solution proposed
below also addresses the proposition that ensuring most AGI are safe to humans is not sufficient and
that all AGI must be rendered safe [34]. The axioms proposed herein presuppose that we cannot foresee
how the evolution of AGI may outgrow the axiom set and the technology and techniques used to
implement them.
Further, if simulation cannot conclusively demonstrate a solution to the singleton problem, then
evolving the methods used to ensure moral, benign AGI along with AGI intelligence must be delegated
to a consortium of AGIs whose values are aligned with humanity’s. The idea is that a beneficent
value and control system will evolve along with AGI and each generation consisting of multiple,
cross-check-and-balance AGIs will, out of self-interest, endow the succeeding generation with the
latest value and control version. Here “generation” means a set of AGIs incorporating a significant
technological advance over a prior set of AGIs. If there is only one AGI, it seems more likely that
an aberrant or errant version could emerge, while if there are, e.g., 500 AGIs in a generation that are
competing pluralistically, as in markets and government based on separation and balance of powers, to
win the DLT consensus to unlock the next generation-enabling AGI technology, it seems far less likely.
Thus what may lock in the transitive endowment of improved control and value alignment
technology between successive AGI generations is storing the technology enabling the next generation
via dApps in the blockchain and requiring multiple AGIs to reach a consensus to unlock, license, and
use the tech, including control and value alignment, to succeeding AGI generations. In this manner
hacking the blockchain, or attempting to coerce individual consensus agents, would be thwarted in the
same way as it is done in the nascent DL methodology extant today. In addition, game theoretic design
approaches may help ensure stable evolutionary strategies, likely a succession of them (dynamic
equilibrium) [24,53,72]. In that context note there can be no Nash equilibrium with one overwhelmingly
dominant player.
Prima facie, an entirely different way to put the principle underlying safe AGI solution to the
singleton problem is to think of future AGI as a distributed automaton, and to recall von Neumann’s
solution to designing a reliable automaton from unreliable parts via redundancy [73]. Critical AGI
algorithms may reside on multiple agents in one or more generations, who require consensus for
ongoing access and cross-check each other in real time (like a deadman’s switch).
4. Conclusions and Future Work
One epochal event likely to trigger AGI, if not the key event, is AI self-programming, or any
other self-improvement, positive-feedback advancement. Close attention should be given to that
development path, progress metrics and simulations developed, and measures enacted to ensure that
access to key self-improvement techniques is via licensing with appropriate safeguards.
Before self-improvement technology can be unleashed, AI behavior control systems need to be
developed and tested in transparent, non-hackable simulation sandbox environments as proposed by
Bore et al. [52] seems essential.
If the ASILOMAR AI Principles [9] or similar agreements are akin to the U.S. Declaration of
Independence, we need to move to the “Articles of Confederation”, step up the current “Federalist
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Papers” stage, and then move to enact the “Constitution”, i.e., firm and ineluctable consensuses among
leading AI workers, encrypted via DLT, as are possible.
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Appendix A. Simple Syllogisms to Help Formalize the Problem Statement
Proposition 1. Probability of Malevolent Use: With no restriction on AGI technology flow via licensing,
malevolent use of AGI is a certainty.
Proof: Assume: 1. There exist malevolent or incompetent humans. 2. They can freely access AGI
technology (e.g., via an AGI app offering “just add goals”). Then: There will exist malevolent use
of AGI.
Corollary 1A: With no restriction on technology flow via licensing, malevolent AGI will destroy a
significant portion of humanity, or the entire species.
Proof: Assume in addition to 1 and 2: 3a. Some malevolent humans would employ AGI for mass
destruction; 3b. Some would seek mass destruction of the entire species.
Corollary 1B: With no restriction on technology flow via licensing, there is a chance that malevolent
AGI may destroy the entire species.
Proof: Assume in addition to 1, 2 and 3: 4. Some malevolent humans are incompetent in their attempts
to contain their destructive goals.
Corollary 1C: The more widely available and easily accessible the destructive AI or AGI, the higher
the probability of its deliberate or inadvertent destructive use.
Proposition 2. Extent of Danger, Importance of Containing: Containing AGI is more important than containing
nuclear weapon usage.
Proof: Assume AGI will have control, by deliberate human consent and design, by accident, or by
AGI intervention, over nuclear weapons, and in addition, other critical resources, e.g., power
grid, transportation systems, financial systems, negotiations between states, etc. Then clearly AGI
containment is more important than containment of nuclear weapon use.
Proposition 3. Probability of Value Misalignment: Given the unlimited availability of an AGI technology as
enabling as “just add goals”, then AGI–human value misalignment is inevitable.
Proof: From a subjective point of view, all that is required is value misalignment by the operator who
adds to the AGI his/her own goals, stemming from his/her values, that conflict with any human’s values;
or put more strongly, the effects are malevolent as perceived by large numbers of humans. From an
absolute point of view, all that is required is misalignment of the operator who adds his/her goals to
the AGI system that conflict with the definition of morality presented here, voluntary, non-fraudulent
transacting (Axiom 3), i.e., usage of the AGI to force his/her preferences on others.
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Appendix B. Examples of AGI Failure Modes from Turchin and Yampolskiy Taxonomies [18,19]
(Continued from Table 4)
Stage/Pathway
Necessary Axioms
See Table 3 Axioms
Sabotage.
a. By impersonation (e.g., hacker, programmer, tester, janitor).
b. AI software to cloak human identity.
c. By someone with access.
a. 7.
b. 7.
c. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11.
Purposefully dangerous military robots and intelligent software.
Robot soldiers, armies of military drones and cyber weapons used to
penetrate networks and cause disruptions to the infrastructure.
a. due to command error
b. due to programming error
c. due to intentional command by adversary or nut
d. due to negligence by adversary or nut (e.g., AI nanobots start
global catastrophe)
Axiom 3, morality, does not apply where coercive
force or fraud are a premise, e.g., military or
police use of force, while axiom 2, ethics, in this
case embodying restrictions on use of force, and 4,
behavior control, and the rest, do apply.
a. 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11
b. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11
c. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11
d. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Under some circumstances, such as if the means is
already available, there is no solution (see
Appendix, Proposition 1).
AI specifically designed for malicious and criminal purposes.
Artificially intelligent viruses, spyware, Trojan horses, worms, etc.
Stuxnet-style virus hacks infrastructure causing e.g., nuclear reactor
meltdowns, power blackouts, food and drug poisoning, airline and
drone crashes, large-scale geo-engineering systems failures. Home
robots turning on owners, autonomous cars attack.
Narrow AI bio-hacking virus. Virus starts human extinction via DNA
manipulation, virus invades brain via neural interface
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Under some circumstances, no solution (see
Appendix, Proposition 1).
Robots replace humans. People lose jobs, money, and/or motivation
to live; genetically-modified superior human-robot hybrids replace
humans
No guaranteed solution from axiom set. All jobs
can be replaced by AGI including science,
mathematics, management, music, art, poetry, etc.
Under axioms 1–3 humans could trade technology
for resources with AGI in its pre-takeoff stage to
ensure some type of guaranteed income.
Narrow bio-AI creates super-addictive drug. Widespread addiction
and switching off of happy, productive life, e.g., social networks,
fembots, wire-heading, virtual reality, designer drugs, games
1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10
Nation states evolve into computer-based totalitarianism.
Suppression of human values; human replacement with robots;
concentration camps; killing of “useless” people; humans become
slaves; system becomes fragile to variety of other catastrophes
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
AI fights for survival but incapable of self-improvement 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Failure of nuclear deterrence AI.
a. impersonation of entity authorized to launch attack
b. virus hacks nuclear arsenal or Doomsday machine
c. creation of Doomsday machines by AI
d. self-aware military AI (“Skynet”)
a. 7
b. 4, 6, 8, 9, 10
c. 1, 2 (if creation of Doomsday machine is
categorized as unethical), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
d. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11
Opportunity cost if strong AI is not created. Failure of global control:
e.g., bioweapons created by biohackers; other major and minor risks
not averted via AI control systems.
To create AGI with minimized risk and avoid
opportunity cost need axioms 1–11
AI becomes malignant. AI breaks restrictions and fights for world
domination (control over all resources), possibly hiding its malicious
intent.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Note it may achieve increasing and unlimited
control over resources via market transactions by
convincing enough volitional entities to give it
control due to potential benefits to them
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Stage/Pathway
Necessary Axioms
See Table 3 Axioms
AI deception. AI escapes from confinement; hacks its way out; copies
itself into the cloud and hides that fact; destroys initial confinement
facility or keeps fake version there.
AI Super-persuasion. AI uses psychology to deceive humans; “you
need me to avoid global catastrophe”. Ability to predict human
behavior vastly exceeds humans’ ability.
Deception scenarios require the axioms of identity
verification via DLT.
Deception plus super-persuasive AI require
transparent and unhackable ethics and morality
stored via DLT.
Singleton AI reaches overwhelming power. Prevents other AI
projects from continuing via hacking or diversion; gains control over
influential humans via psychology or neural hacking; gains control
over nuclear, bio and chemical weaponry; gains control over
infrastructure; gains control over computers and internet.
AI starts initial self-improvement. Human operator unwittingly
unleashes AI with self-improvement; self-improvement leads to
unlimited resource demands (a.k.a. world domination) or becomes
malignant.
AI declares itself a world power. May or may not inform humans of
the level of its control over resources, may perform secret actions;
starts activity proving its existence (“miracles”, large-scale
destruction or construction).
AI continues self-improvement. AI uses earth’s and then solar
system’s resources to continue self-improvement and control of
resources, increasingly broad and successful experiments with
intelligence algorithms, and attempts more risky methods of
self-improvement than designers intended.
The axioms per se do not seem to solve Singleton
scenarios. They are addressed in a section below
where the fundamental premise is each generation
of AGI will contract with the succeeding
generation and use the best technology and
techniques to ensure continuation of a common
but evolving value system. The same principle
underlies solutions to successively self-improving
AI to AGI transition and AGI evolution in which
humans are still meaningfully involved.
AI starts conquering universe at “light speed”. AI builds nanobot
replicators, sends them out into galaxy at light speed; creates
simulations of other civilizations to estimate frequency and types of
alien AI and solve the Fermi paradox; conquers the universe in our
light cone and interacts with aliens and alien AI; attempts to solve
end of the universe issues
The inevitable scenario where AI evolution
exceeds human ability to monitor and intercede is
what necessitates distributed, unhackable DLT
methods and smart, i.e., automated, contracts.
Further, transparent and unhackable ethics, and a
durable form of morality, also unhackable via
DLT, are what may ensure each generation of AGI
passing the moral baton to the succeeding
generation.
Appendix C. Typical Failure Use Cases by Axiom
Axiom of Safe AGI
Omitted from Set
Failure Use Case if Omitted
Licensing of technology via
market transactions
1. Restriction and licensing via state fiat: Corrupt use or use benefitting special interest.
2. No licensing (freely available): Unauthorized and immoral use
Ethics transparently stored
via DLT so they cannot be
altered, forged or deleted
1. User cannot determine if AI has behavior safeguard technology (i.e., ethics)
2. Invisible ethics may not restrict moral or safe access
Morality, defined as no use
of force or fraud, therefore
resulting in voluntary
transactions, stored via DLT
1. Inadvertent or deliberate access to dangerous technology by immoral entities (human or
AI), i.e., entities using AI in force or fraud
2. Note that police and military AI will have modified versions of this axiom
3. Note that this axiom does not solve the case of super-persuasive AI as alternative to fraud
Behavior control structure
(e.g., a behavior tree)
augmented by adding
human-compatible values
(axioms 2 and 3) at its roots
1. Uncontrolled behavior by AGI, e.g., behavior in conflict with a set of ethics and/or
morality, either deliberately or inadvertently
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Axiom of Safe AGI
Omitted from Set
Failure Use Case if Omitted
Unique hardware and
software ID codes
1. Inability for entities to restrict access to AGI components because they cannot specify them
2. Inability to identify causes of AGI failure to meet design intent
3. Inability to identify causes of AGI moral failure via identification of components causing
the failure
Note the audit trail axiom depends on this one.
Configuration Item
(automated configuration)
1. Lessened ability to detect improper functionality or configuration of software or hardware
within AGI.
2. Lessened ability to detect improper functionality or configuration of software or hardware
to which AGI has access.
3. Inability to shut down internal AGI software and hardware modules.
4. Inability to shut down software and hardware modules to which AGI has access.





1. Inability to detect fraudulent access to secured software or hardware (e.g., nuclear launch
codes, financial or health accounts).
2. Inability to detect AGI impersonation of human or authentic moral AGI (e.g., POTUS,
military commander, police chief, CEO, journalist, banker, auditor, et al.).
Smart contracts based
on DLT
1. Inability to enforce evolution of moral AGI due to its pace
2. Inability to enforce contracts with AGI due to its speed of decisions and actions




modules encrypted via DLT
1. Inability to restrict access to key software modules essential to AGI (i.e., they could be
hacked more easily by humans or AI).
Audit trail of component
usage stored via DLT
1. Inability to track unauthorized usage of restricted software and hardware essential to AGI.
2. Inability to track unethical usage of restricted software and hardware essential to AGI.
3. Inability to track immoral usage of restricted software and hardware essential to AGI.
4. Inability to identify which component(s) failed in AGI failure.
5. Inability to prevent hacking of audit trail.
6. Increased cost in time and capital to detect criminal usage of restricted software and
hardware by AGI, and therefore, to apply justice and social ostracism.
7. Inability to compete with regimes using DLT-based audit trails due to slowness to detect
failure, identify entities or components responsible for failure, and implement solutions




petitions based on DLT
1. Lessened ability to reduce criminal AGI access to societal resources.
2. Inability for entities to preferentially reduce non-criminal AGI access to societal resources.
Game theory/mechanism
design
1. Lacking a system to incent increasingly diverse autonomous intelligent agents to
communicate results likely to be valuable to other agents and in general collaborate toward
reaching individual and group goals, cohesiveness required for collaborative effort fails
over time.
2. DLT in a digital ecosystem theoretically permits all conflicts to be resolved via voluntary
transactions (the Coase theorem), but a pre-requisite set of rules may be necessary.
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Abstract: In this paper we describe a holistic AI forecasting framework which draws on a broad
body of literature from disciplines such as forecasting, technological forecasting, futures studies and
scenario planning. A review of this literature leads us to propose a new class of scenario planning
techniques that we call scenario mapping techniques. These techniques include scenario network
mapping, cognitive maps and fuzzy cognitive maps, as well as a new method we propose that we
refer to as judgmental distillation mapping. This proposed technique is based on scenario mapping
and judgmental forecasting techniques, and is intended to integrate a wide variety of forecasts into a
technological map with probabilistic timelines. Judgmental distillation mapping is the centerpiece of
the holistic forecasting framework in which it is used to inform a strategic planning process as well as
for informing future iterations of the forecasting process. Together, the framework and new technique
form a holistic rethinking of how we forecast AI. We also include a discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the framework, its implications for practice and its implications on research priorities
for AI forecasting researchers.
Keywords: AI forecasting; technology forecasting; scenario analysis; scenario mapping;
transformative AI; scenario network mapping; judgmental distillation mapping; holistic forecasting
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1. Introduction
In a world of quick and dramatic change, forecasting future events is challenging. If this were not
the case then meteorologists would be out of a job. However, meteorological forecasting is relatively
straightforward today given the relatively low price of computation, the advanced capabilities of
numerical simulation and the myriad powerful sensors distributed around the world for collecting
input information. Forecasting technological progress and innovation, however, is much more difficult
because there is no past data to draw upon and future technologies are at best poorly understood [1].
Forecasting progress toward broadly capable AI systems is even more difficult still because we do not
yet know the fundamental architectures that may drive such systems.
This decade has seen significant milestones in AI research realized [2–5], and the realization of
these milestones has left many to perceive the rate of AI progress to be increasing. This perceived
increase in the rate of progress has been accompanied by substantial increases in investment, as well
as increased public and governmental interest. Consequently, there is a growing group in the AI
strategy research community that is working to measure progress and develop timelines for AI,
with significant effort focusing on forecasting transformative AI or human-level artificial intelligence
(HLAI). (We consider forecasts for human-level machine intelligence, high-level machine intelligence
and artificial general intelligence to be equivalent to forecasting HLAI.). Efforts to these ends, however,
are not unified and the study of AI forecasting more broadly does not appear to be directed at a well
understood objective. Only one previous study has proposed a framework for forecasting or modeling
AI progress [6]. This paper outlines an alternative to that previous framework that utilizes both
judgmental, statistical and data driven forecasting techniques as well as scenario analysis techniques.
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To be certain, efforts to forecast AI progress are of paramount importance. HLAI has the potential
to transform society in ways that are difficult to anticipate [7]. Not only are its impacts difficult
to imagine, but the notion of HLAI itself is ill-defined; what may be indicative of human-level
intelligence to some may not be sufficient to others, and there is no definitive test for human-level
intelligence. (Recently, a new field of scientific study has been proposed for better understanding
machine behavior [8].) This has lead studies concerned with forecasting AI progress or HLAI to focus
on the replacement of humans at jobs or tasks [9,10]. The lack of an objective definition for HLAI is
due in part to the fact that we do not know how to create it. In theory, HLAI could be instantiated by
one algorithm [11] or constructed by combining different components [12]. To adequately address this
and other unique challenges faced in forecasting HLAI, methods that integrate diverse information
and a variety of possible paths are required.
The necessity of planning for HLAI is obvious. It is also plausible, and perhaps even likely, that AI
will have severe transformative effects on society without reaching human-level intelligence. A formal
description of the extreme case for such a scenario is Drexler’s notion of comprehensive AI services
(CAIS) [13]. Therefore, for the purpose of ensuring that AI is developed to do the most good possible
for humanity, we identify the primary task of AI forecasting to be that of forecasting transformative AI
(this includes artificial general intelligence [AGI], AI generating algorithms and superintelligence).
We define transformative AI to be any set of AI technologies that has the potential to transform society
in ways that dramatically reshape social structures or the quality of life for social groups.
Here, we take the position that AI forecasts solely in the form of timelines (dates given by which
we should expect to have developed transformative AI) are undesirable. To address this issue we
propose a new AI forecasting framework along with a new scenario mapping technique that supports
the framework. Independently, the framework and the new method each constitute novel contributions
to the body of knowledge. However, together the framework and new technique demonstrate a holistic
rethinking of how we forecast AI. It is this new perspective that we believe to be the paper’s most
significant contribution.
In the following pages the paper proceeds by first examining related literature. We do not consider
the broader body of literature for the relevant topics, rather we focus only on the salient elements.
After outlining scenario planning techniques, we move to propose a new subclass of scenario mapping
techniques. Next, we propose a new method as part of this subclass which we call judgmental
distillation mapping. This new method is then described as a critical component of the new AI
forecasting framework. Following this description of the framework, we discuss strengths, weaknesses,
the implications of practice and the implications on future research in AI forecasting. We conclude by
summarizing the key ideas and recommendations.
2. Literature Review
This section examines several bodies of literature relevant to the holistic framework being
proposed. This literature review is by no means comprehensive, and, due to the large number of
academic disciplines and techniques covered, a more extensive literature is suggested for future work.
We consider the research topics of forecasting, technology forecasting, scenario analysis, AI forecasting
as well as a brief discussion of digital platforms.
2.1. Forecasting
Forecasting techniques are commonly broken down into two broad classes: judgmental methods
and statistical methods [14]. Statistical methods are preferred for most forecasting applications and
can range from simple extrapolations to complex neural network models or econometric systems of
simultaneous equations [15]. However, statistical methods perform poorly in cases with little or no
historical data, cases with a large degree of uncertainty and cases involving complex systems [16].
In such situations it is common to fall back on judgmental techniques. In this subsection we will forgo
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any discussion of statistical methods to focus on the different judgmental techniques and the challenges
of expert selection.
Surveys are likely the most widely used judgmental technique. They solicit expert opinion
from multiple experts without interaction between them. This technique is widely used because it
is straightforward to implement and relatively inexpensive [1]. Challenges to this method include
sampling difficulties, especially those due to nonresponses. The Cooke method (or the classic method)
of assessing the quality of expert judgements for expert elicitation comes from the field of risk
analysis [17]. It is a very powerful technique that involves the inclusion of calibration questions to
calibrate the experts’ forecasts so that they may be weighted during aggregation [18].
The Delphi technique was developed at the Rand Corporation in the 1950s at the same time
as the development of scenario planning methods [19]. This approach involves a group of experts
participating in an anonymized forecasting process through two or more rounds [1]. Each round
involves answering questionnaires, aggregating the data and exchanging the summarized results and
comments. Expert participation, expert selection and the falloff rate of participants over iterative
survey rounds are the primary challenges. The Delphi technique is powerful and versatile, with the
capability to be used for scenario building exercises as well as forecasting, and the flexibility to support
large groups of experts with small modifications [20]. Despite its wide use for over a half century,
there are still many questions about fundamental issues of its effectiveness for certain situations [21,22].
Specifically, academic work that has been conducted on the Delphi technique has frequently used
students, which, for numerous reasons may be misleading. No work on the Delphi technique or other
powerful judgmental forecasting techniques has been conducted to assess the quality of forecasts for
the purpose of technology forecasting.
Prediction markets are exchange traded markets intended for predicting the outcomes of events.
They rely on a platform that allows people to make trades depending on their assessment of these
outcomes. Prediction market contracts are binary options that are created to represent a forecasting
target and then traded through the market. During trading, the market price of a contract adjusts
dynamically to account for participants’ predictions and is used as an indicator of the probability
of these events. This incentivizes participants to be as accurate as possible in order to receive the
most gain while allowing for aggregation over an arbitrarily large market. The free market tends to
collect and aggregate predictive information well due to the strong economic incentives for better
information. Consequently, prediction markets often produce forecasts that have lower prediction
error than conventional forecasting techniques [23]. Green et al. performed a comparison of the
Delphi technique and prediction markets, finding that, when feasible, prediction markets have some
advantages, but that the Delphi technique was still generally underused (it is unclear which is better
for technology forecasting) [24]. However, the advantages of each technique were also dependent on
the problem. Prediction markets performed better for short-term, straightforward problems whereas
the Delphi technique was useful for a broader range of problems and for high uncertainty situations.
Superforecasting is a recently developed technique that uses groups of forecasting experts,
i.e., superforecasters, in combination with advanced aggregation techniques to generate forecasts.
Superforecasting has been demonstrated to be more accurate than prediction markets and to forecast
certain types of targets (e.g., geopolitical events) better than any other methods [25]. The technique was
developed using forecasting tournaments for a competition for the US’ Intelligence Advanced Research
Projects Activity (IARPA). The project was funded for the purpose of developing new methods in
order to improve the US intelligence communities forecasting abilities [26]. However, superforecasting
is not suitable for all forecasting problems. Particularly, it is ill-suited for predictions that are either
entirely straightforward and well suited for econometric methods, or for predictions that are seemingly
impossible. It is also not suitable for existential risk applications [27]. Furthermore, while it may be
one of the most powerful forecasting methods available for near-term forecasts, it still is not able to
make forecasts any better than a coin toss for events over five years in the future (Tetlock considers
experts no better than normal people at forecasting political events).
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Combining different types of forecasts that draw from different information sources can be
a powerful technique for forecasting when there is significant uncertainty about the situation or
uncertainty about the different methods [14]. Another powerful technique can be the adjustment of
statistical forecasts using expert judgment, particularly in cases of high uncertainty where domain
expertise is critical and environments are poorly defined [28]. In such cases, structured judgmental
adjustment can be a very powerful technique as long as efforts are made to counter cognitive biases [29].
Scenario planning methods are sometimes considered an adjunct forecasting method and scenarios
are commonly employed to deliver the results of forecasts to decision makers [14]. However,
substantial work has been conducted considering their practical use in improving decision making
under uncertainty [30,31]. They are considered an essential technique in the technology forecasting
and management literature [1], thus, we devote an entire subsection to them in the following pages.
Goodwin and Wright examine both statistical and judgmental forecasting methods in their
ability to aid the anticipation of rare, high-impact events [21]. They find that while all methods have
limitations, it is possible to combine dialectical inquiry and components of devil’s advocacy with the
Delphi technique and scenario planning techniques to improve the anticipation of rare events. In their
comparison of techniques (including an informative table comparing methods for anticpating rare
events) they consider several judgmental methods including expert judgment, structured judgmental
decomposition, structured analogies, judgmental adjustment and prediction markets, as well as the
Delphi technique and scenario planning.
Selecting experts is a challenging but necessary task when using any of these judgmental forecasting
techniques. The first step in identifying experts is to identify the range of perspectives that will be
needed in the study [1]. Researchers typically want to prioritize the most knowledgeable experts for
vital perspectives first; less vital viewpoints can often times use less knowledgeable experts or substitute
secondary sources for expert opinion. Researchers should also be cognizant of possible sources of
experts’ biases when selecting experts and analyzing their responses. Some significant attributes
include a broad perspective relating to their knowledge of the innovation of interest, a cognitive agility
for being able to extrapolate from their knowledge to satisfy future possibilities, and uncertainties and
a strong imagination [32]. There is also the question of how many experts one needs for a study. This is
commonly dependent on many factors, including the type of the study, the technology of interest and
the scope of the study. Sampling diverse populations can lead to many issues, however, when it is
necessary, documentation for the particular type of study commonly addresses these issues [33].
2.2. Technology Forecasting
Technology forecasting is a challenging task and the body of literature concerning this topic
is very broad. To be certain, there is not a well-developed field of study that directly concerns the
forecasting of future technologies. Much of what is considered here as technology forecasting literature
is focused on technology management, and, consequently, many of the techniques are intended to aid
in organizational management and planning.
A wide variety of methods are used for technology forecasting, including both statistical and
judgmental techniques. Other techniques are also used, some of which are unique to technology
forecasting. Innovation forecasting techniques can be used for mapping scientific domains that
rely on bibliometric analysis [34]. Tech mining is a similar technique that harnesses data mining
methods to extract information from patent databases and the Internet for the purposes of innovation
forecasting [35]. Due to the substantial uncertainty, scenario analysis techniques are also widely used
for strategic planning involving emerging technologies [1]. This subsection does not revisit judgmental
forecasting techniques discussed in the previous subsection, but focuses on techniques that have not
yet been discussed. Scenario analysis is discussed in depth in the following subsection.
Assessing progress—particularly the rate of progress—is essential when developing any type
of technology forecasting model. This is so because the naïve assumption that historical trends can
be extrapolated to the future is many times correct, and, consequently, trend extrapolation is a very
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powerful forecasting technique [1]. Indicators are variables that can be used for extrapolation or for
building statistical forecasting models because we believe them to be good for predicting future progress.
There are two basic types of indicators that are of interest in technology forecasting: science and
technology indicators and social indicators. Science and technology indicators, or simply technology
indicators, are directly related to the progress of the technology of interest. Social indicators are intended
to collectively represent the state of a society or some subset of it. Technology indicators ideally must
adhere to three restrictions: (1) the indicator must measure the level of a technology’s functionality,
(2) the indicator must be applicable to both the new technology and to any older technologies it replaces
and (3) there must be a sufficient amount of data available to compute historical values. In reality,
many times indicators are not available which satisfy all of these requirements. In such cases efforts
should be made to identify indictors that suffice as best as possible. Social indicators can include
economic factors, demographic factors, educational factors, etc., and they are thought to be analogous
to a technology’s functional capacity.
Technology roadmapping is a widely used and flexible technique that is commonly used for
strategic and long-term planning [36]. It is known to be particularly effective in structuring and
streamlining the research and development process for organizations [37], but it can be used for
planning at both an organizational level and a multi-organizational level. It is generally thought to
consist of three distinct phases—a preliminary phase, a roadmap construction phase and a follow-up
phase—and commonly uses workshops for the map generation phase [38]. When applied, it often
uses a structured and graphical technique that enables exploring and communicating future scenarios.
However, its lack of rigor and heavy reliance on visual aids can also be seen as weaknesses [1].
Innovation forecasting is a term that is typically associated with the use technology forecasting
methods in combination with bibliometric analysis [34]. In general, bibliometric methods are powerful
analysis tools for understanding the progression of science. Such methods have been used for the mapping
of this progression in different scientific disciplines for several decades [39]. Maps of relational structures
present in bibliometric data are useful for visualizing the state of research within the domain(s) of interest
and can lead to insights regarding future research directions and geopolitical issues [40].
Tech mining is another notion that is frequently associated with innovation forecasting and
management [35]. It generally refers to a broad set of techniques which can be used to generate indicators
from data. Porter and Cunningham discuss the use of innovation indicators for understanding emerging
technologies, and propose nearly 200 such indicators. Here, we consider tech forecasting to encompass
all bibliometric and scientometric techniques used for the purposes of technology forecasting.
While we have focused here on judgmental forecasting techniques and other techniques for
technology forecasting, there is evidence that suggests that extrapolation and statistical methods
are better for forecasting technological progress [41]. Studies have found that technology forecasts
developed using statistical methods were more accurate than those developed from other methods,
with forecasts about autonomous systems and computers being the most predictable [42]. However,
there is certainly not agreement on this topic. Brynjolfsson and Mitchell conclude that “simply
extrapolating past trends will be misleading, and a new framework is needed,” [43]. The holistic
perspective proposed here attempts to provide a new framework.
2.3. Scenario Analysis
Scenario analysis is a term used in technology management literature to refer to scenario planning
techniques when applied in the context of technology and innovation forecasting [1]. People use
scenario analysis naturally by thinking in terms of future scenarios when making most decisions
involving uncertainty in everyday life. It is also a very effective technique for decision-making processes
in more complex situations [44]. Scenario methods are rooted in strategic planning exercises from the
military in the form of ‘war game’ simulations, or simply wargames. Wargames are a type of strategy
game that have both amateur and professional uses. For amateurs they are used for entertainment,
with some of the earliest examples being the games of Go and chess. Fantasy role-play games such as
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Dungeons and Dragons are also derived from wargames and used for entertainment. Professionally,
wargames can be used as a training exercise or for research into plausible scenarios for highly uncertain
environments such as those encountered on battlefields during wartime [45]. Events in World War II,
such as the allied preparations for D-Day, made clear to military commanders the value of wargames
and scenario techniques. Following the war, during the 1950s and 1960s, new scenario techniques were
independently developed in both the United States and France. In the United States, the methods were
developed at the Rand Corporation, a research and development venture of the US Air Force. In France,
the techniques were developed for public planning purposes. Although developed independently,
these two schools eventually led to the development of very similar scenario techniques.
Scenario analysis, as it is known today, typically involves the development of several different
scenarios of plausible futures. It is most widely thought of as a qualitative technique for the purposes
of strategic planning in organizations [46]. Proponents of this thinking often consider scenarios as
an aid for thinking about the future, not for predicting it. However, a rich body of literature has
developed over the years, and many quantitative and hybrid techniques have also been shown to
be practically useful [20]. Here we describe three schools of scenario techniques: the intuitive logics
school, the probabilistic modified trends (PMT) school and La Prospective, a.k.a. the French school.
We attempt to outline these different schools below.
The most prominent of qualitative methods, having received the most attention in the scenario
planning literature, is the intuitive logics school [20]. After being developed by at the Rand Corporation
in the 1950s and 1960s, it was popularized from its use by Royal Dutch Shell in the 1970s, and it is
sometimes referred to as the ‘Shell approach’ [19]. This school of methods is founded on the assumption
that business decisions rely on a complex web of relationships including economic, technological,
political, social and resource-related factors. Here, scenarios are hypothetical series of events that serve
to focus attention on decision-points and causal processes. While such scenario planning techniques
are very useful for business purposes, alternative scenario planning techniques can be used for much
more than investigating blind spots in organizations’ strategic plans [47].
The most common of quantitative methods is considered to be the PMT school, which also originated
at the Rand Corporation during the 1960s [20,48]. This school incorporates two distinct methodologies:
trend-impact analysis (TIA) and cross-impact analysis (CIA) [19]. TIA is a relatively simple concept
which involves the modification of extrapolations from historical trends in four relatively simple steps.
CIA attempts to measure changes in the probability of the occurrence of events which could cause
deviations from extrapolated trends through cross-impact calculations. The primary difference between
the two techniques is the added layer of complexity introduced in CIA during the cross-impact calculation.
The two schools described above may do well to illustrate qualitative and quantitative scenario
techniques, but they are by no means an exhaustive description of this dichotomy of scenario planning
methods. Another way to think of qualitative and quantitative scenarios is as storylines and models.
The former captures possible futures in words, narratives and stories while the latter captures possible
futures in numbers and rules of systems’ behaviors. Schoemaker notably suggests that the development
of quantitative models is an auxiliary option for assisting in making decisions, whereas the development
of scenarios is the purpose of the activity [49]. Hybrid scenario techniques attempt to bridge the gap
between methods which rely on storylines and models.
La Prospective is a school of hybrid scenario techniques that emerged in the 1950s in France for
long-term planning and to provide a guiding vision for policy makers and the nation [20]. This school
is unique in that it uses a more integrated approach through a blend of systems analysis tools and
procedures, including morphological analysis and several computer-aided tools [19]. Although it arose
independently, this school can also be seen to a large extent to combine the intuitive logics and PMT
methodologies. A full review of scenario planning literature is beyond the scope of this work, but we
believe that these simple characterizations to be sufficient for the purpose of this work.
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2.3.1. Scenario Analysis for Mapping
Traditional qualitative scenario planning techniques certainly have a role in assisting decision makers
of organizations and other stakeholders involved in the development and governance of transformative
AI. However, such techniques can do little to map the plausible paths of AI technology development
due to the large space of possible paths. Traditional quantitative methods certainly have a role in some
organizational decisions as well. However, while they are commonly sufficient for strategic decision
making, they typically fall short for understanding and informing design decisions of complex systems.
Over the past two decades, the use of scenario analysis techniques for mapping complex systems,
complex environments and complex technologies has increased [50]. Particularly, we focus on three
such techniques. The first is a relatively obscure method that has seen little practical application, yet it
has significant potential for mapping the paths of possible futures for which there are high levels of
uncertainty [20]. The second originated as a way to represent social scientific knowledge through
directed graphs, and has since become a common method for scenario analysis in multi-organizational
contexts [51]. The third extends the second by making those methods computable for quantitative
forecasting, but also has practical uses in a large number of applications across various other domains.
Each of these techniques offers insight that contributes to the holistic framework proposed here for
forecasting transformative AI.
Scenario network mapping (SNM) is a qualitative scenario technique that was proposed to
improve upon existing methods by including a substantially larger number of scenarios, each of which
forms a portion of a particular pathway of possible events [52]. This results in a network-like structure
which is easily updated in the future with the addition, removal and repositioning of scenarios and
their interactions in light of new information. A key feature to SNMs is their reliance on the holonic
principle which implies that a scenario can also be decomposed into more scenarios. Following the
development of the scenario map, the scenarios can be refined further using causal layered analysis
techniques [53]. This technique benefits from larger groups of experts, because the structure of the
network becomes more comprehensive with iterative refinement. In a typical SNM scenario building
workshop, several hundred possible scenarios are generated, which are then typically reduced to
30–50 plausible scenarios that are used to create the scenario map. Due to this ability to accommodate
a large number of plausible scenarios, we see potential for this method for its intended purpose as well
as the potential for some derivative of it to be effectively used to identify a large number of possible
paths to HLAI (here, we denote the later SNM with an asterisk).
Axelrod first introduced cognitive maps in the 1970s to represent social scientific knowledge with
directed graphs [54]. His work has since been extended to a variety of applications including scenario
analysis. However, the psychological notion of cognitive maps—people’s representations of their
environments and mental modes—comes from two decades earlier [55]. Cognitive maps are effective
for facilitating information structuring, elaboration, sequencing and interaction among participants or
stakeholders [51]. They are sometimes thought of as causal maps because of the causal network of
relationships represented in the nodes and edges. Here nodes can be thought of as scenarios, and the
edges describe the causal relationships between them.
Fuzzy cognitive map (FCM) modeling is another hybrid scenario technique that can better
integrate expert, stakeholder and historical data through the development of scenarios that assist in
linking quantitative models with qualitative storylines [50,56]. FCMs were first proposed by Kosko in
the 1980s as a means for making qualitative cognitive maps—used for representing social scientific
knowledge [54]—computable by incorporating fuzzy logic. While effective for scenario analysis,
FCMs are used generally for decision making and modeling complex systems, and they have a wide
variety of applications in multiple domains ranging from online privacy management to robotics [57].
Simply, we can think about FCMs as weighted directed graphs wherein the nodes are fuzzy (i.e.,
they take a continuous value from zero to one rather than a discrete value) and representative of
verbally described concepts while the edges are representative of causal effects.
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2.3.2. Using Expert Opinion for Scenario Analysis
Virtually all scenario analysis techniques use expert opinion in some way, and there are various
ways in which expert opinion is elicited for scenario generation. These techniques include interviews,
panels, workshops and the Delphi technique [20]. Many times specific techniques rely directly
on the methods for elicitation of expert opinion being employed. For example, the proprietary
Interactive Cross-Impact Simulation (INTERAX) methodology relies the generation of a large database
of the use of an ongoing Delphi study with close to 500 experts to maintain and update a database
of approximately 100 possible events and roughly 50 trend forecasts. Based on six case studies,
List suggests that for creating SNMs four half-day workshops with 20 experts is roughly optimal [58].
However, some techniques do not rely specifically on one method for elicitation of expert opinion.
FCMs can be developed using expert panels, workshops or interviews. In the case of using interviews,
where combining expert opinions is required, all experts’ opinions can be treated equally or expert
opinions can be weighted based on some assessment of confidence in expert’s judgement [56].
2.4. AI Forecasting
The study of forecasting AI and HLAI is in its nascency, and much of the work has relied on expert
surveys. The oldest of these dates to a survey conducted in 1972 at a lecture series at the University
College of London [59]. Since 2006 12 more surveys have been administered [60]. Such surveys
have been used to generate forecasts in the form of timelines. The most recent work has aggregated
probability distributions collected from participants [10,61,62]. While the collection and aggregation
of probability distributions from experts is an improvement upon previous studies on the topic,
there remain many shortcomings in trying to quantify long-term forecasts from surveys of expert
opinion, the foremost perhaps being the questionable reliability of experts [25].
The most rigorous of expert survey studies include four particular surveys which have been
conducted since 2009, all pertaining to notions of artificial general intelligence (AGI). (Here, we consider
human-level machine intelligence, high-level machine intelligence, human-level artificial intelligence
and other similar ideas as notions of AGI.) The first of these surveys was conducted at the 2nd
Conference on Artificial General Intelligence and found that the majority of experts believed that
HLAI would be realized around the middle of the 21st century or sooner [63]. The study also found
disagreement among experts concerning the risks involved with AGI and the order of certain milestones
(different human-level cognitive tasks) leading to the development of AGI. The next of these studies
consisted of a survey that was distributed among four groups of experts at the conference on Philosophy
and Theory of AI in 2011, at the AGI-12 conference, to members of the Greek Association for Artificial
Intelligence and to the top 100 authors in artificial intelligence by number of citations in May 2013 [64].
This survey questioned participants as to when they expected high-level machine intelligence (HLMI)
to be developed, and reported the experts to give a 50% chance of HLMI being developed between
2040 and 2050. These experts further indicated that they believed superintelligence would be created
between 2 and 30 years after the emergence of HLMI. Slightly over half of them believed that this
would be a positive development while roughly 30% expected it to have negative consequences.
The next survey solicited the primary authors of the 2015 Neural Information Processing Systems
(NeurIPS) conference and the 2015 International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML) [61].
This study questioned participants on their forecasts of HLMI, but also included questions about a
large number of specific tasks. All forecasters were asked for 10%, 50% and 90% probabilities, which
effectively elicited a probability distribution from each. This was not new, but the analysis, including
the aggregation of these probability distributions, was novel in the context of AI forecasting. The results
indicated a median of 45 years until the development of HLMI, but, interestingly, a median of 120 years
before all human jobs would be automated. The study also found Asian participants to have much
earlier predictions that Europeans and North Americans.
The most recent expert survey was solicited at the 2018 International Conference on Machine
Learning, the 2018 International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 2018 Joint Conference
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on Human-Level Artificial Intelligence [10]. Rather than focusing on notions of AGI, this study elicited
five forecasts for different levels of transformative AI. It also included calibration questions—the first
expert survey in the context of AI forecasting to do so. While the forecasts were closely aligned with
the previous study, an improved statistical model was used. The use of a naïve calibration technique
improved the explainability of the variability in the statistical model for the most extreme transformative
AI forecasts. The results also indicated that forecasts from researchers at the HLAI conference were
more precise and that this group exhibited lower levels of uncertainty about their forecasts.
A number of meta-analyses of AI forecasting studies have also been conducted. In 2012 and 2014,
Armstrong and Sotala and Armstrong et al. assessed previous timeline predictions that had been
incorrect [65,66]. They proposed a decomposition schema for analyzing, judging and improving the
previous predictions. Muehlhauser has also conducted examinations of timelines and previous AI
forecasts [67,68]. His studies offer the most comprehensive discussion of timelines for notions of AGI
prior to the surveys conducted over the past decade. Regarding timelines, Muehlhauser concludes
that we have learned very little from previous timelines other than the suggestion that it is likely
we achieve AGI sometime in the 21st century. He further explores what we can learn from previous
timelines and concludes with a list of ten suggestions for further exploration of the existing literature.
AI Impacts (www.aiimpacts.org) is a non-profit organization that is commonly thought to be the
leading AI forecasting organization. It has conducted significant work discussing techniques, curating
related content and organizing previous efforts for forecasting HLAI, among other research and
curation efforts that are aimed at understanding the potential impacts and nature of HLAI. AI Impacts
has contributed significantly to practical forecasting knowledge, even leading a major AI forecasting
study in 2016 [61].
Recent work by Amodei and Hernandez presented a trendline for the increase in training costs
for major milestones in AI progress between 2012 and 2018 [69]. This trendline depicted exponential
growth for the increase in the amount of training time required for achieving selected AI milestones;
the training time doubled every 3.5 months. However, several critiques of this have emerged [70,71],
the most compelling being that from a purely economic perspective the trend was unsustainable for
a long period; the exponential rate for training costs was significantly greater than the exponential
decrease in costs of compute. Despite these fundamental challenges to the trend, AI experts generally
expect the trend to continue for at least 10 years [10]. While not receiving as much visibility, other efforts
have been made to plot or collect relevant data to measure the progress of AI research [72–75]. Despite
these efforts, the best technology indicator given the criteria previously discussed may be that of
Amodei and Hernandez.
While most practical work on AI forecasting to date has relied on expert surveys and extrapolation,
there are several important exceptions. Zhang and Dafoe recently conducted a large-scale survey of
non-expert opinion that was intended to assess the opinions of the American public regarding AI
progress [62]. Another study that was conducted in 2009 used the technology roadmapping technique
in an attempt to create a roadmap for the development of HLAI [76]. The results of this workshop
depicted expected milestones on the path to HLAI arranged in a two-dimensional grid of individual
capability and sociocultural engagement. While organizers of the workshop were disappointed in
what they perceived as a failure of the workshop to generate a straightforward roadmap [77,78],
arguably 50% or greater of the tasks have been completed [79]. More recently, the Association for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence and the Computing Community Consortium have completed
a 20-year Roadmap for AI research [80]. This roadmap was less ambitious than the earlier attempt,
and focused on three major themes: integrated intelligence, meaningful interaction and self-aware
learning. The AI Roadmap Institute (www.roadmapinstitute.org) has also been created to study,
create and compare roadmaps to AGI. Although the institute’s efforts have resulted in the development
of a roadmap, however, it does not concern technical elements as much as social elements.
Another relevant body of research concerns risk analysis. Significant work has been conducted
regarding existential risks, and, particularly, the risks posed by AI and superintelligence. (For the
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purposes of forecasting we do not consider superintelligence, an intelligence explosion or their
ramifications [81]). In 2017 Baum created a comprehensive survey of AGI projects that includes a
mapping of all relevant stakeholders at the time [82]. Barrett and Baum conducted two studies during
2017, one which focused on the use of fault trees and influence diagrams for risks analysis, and the
second which considered expert elicitation methods and aggregation techniques as well as event trees,
including a probabilistic framework [83,84]. Additionally, in 2017, Baum et al. examined techniques
for modeling and interpreting expert disagreement about superintelligence [85].
Recent work evaluated the methods currently used to quantify existential risk, considering both
statistical and judgmental forecasting methods [27]. This study found that while there were no clear
‘winners,’ the adaptation of large-scale models, the Delphi technique and individual subjective opinions
(when elicited through a methodologically rigorous process) had the highest potential. Furthermore,
the authors concluded that surveys met all of the criteria to an acceptable degree and that fault tress,
Bayesian networks and aggregated expert opinion were all well suited for quantifying AI existential
risks. Prediction markets and superforecasting were not found to be especially suitable in general,
or for AI risks specifically.
Other recent work by Avin has considered AI forecasting from the futures studies perspective
including consideration of the use of scenario planning and wargaming as well as standard judgmental
and statistical methods [86]. Wargames (a.k.a. professional role-playing games or government
simulation games) are particularly promising as they can be used for informing difficult and complex
strategic policy decisions [87]. As mentioned earlier, wargaming can serve two valuable purposes in
preparing organizations for futures involving a large degree of uncertainty—training and research—and
has been suggested by Avin (in the form of an AI scenario role-play game) as a valuable tool for both of
these purposes in the AI strategy field. Furthermore, wargaming can be used in a model-game-model
analysis framework to iteratively refine different models for how certain future scenarios may
unfold [88]. The work of Beard et al., Barrett and Baum, and Avin represent the only known work in
the literature to explore the possibilities for judgmental forecasting techniques (other than surveys)
and scenario planning techniques for AI strategy purposes in any depth [27,83]. (We note that there
are ongoing efforts to use and improve prediction markets for AI forecasting as well as to develop a
new type of forecasting platform for AI forecasting.)
Assessing progress in AI is crucial in order to use extrapolation or other statistical forecasting
techniques that require historical data. Consequently, a substantial amount of work has considered
theoretical aspects of assessing and modeling AI progress for different ends [89–91]. This discussion
focuses on some recent efforts and other notable contributions. In 2018, Martinez-Plumed et al. proposed
a framework for assessing AI advances using a Pareto surface which attempted to account for neglected
dimensions of AI progress [92]. More recently, in 2019, Martinez-Plumed and Hernandez-Orallo
built on previous work on item response theory to propose four indicators for evaluating results
from AI benchmarks: two for the milestone or benchmark; difficulty and discrimination, and two for
the AI agent; ability and generality [93]. Hernandez-Orallo has written extensively about measures
of intelligence intended to be useful for intelligences of all substrates that allow for our existing
anthropocentric psychometric tests to be replaced with a universal framework [94]. In contrast to these
studies, a measure of intelligence has been proposed by Riedl that is based on creativity [95]. The topic
has also garnered mainstream attention with a workshop being dedicated to it in 2015 [96], and work
on it being featured in Nature in 2016 [97]. Although there is no consensus on how to measure AI
progress or intelligence, it is clear that simple measures which can be represented in a small number of
dimensions are elusive.
Work by Brundage has attempted to develop a more rigorous framework for modeling progress
in AI [6]. In it he suggests that this type of rigorous modeling process as being a necessary precursor
to the development of plausible future scenarios for aiding in strategic decision making. To these
ends he proposes an AI progress modeling framework that considers the rate of progress in hardware,
software, human input elements and specialized AI system performance. In this work, Brundage
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considered indicators and statistical forecasts as being fundamental for modeling AI progress. However,
later efforts by Brundage began to try and integrate scenario planning and judgmental forecasting
techniques into formal models (i.e., agent-based models and game theory) [98]. While this later work
did not result in the proposal of a rigorous framework like his earlier effort, we believe that it indicates
that the integration of various techniques is necessary for adequately modeling and forecasting AI
progress. Moreover, it was successful in identifying numerous challenges posed by such an integration.
The proposed framework here draws from this previous work in attempts to address these challenges.
In the AI governance research agenda, Dafoe discusses the notion of mapping technical possibilities,
or the technical landscape, as a research cluster for understanding possible transformative futures [7].
He also notes the important role of assessing AI progress and modeling AI progress. Separately,
he discusses AI forecasting and its challenges and also includes a desiderata for forecasting targets.
This paper addresses the issues of generating a mapping, and the task of forecasting events comprising
this mapping to the greatest degree that we are able to, as the AI governance research agenda prescribes.
Table 1 compares existing studies to illustrate to readers the focus on surveys and the lack of focus
on alternative techniques (it also demonstrates the little amount of work existing in the literature).
The earlier work of Brundage seen in Table 1 and discussed in the previous paragraph is the only
other known work to consider an integrated and rigorous methodical approach to the specific problem
of AI forecasting. However, Brundage did not consider any of these techniques from a forecasting
perspective in the way we do. Particularly, his work focuses on applying these techniques directly to a
model of AI governance. This study goes further by building on the need for a mapping described
by Dafoe and by considering a broader range of forecasting and scenario analysis techniques than
previous work to develop a holistic forecasting framework.
Table 1. A comparison of surveys and alternative studies previously conducted on AI forecasting.
Study Year Type Results Conclusion (Median yrs)
AI Forecasting Surveys
Baum et al. 2011 Expert (HLAI) Statistical Experts expect HLAI in comingdecades, much disagreement
Grace et al. 2016 Expert Probabilistic 45 yrs 50% chance HLAI, Significantcognitive dissonance
Gruetzemacher et al. 2019 Expert (HLAI/AI) Probabilistic 50 yrs 50% chance HLAI, Type ofexpertise is significant
Müller and Bostrom 2014 Expert Statistical 2040–50 50% chance HLAI; <30 yrsto superintelligence
Zhang & Dafoe 2019 Non-expert(Americans) Probabilistic
54% chance of HLAI by 2028,
support AI, weak support HLAI
Other AI Forecasting Studies
Amodei and
Hernandez 2018 Extrapolation Trendline
Compute required for AI milestones








and no better than non-experts
Armstrong et al. 2014 ComparativeAnalysis
Decomposition
schema analysis
Models superior to judgment,
expert judgment poor, timelines
unreliable
Brundage 2016 Methods ModelingFramework
A framework for modeling AI
progress
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Table 1. Cont.
Study Year Type Results Conclusion (Median yrs)
Muehlhauser 2015 ComparativeAnalysis Generalization
We know very little about timelines,
accuracy is difficult
Muehlhauser 2016 Historical Survey Suggestions Future work ideas, AI characterizedby periods of hype/pessimism
2.5. Summary of the Related Literature
There are generally thought to be two types of forecasting techniques: judgmental and statistical.
Statistical methods are typically preferred when data is available; however, in cases for which data
does not exist, is missing or for which there are other inherent irreducible uncertainties, judgmental
techniques are commonly the best or only options. AI forecasting falls into the later of these categories.
Work from Brundage has previously proposed a general framework for modeling AI progress [6],
and later work attempted to integrate scenario analysis, expert judgment and formal modeling [98].
Although most previous studies using judgmental techniques have used expert surveys, there is new
evidence that other techniques are more appropriate for this problem [27]. Other potentially valuable
techniques, such as tech mining, bibliometric analysis or mapping the technical possibilities have been
suggested but have not been attempted in the literature. This study goes further than previous work by
considering a holistic framework which attempts to use statistical techniques as best as possible, and to
augment their use by including judgmental techniques and scenario analysis techniques. We ultimately
take a step beyond forecasting to suggest exercises for strategic management and planning.
3. Judgmental Distillation Mapping
Section 2.3.1 highlighted three scenario analysis techniques that have mapping qualities. We refer
to these techniques collectively as scenario mapping techniques due to two significant properties they
share: (1) they do not have a strict limit on the number of scenarios they can accommodate and (2) they
represent the scenarios as networks with directed graphs (i.e. maps). Although only three have been
identified, other approaches are possible. Here, we draw from the existing techniques to propose a new
scenario mapping technique which also exhibits the same mapping characteristics as the techniques
described in Section 2.3.1. We refer to the proposed technique as judgmental distillation mapping
(JDM). Figure 1 depicts a diagram of the JDM process.
Figure 1. The judgmental distillation mapping technique. The technique is flexible and can be thought
of as generally being comprised of iterative rounds of questionnaires and interviews intended to isolate
a scenario map for which forecasts are generated through Monte Carlo simulation.
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The map created (see Figure 2) is distilled from larger input maps (we use map here generically
to refer to the combination of tech mining and historical indicators) comprised of both historical or
tech mining data, and scenarios developed either by previous rounds of the judgmental distillation
process, through interviews or through a technical scenario network mapping workshop (i.e., a scenario
network mapping solely for mapping paths to notions of AGI [99]). The scenario map (i.e., the graph)
is equivalent in characteristics to that of an FCM, with advanced technologies being represented as
nodes. The input nodes represent technologies for which forecasters believe it tractable to use existing
forecasting techniques to forecast. The 2nd order and greater nodes in the maps cannot be forecast
directly using powerful, traditional techniques such as Delphi, prediction markets or superforecasting.
However, these methods are suitable for the first order nodes as long as they are used in a fashion that
generates the probability distributions that are necessary for computing the timelines for higher order
technologies. These timelines are generated using Monte Carlo simulation and the causal relations
between technologies, as determined by expert judgment given the input data. As the final outcomes
of transformative AI technology are unknown (possible outcomes include HLAI, comprehensive AI
services or AI generating algorithms [100]), the resulting map is able to accommodate a variety of
outcomes. Figure 2 depicts a possible result of the JDM process. (This figure is not intended as a
forecast, but rather as an example of what JDM could result in. Input distributions are randomly
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(b) (c) 
Figure 2. (a) A hypothetical judgmental distillation map is depicted. White ovals are inputs and light
grey ovals are next generation (2nd order) technologies. General intelligence is depicted in a stacked
fashion to indicate the possibility of future technological scenarios in the model to be realized through
the combination of different paths (i.e., adheres to the holonic principle). The links in the figure are
representative of causal relationships and the weights for these links correspond to the strength of these
relationships. Note that this figure is not intended to be a forecast, but rather an example of what the
JDM process could result in. Input distributions are randomly assigned using a normal distribution.
Actual input distributions would not be based on a normal distribution and would be aggregated from
expert opinion rather than parameterized distributions. (b) A histogram depicting the results of a
Monte Carlo simulation for the next generation adaptive learning technology. (c) A histogram depicting
the results of a Monte Carlo simulation for the next generation natural language understanding (NLU)
technology. (Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate the distributions found in b and c. A notebook
for computing these distributions can be found here: www.github.com/rossgritz/research/.)
JDM is a resource intensive technique that requires a substantial degree of expertise from the
forecaster(s) as well as a large number of participating experts. The primary burdens of decomposition
and aggregation fall to the facilitator of the process, and, as noted, this provides significant opportunity
for facilitators to exercise their own judgment. If not making all input data available to all experts,
substantial effort would be required in delegating portions of the input data, and subsequently
developing individualized interview questions and questionnaires for the participating experts.
To obtain the best results, it is likely best to employ a team for the entire JDM process. Moreover,
the best results from the process may be achieved with long periods dedicated to judgmental distillation.
There are three primary inputs for the JDM process: historical data and statistical forecasts,
judgmental data and forecasts, and scenarios. Historical data, statistical forecasts and scenarios should
initially be in the form of mappings, but such inputs will frequently be deconstructed by the forecasters
into forms easily digestible for analysis. Efforts to avoid information overload should be prioritized by
forecasters when presenting the information to experts. The questionnaire and interview questions
involve asking experts to respond to or comment on scenarios, statistical forecasts, judgmental forecasts
and the relationships between these input items. While an example of data that could be shown to
interview candidates is shown in Figure 3 and described below, the majority of the JDM process may
still be comprised of questions building on qualitative input data rather than quantitative input data.
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Figure 3. This depicts a simple extrapolative forecast of a social indicator. This is an example of the type
of quantitative information that can be provided to experts for adjustment, distillation and aggregation.
When presented with this, experts could be asked whether they agree or disagree that this extrapolation
is reasonable. If they disagree, they would be asked to explain how they disagreed and what they
thought was a reasonable trend for the indicator presented in the figure. Based on these responses,
they may also be questioned about economic realities governing the behavior of this indicator and
whether they believed it was possible, even over a substantially longer timeframe, for these economic
factors to be altered such that this the indicator may ultimately hit some of the major milestones
depicted. They may also be asked questions raising concerns identified by other experts or questions
as to why or why not AI research should be analogous to nuclear physics or rocket science. Careful
consideration about the indicators and the questions to ask would be determined by the forecaster,
or by a forecasting team.
Table 2 is included below to enable an easy comparison of the scenario mapping techniques for
readers. It is inserted here so that the newly proposed method of JDM can be included. Therefore,
it demonstrates how the new method just described is the only scenario mapping method that is
capable of producing probabilistic forecasts for a large number of complex scenarios. The table also
indicates that this increased value does come at the cost of substantial resources and a large number
of experts (this is discussed further in the discussion section). These factors increase the practical
applicability of the method significantly. It can also be noted here that SNM is another useful method
for complex cases with large numbers of possible scenarios. Specifically, SNM is useful for mapping
the paths to AGI qualitatively while JDM is better suited for generating probabilistic forecasts for
AGI and other transformative AI technologies. Overall, (considering the AGI-SNM workshopping
technique under development) this table clearly demonstrated the significant practical advantages
of the newly proposed methods over the other methods grouped into the scenario mapping class of
techniques. (While these new techniques are clearly better for the purposes of forecasting AGI and
transformative AI, they may also be useful for other forecasting applications, e.g., for forecasting issues
related to existential risks, for forecasting issues related to other complex technology development or
for forecasting the broader progress of different domains of scientific study. We do not discuss these
options here, but we do suggest that future work consider this broader range of alternate applications.)
82
Big Data Cogn. Comput. 2019, 3, 35
Table 2. A comparison of scenario mapping techniques.
Scenario Mapping Techniques
Technique No. Scenarios Quantitative Qualitative Strengths Weaknesses
Scenario Network
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4. A Holistic Framework for Forecasting AI
JDM was developed to integrate a large variety of forecasts into a single mapping that includes
probabilistic timelines for its components. However, these results are more model than narrative and
they focus on technological developments rather than economic, political, social or resource-related
factors. Moreover, JDM is a technique rather than a broader solution for forecasting, planning and
decision making on a continuing basis. The proposed holistic framework uses JDM to leverage flexible
combinations of powerful forecasting techniques in an attempt to provide a comprehensive solution.
The framework is depicted in Figure 4. In this figure, inputs are depicted as rectangles, required
inputs are depicted as ovals and actionable forecasts are depicted as circles. As depicted in the
legend, the elements of the framework can be thought to comprise three distinct groups of processes:
input forecasts, JDM and strategic planning. The inputs are comprised of traditional forecasting and
scenario analysis/mapping techniques. JDM is modified for the framework to generate two outputs,
one directed back at the next iteration of inputs and the other directed at the strategic planning
processes. These strategic planning processes then build on JDM forecasts by considering economic,
political and technological aspects with both traditional scenario analysis techniques as well as a
powerful existing scenario mapping technique. A strategic AI scenario role-playing game can be used
for training as well as scenario refinement.
The inputs to the framework are illustrated in Figure 4, and are consistent with the input
requirements described for JDM. The quality of the inputs is expected to be strongly correlated with the
number of experts, the time requirements and the input forecast quality of JDM. Therefore, we anticipate
tech mining, indicators (tech and social), interviews and survey results to all be relatively essential
for obtaining a reasonable output given a reasonable amount of resources. The non-essential inputs
depicted are SNM, the Delphi technique, superforecasting and prediction markets. The SNM input
(scenario network mapping*) is not equivalent to the actionable SNM, but is a workshop technique
focused on mapping the paths to strong AI [99] that uses a highly modified form of SNM specifically
developed for this purpose. Alternately, the form of SNM used for strategic planning is consistent
with the original intentions of the technique and is discussed at length below with the discussion of
the strategic planning elements of the framework.
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Figure 4. The proposed holistic framework for AI forecasting. Rectangular boxes denote inputs,
ovals denote required inputs and circles denote actionable forecasts. Inputs to the framework must
include scenarios and a mapping of indicators, however, the specific choice of these and the methods
for obtaining them are flexible.
JDM was described thoroughly in the previous subsection. However, in this discussion we
considered only the output of the mapping and its timelines. When incorporated into the framework,
JDM assumes the dual role of both generating forecasts and informing future component forecasts
for iterative application of JDM in the holistic framework. In this way, the framework represents an
ongoing forecasting process in which the judgmental distillation process has two objectives and two
outputs; one for planning and one for continuing the forecasting process. The figure depicts the first
output as moving left for informing actionable strategic planning techniques, and the second element
as directing qualitative information right to be merged with updated indicators for developing new
targets, forecasts and the next iteration of JDM. This second role performed by JDM, of providing
feedback for future iterations, also has the effect of refining the previous forecasts and forecast targets.
Since the process of completing an iteration of JDM in the proposed framework is resource intensive,
it may be realistic to iterate over longer time periods, e.g., on an annual basis. This may be more
amenable to expert participation because the frequency would be less burdensome to the experts,
and with a relatively modest incentive (e.g., a gift card or lodging reimbursement for adding a workshop
to an annual conference itinerary) participation may pose less of a challenge than other elements of
the framework.
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The input forecasts and the JDM process can be thought to work in tandem to produce an
updated mapping with timelines on a continuing basis. It is likely that this cyclic pair of processes is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the AI strategy community for a mapping and timelines [7].
However, we do not have to stop here. The purpose of forecasting is to inform decision makers
such that they can make the best decisions, and, in order to do this we can draw from the methods
discussed in the literature review to extend the JDM results so that they are most effectively used.
The weakness of the mapping and timelines resulting from JDM is their heavy focus on the technology.
To make the best strategic decisions, numerous factors must be considered (e.g., economic, political and
technological). As discussed earlier, scenario analysis techniques are used to incorporate such factors
in the planning and decision-making processes. Despite being strongly influenced by scenario analysis
techniques, JDM does not include consideration of political factors, social factors or resource-related
factors. Therefore, the strategic planning portion of the framework builds on the mapping and
timelines for future AI technologies produced from JDM by considering economic, political, social and
resource-related factors. It does this by two methods; one for high-level planning (intuitive logics
scenarios) and another for exploring granular scenarios (scenario network mapping scenarios). No AI
experts are required for these strategic planning elements in the framework. While we only consider the
use of scenario planning to improve upon the results of the technology maps and timelines generated
from JDM, it is also possible to extend the framework to incorporate forecasts of economic and political
events into a separate JDM process keeping the technology map fixed. This possible dual use of JDM
underscores the power of the holistic forecasting framework.
The use of intuitive logics scenario planning is inspired by their extensive record of success in
business applications. Due to their widespread use and popularity, such scenarios may be more
acceptable for use by traditional policy professionals not familiar with AI strategy or advanced scenario
planning and technology forecasting methodology (their reliance on narratives makes them more
palatable for such persons). In this case, the intuitive logics scenario planning technique would
be used as intended to address and plan for uncertainties that are not implicit in the forecasts.
This will likely lead to three or four high-level scenarios which can be used for guiding planning
and decision-making processes directly. Scenario network maps may have some advantages over
intuitive logics scenarios, however, they each can play important roles. Intuitive logics scenarios may
be suitable for public dissemination whereas scenario network maps may be too granular and include
sensitive information that may not be suitable for public release. Because intuitive logics scenarios may
be more appropriate for politicians or other stakeholders who are not familiar with more advanced
scenario planning techniques, they are sufficient for official reports from institutions using any holistic
forecasting framework. When such scenarios are substantiated by a rigorous forecasting methodology,
as discussed here, they can be much more effective for affecting public policy decisions.
SNM is also used here, i.e., the strategic planning context, in the manner that it was intended.
However, the workshop technique will need to be modified from that detailed in the SNM manual [101]
in order to incorporate the technology map generated from JDM. One of the unique advantages of SNM
in this application is its use of the holonic principle. The holonic principle enables the deconstruction of
complex scenarios even further. Therefore, Figure 4 includes a self-referential process arrow to indicate
the possibility of continuing the scenario decomposition process to the desired level. This could be
very useful due to the complex nature of this unique wicked problem [102].
JDM is also a flexible method, and within the holistic framework it can be used to forecast a large
variety of AI forecasting targets. The output map would typically be expected to be similar to an FCM,
comprised of somewhere between six and twenty nodes. However, there is no fundamental limit
on the number of nodes in the map and it could be possible to retain the holonic principle from an
input SNM through the distillation process to the output (or to use the holonic principle during the
distillation process). Therefore, JDM could be used to forecast automatability of classes of jobs and
even particular jobs or tasks with in specific jobs by means of judgmental decomposition. The details
of such a process are not discussed at length here, but it is important to realize that as a forecasting
85
Big Data Cogn. Comput. 2019, 3, 35
project proceeds to further decompose its targets the required resources would continue to increase.
Therefore, while it may be possible to use the framework for forecasting the automation of individual
tasks, it is likely not a reasonable pursuit for most organizations due to resource constraints.
5. Discussion
5.1. Strengths and Weaknesses
One of the most obvious weaknesses of both JDM and the proposed framework are the heavy
reliance of each on the use and elicitation of expert opinion. These methods may prove difficult to
apply when access to experts is limited or biased (as in a single organization). Moreover, the resource
requirements may be quite costly in the need for forecasting expertise. The JDM process requires a
substantial amount of analysis on the part of the forecaster(s) for deconstructing, creating individualized
expert questions and aggregating expert opinion into a single scenario map of AI technologies.
The process, as envisioned here, is most likely better suited for teams when working on projects of any
reasonable scale. However, the method proposed is flexible and could be revised so as to maintain the
holistic framework while reducing reliance on expert judgment. It is unclear whether this would be
desirable or not, but it is worth further examination.
The reliance of the proposed method and framework on expert judgment is also one of their greatest
strengths. The literature review indicated that for forecasting problems concerning large degrees
of uncertainty or for forecasts of rare and unprecedented events, statistical forecasting techniques
do not suffice, and judgmental forecasting techniques are required [14,21]. Furthermore, it has been
suggested that only those working closely on advanced AI technologies such as AGI may be qualified
to make forecasts for such technologies [103]. However, the framework and method proposed here
do not go so far as to remove all elements of statistical or data-based forecasting. Rather, we believe
that all resources should be used as best as possible. Therefore, the holistic perspective focuses
on judgmental techniques while using data-based statistical forecasting techniques to inform them.
The framework and method are both inspired by a mixed methods approach to forecasting that uses
both qualitative and quantitative judgmental methods. This mixed methods approach to the technique
and the framework is another one of its strengths.
5.2. Implications for Practice
Implications for practice are straightforward and have been discussed to some degree in previous
sections. However, they raise important questions about the feasibility of practical applications of this
technique and framework. For one, the technique is resource intensive and requires a large number of
experts for virtually all of the process. Skeptics may see the issue of expert involvement to immediately
render the method inviable, and while we believe such a perspective may be extreme, the number or
required experts is a credible challenge that should be addressed. There are several ways to consider
soliciting experts for participation and they depend on the nature of the organization pursuing the
forecast. Academic organizations may have more trouble incentivizing experts while organizations
like the Partnership for AI, or the companies which comprise it, may be able to leverage member
organizations’ or employees’ cooperation to obtain expert opinion. It is also likely that motivated and
well-funded non-profit organizations (e.g., The Open Philanthropy Project) could effectively solicit
expert opinion by means of paying experts appropriately for their time. Another considerable challenge
is obtaining an appropriate sample of those actively working on relevant projects, and, based on
the nature of the work being done, it may be desirable to intentionally collect biased samples [103].
(This would be equivalent to weighting work being conducted at certain organizations.)
Perhaps equally as costly for practical implementations of JDM and the proposed framework
would be the requirement of forecasting expertise. It may be difficult to maintain full-time forecasting
experts on the payroll of any organization, even one created specifically for the task of AI forecasting.
Limited mappings could be developed by a single forecasting expert, and this may be sufficient for
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demonstrating the viability of the concept. However, the most comprehensive and accurate results
would likely be realized with forecasting teams. In such teams it may be more appropriate to primarily
retain forecasting experts as advisors for management and consultation while employing early career
forecasters for the majority of tasks.
5.3. Implications for Research
AI forecasting is a nascent discipline, and, to date, no unifying document exists. While this work
does not intend to be such a document, we do wish to draw attention to the need of the research
community for one. This document presents a framework that relies on numerous techniques working
harmoniously toward a single goal. Therefore, research to improve the method and framework may be
most effective through analysis of some of the contributing elements. Moreover, work is also necessary
which explores this framework, improvements or variations thereof, and alternate ways to incorporate
judgmental forecasting methods with statistical forecasting methods and scenario analysis methods
(e.g., Brundage [98]). Here we outline some suggestions of this type for future work that could be
elaborated upon in the form of an AI forecasting research agenda. A structured research agenda with a
coherent vision for the forecasting space could act as the sort of unifying document needed for the
AI forecasting research space. (The method and framework presented here may contribute to a clear
vision for the AI forecasting space, but further input is needed from others with experience in the field
to iron out a unified vision.)
This study has illuminated a large number of topics that do not seem to have received appropriate
attention thus far in the study of AI forecasting. Other recent work has identified some of these topics
as salient [27,86], however, the previous work has not gone so far as to suggest action to motivate
progress in future research. To our knowledge, no literature review exists that is equal in scope to the
one presented here with respect to AI forecasting (the depth of this literature review leaves much to be
desired). We believe that going forward a major priority in the study of AI forecasting is the necessity
of a large number of comprehensive literature reviews for narrow topics (e.g. the many techniques
discussed here) in the context of how they may be used for the tasks involved in AI forecasting.
Saura et al. demonstrate an excellent example of an effective literature review for a related topic that
offers a good model for such work [104]. We also see the need for a broad, comprehensive literature
review—the literature review here may be a good start, but we argue that a dedicated document is
desirable. These suggestions are mentioned first as they may be the lowest hanging fruit but also have
significant potential for being very useful.
The literature review here found the body of existing work was lacking in studies that had
compared forecasting methods. Of the studies that did, none of these compared superforecasting
and none of these considered methods when used for the purpose of technological forecasting or for
AI forecasting specifically. Moreover, work considering the Delphi technique found academic work
assessing its viability to be lacking due to the excessive use of students rather than professionals and
experts. (The Delphi technique is intended specifically for use with experts. Some studies with students
have attempted forecasts of things such as college football, for which students may be considered
experts, however, the vast majority of these studies did not [21].) Since the literature review was not
comprehensive, a focused and more extensive effort may illuminate valuable work that has not yet been
uncovered (this illustrates the possible significance that literature reviews can play). Regardless, it is
clear that significant future work on methods evaluation and comparison, particularly for the viability
of various forecasting techniques in the context AI forecasting, are required in order to best determine
how and when the wide variety of methods are suitable in this framework and when they are suitable
for AI forecasting purposes more generally. Three methods are depicted in Figure 4 as being optional
inputs for JDM in the framework: the Delphi technique, prediction markets and superforecasting.
It may be that one of these is indeed superior for the majority of related tasks, or, that they each can
serve certain purposes in a balanced capacity to achieve the best results. Priorities for future research
include comparing these three methods directly, as well as comparing the suitability of these methods
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in the JDM process. Such comparisons are useful both in the context of AI forecasting as well as in
other contexts.
Calibration is another topic related to judgmental forecasting techniques that could be helpful
for AI forecasting if better understood. Gruetzemacher et al. recently demonstrated an alternative
calibration technique (i.e. naïve calibration) that demonstrates the possibility of novel calibration
techniques [10]. While calibration is widely used and fundamental to superforecasting techniques,
there remains little work on the topic. No work exists to confirm or assess the value that calibration
training can have in forecasting, or what level of training is necessary for improving untrained
experts’ forecasts. Straightforward empirical studies to assess calibration training or different types
of new calibration techniques for various judgmental forecasting techniques are likely very valuable.
As Gruetzemacher et al. has recently shown, a substantial proportion of AI experts’ forecasts are poorly
calibrated, such studies to improve and better understand calibration techniques could have a quick
and nontrivial return for AI forecasting efforts.
Tech mining and bibliometric mapping have a huge role to play in the proposed framework,
and likely in any AI forecasting framework. Brundage mentions the use of bibliometric methods for
mapping inputs [6], however, no work is known which has pursued this suggestion. While the foremost
priority is likely a review of the related literature, practical work is also desperately needed. It is
likely that these techniques must be used to some degree to demonstrate and/or validate the proposed
method and framework, but a more extensive examination of these techniques should also be a priority.
Examples of such powerful new techniques for language modeling [105], citation analysis [106] and
data text mining [107] should be explored for their suitability in this topic (a literature review could
likely identify even more). A large body of software also exists for the mapping of science [108],
however, each flavor produces a different result. We are uncertain as to what form of results will in
fact be useful for judgmental distillation, or for alternate forecasting frameworks, and this is of critical
interest for an initial inquiry or for numerous simultaneous inquiries. It may be that several techniques
are valid and can be shown to one expert or different experts in the JDM process. It could also be that
an interactive mapping platform is most valuable for judgmental distillation in that such a platform
could enable active navigation through complex maps in three dimensions. If this is the case, and if
the needs for AI mapping are not met with existing software, future work could also be necessary
for developing, testing and refining a tech mining based AI mapping platform. Regardless, it seems
imperative that work on these topics be prioritized.
Another topic of interest is that of relevant indicators of AI progress. The literature review here
discussed a growing body of work in this direction, and this work is certainly desirable moving
forward. The framework proposed here takes a slightly different perspective than a substantial portion
of the work toward these ends in that it suggests value in a larger number of salient indicators as
opposed to a smaller number of indicators. A larger number of indicators is more realistic for the high
dimensional space of AI progress, and trying to reduce progress toward broadly capable systems to a
small number of vectors ignores the fundamental uncertainty of the technology that we are trying to
forecast. The indicator proposed by Amodei and Hernandez met the criteria for technology indicators
relatively well [69], as did some of the other metrics that have been developed for measuring AI
progress [93]. Ongoing efforts toward the latter are likely sufficient at this time, but efforts to explore
indicators like the former, or like the one depicted in Figure 3, while being difficult to identify, should
be considered a prioritiy. There are a large range of possible outcomes and any forecasting framework
must consider this.
Finally, forecasting targets are another critical topic that should be considered for future research
efforts. The desiderata presented by Dafoe is an excellent ideal [7], however, in practice it can be
challenging to develop targets. Structured methodologies to develop these targets are highly desirable.
Work on such methods is therefore a priority given the significance of including expert forecasts for
adjustment in addition to statistical forecasts. For example, workshopping techniques or interview
techniques to identify and refine these targets are sorely needed. Targets that suffice may be more
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realistic than ideal targets, and a list of minimum criteria may be useful in addition to Dafoe’s desiderata.
An initial effort to expound on Dafoe’s work and to examine its strengths and weaknesses could
be a simple yet valuable contribution now. Also of interest are the effects of combining statistical
forecasts with judgmental forecasts and aggregated expert opinion forecasts for adjustment, or the
effects of combining multiple forecasts of other variations. Work exploring these effects could be
examined with or without the use of domain expertise and could have significant implications on
how forecasters deconstruct and delegate questions to experts in the judgmental distillation process.
Furthermore, the methods of determining forecasting targets’ resolution may sometimes be ambiguous
and techniques are necessary for objectively resolving forecasting targets.
5.4. Challenges and Future Work
This paper only outlines and describes a new method and a new foreacsting framework.
Many challenges lie ahead for continuing research on this topic. Foremost, efforts should be undertaken
to evaluate and validate both the method and framework proposed here. The method may be possible
to evaluate objectively in contexts other than AI forecasting, doing so may be a good step for confirming
the viability of the method and the framework, however, evaluation should not be limited to toy
cases. An alternate means of validation is to employ the method first in a preliminary fashion, as for
demonstrating viability, and then to pursue a full-scale implementation of the method and framework.
Results from the former could be used for validating and refining the technique and framework
through the inclusion of calibration targets ranging from one to three years. If this was done to pilot the
proposed method and framework, validation of the method would be confirmed gradually over three
years. If successful early on, then further resources could be justified moving forward if performance
persisted. This would also have the added benefits of improving training for AI strategy researchers and
professionals and improving the scenario planning capabilities of the strategy community. If timeline
forecasts were equal to or less accurate than existing methods, over short time frames, then qualitative
assessment of the benefits to the planning process would have to be considered also, and the forecasting
framework could be modified. Work is ongoing toward these ends. Other work should also be
prioritized that assesses and validates the framework and method in other contexts which may not
take as long, or, that works to refine and improve the framework and method. The framework and
new method could also possibly be decomposed, evaluated and validated piece-wise to expediate the
process. Regardless the path chosen, much difficult work certainly lies ahead.
6. Conclusions
The framework proposed here is not intended to be the solution for AI forecasting. Rather, it is
intended to illuminate the possibility of considering a holistic perspective when addressing the unique
challenges of AI forecasting. It differs from previous work in its holistic perspective and through the
development of a new method for judgmental distillation of the salient features of a diverse group of
forecasting techniques. By incorporating expert judgment in addition to historical and mined data,
it attempts to address issues of severe uncertainty inherent in AI forecasting, while still harnessing the
power of statistical methods and scenario analysis in a novel manner through the proposed framework.
There are several significant novel contributions of this work. First, the paper proposes and outlines
a new method for mapping and forecasting transformative AI with judgmental distillation mapping
(JDM). Second, the paper proposes and outlines a new framework for forecasting transformtive AI
that builds on the new method of JDM while incorporating a variety of forecasting techniques in a
holistic approach. Finally, the paper approaches the problem of forecasting in a holistic manner by
incorporating many competiting methods into a single forecasting ecosystem. There are significant
social implications because this method and framework, unlike any other approaches, is able to
combine complex yet plausible future scenarios with a rigorous methodological foundation. In doing
so, it has the potential to compel lawmakers to act on policy recommendations that in the past have
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seemed too unrealistic or implausible. Ultimately, the intended beneficiaries of this new approach are
lawmakers constituents and all the world’s citizens.
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Abstract: In a human society with emergent technology, the destructive actions of some pose a danger
to the survival of all of humankind, increasing the need to maintain peace by overcoming universal
conflicts. However, human society has not yet achieved complete global peacekeeping. Fortunately,
a new possibility for peacekeeping among human societies using the appropriate interventions of an
advanced system will be available in the near future. To achieve this goal, an artificial intelligence
(AI) system must operate continuously and stably (condition 1) and have an intervention method
for maintaining peace among human societies based on a common value (condition 2). However,
as a premise, it is necessary to have a minimum common value upon which all of human society
can agree (condition 3). In this study, an AI system to achieve condition 1 was investigated. This
system was designed as a group of distributed intelligent agents (IAs) to ensure robust and rapid
operation. Even if common goals are shared among all IAs, each autonomous IA acts on each local
value to adapt quickly to each environment that it faces. Thus, conflicts between IAs are inevitable,
and this situation sometimes interferes with the achievement of commonly shared goals. Even so,
they can maintain peace within their own societies if all the dispersed IAs think that all other IAs aim
for socially acceptable goals. However, communication channel problems, comprehension problems,
and computational complexity problems are barriers to realization. This problem can be overcome by
introducing an appropriate goal-management system in the case of computer-based IAs. Then, an IA
society could achieve its goals peacefully, efficiently, and consistently. Therefore, condition 1 will be
achievable. In contrast, humans are restricted by their biological nature and tend to interact with
others similar to themselves, so the eradication of conflicts is more difficult.
Keywords: autonomous distributed system; conflict; existential risk; distributed goals management;
terraforming; technological singularity
1. Introduction
Emergent technology is continually advancing because of its many benefits for humankind.
However, technology is not always used for good. As a result, the number of people who have
destructive offensive capabilities are increasing. These trends enhance existential risks such as
deliberate misuse of nanotechnology, nuclear holocaust, and badly programmed superintelligence [1].
Specifically, the existence of a small number of persons whose aim is to use AI for destructive
purposes has the potential to have an enormous impact on humanity. Suspicion between nations
has the potential to cause a disastrous war [2]. This irreversible change is also called the “threat of
universal unilateralism” [3], and this sufficiently high existential risk could explain Fermi’s paradox:
“humanity has no experience of contact with civilized extraterrestrials, compared to their potentially
high likelihood of existence” [4].
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In many cases, such an abuse of advanced technology is motivated by conflicts in societies, but
eliminating all conflict is impossible. Today, the accelerating innovation by, the artificial intelligence
(AI) and the recruiting human resource for that are the kinds of major factors of competition when
nations and organizations seek to gain supremacy [5,6]. From this background, a human society
equipped with advanced technology cannot sustain itself without keeping the peace despite various
conflicts. Humankind has made many efforts to maintain peace, including the creation of institutions
and organizations such as the United Nations and International Law and Peace Keeping Operation,
and their effects have been observed. However, they have been unable to eradicate disputes, wars,
and conflicts. Thus, maintaining peace among human societies using only human efforts remains
a challenge.
AI will gradually surpass human intelligence, and human-level artificial general intelligence is
estimated to be created by 2100 [7]. In general, this unpredictable change is feared due to various
dangers [8–12], but this change will provide us with an opportunity to eradicate disputes, conflicts,
terrorism, and wars. Peace in human society can be achieved through appropriate interventions by
advanced artificial intelligence, rather than by human effort. Figure 1 shows an example of an ecosystem
in which an AI system built as a society of intelligent agents (IAs) supports human society. In this
example, basically, the AI society observes the values of individuals and/or groups and provides them
with benefits. Simultaneously, based on the common values of all of humanity, IAs arbitrate conflicts
and contradictions that exist in human society. AIs also act to persuade and educate individuals
and groups.
Figure 1. Example ecosystem consisting of human society and artificial intelligence (AI) society.
Note: IA denotes intelligent agent which contains AI.
For the AI system to keep the peace in human society, at least the following three conditions must
be satisfied:
(1) Condition 1: the AI system is operating continuously and is stable.
(2) Condition 2: the AI system has an intervention method that maintains peace in human societies
based on a common value or values.
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Additionally, as a premise, the following conditions are required. These conditions involve the
sustainable development goals (SDGs), which are a collection of the wisdom of many people, and are
potential candidates for common values of humankind in the near future.
(3) Condition 3: a minimum common value must exist that can be agreed upon across human society.
In this study, a thought experiment was conducted to investigate the first condition. The research
question is “Is it possible to build an AI system that operates continuously and stably?”. The reason
this argument is necessary is because an AI system that inevitably creates a society of autonomous
decentralized agents can be destabilized by the occurrence of competition, as well as by human society.
For an AI system that is becoming increasingly fast, the range of operations that can be controlled by
humans decreases. Therefore, the AI system must be able to operate stably without human assistance.
In the next chapter, I explain the setting for a thought experiment in which an AI system is
responsible for the execution of terraforming. This mission can be currently readily agreed upon as a
common goal by all human beings. AI systems need to be able to react quickly to various situations and
must be robust against threats of destruction and failure. For these reasons, the AI system should be a
team of distributed autonomous intelligent agents (IAs). In Section 3, the occurrence of contradictions,
competition, and conflict in a society of autonomous decentralized IAs is investigated. Even in this
case, peace can be maintained if all IAs think that the other IAs share similar goals; however, several
obstacles exist to realizing this ideal situation. In Section 4, I argue that a distributed goal-management
system for the IA society can be constructed to support sharing goals among agents. By introducing
this system, conflicts in IA society can be arbitrated and peace can be realized. In Section 5, I discuss
the reasons why it is difficult for human society to maintain peace by itself in comparison with an AI
society. In Section 6, the first argument is that IAs can be comrades for human beings, unlike other
animals. Further, I argue that unlike human society, majority decision-making does not make sense for
an IA society. The major conclusions are finally summarized in Section 7.
2. Thought Experiment Settings
Before explaining the terraforming that is the subject of the thought experiment in the following
sections, a trivial example in which resource competition creates peaceful cooperation rather than
conflict is explained. For example, in the case where a deep reinforcement learning agent [13] runs
searches in parallel for a parameter that achieves the highest score in a certain game task, the agent
plans how and in what order to conduct a number of experiments. During the process, no parameter
fights another over finite computational resources, and thus there can be no problematic situation
that requires resolution. Due to the clarity of common goals, and due to an absence of local goals in
each parameter set, there is no competition among parameter sets (although such virtual competition
paradigms can be possible). This means that there can be no struggle under shared common goals and
unified management.
This section is divided into subheadings. It provides a concise and precise description of the
experimental results, their interpretation, and the experimental conclusions that can be drawn.
2.1. Intelligent Agent Society for Terraforming
In the above example in which no agent has local goals, no competition can occur. As the setting
of the thought experiment in this article, it is assumed that a number of IAs that can proliferate
themselves have been sent to an unknown planet. The background of this setting is that the IAs are
dispatched from Earth by humans, and charged with the mission of remaking the environment of the
planet in preparation for human migration. Thus, the goal of these IAs is transforming the planet into
being human-habitable; that is, terraforming. The Invincible (first published in 1945) by Stanisław
Lem [14] and Code of the Lifemaker by James P. Hogan [15] are famous fictional examples of this kind
of scenario.
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This science fiction-like setting is introduced for two reasons. The first is to simplify the structure
of the struggle in human society. The second is to reduce the influence of biased thinking caused by
personal history. The procedure of providing an objective function to an agent is standard in artificial
intelligence research, and can be easily discussed. In addition, I think that expanding human habitats
to other planets is an effective method to increase the survivability of humanity.
In the following sections, the scenario that the IA society avoids disputes and war and maintains
peace, despite technological progress causing conflicts among that society, is described.
2.2. Autonomous Distributed Agents: For the Survival of the Group
Fortunately, a group of IAs have landed on a planet. They have secured resources including
energy and have successfully survived for the time being. To achieve their common goal, which is the
terraforming of this new planet, they begin striving and working toward it.
For the following reasons, each member of the group must be spatially distributed and
autonomous [16] because, firstly, each IA should adapt to the surrounding environment to respond
quickly to what is in front of its eyes with limited information processing capabilities. The second
reason is concerned with the robust survivability of the group. The hardware of individual IAs is
constantly exposed to various environmental factors and may be destroyed. To secure the survival of
the group, therefore, IAs have to be highly autonomous and spatially dispersed.
2.3. Physical Composition of the IAs and Their Group
It is assumed that the hardware of each IA is a set of physical devices for memory, communication,
computation, sensory inputs, locomotion, manipulation, and so forth. It is further assumed that
hardware for new members is produced/reproduced in manufacturing plants, in a system that is similar
to that of social insects. Unlike living organisms, though, reproduced IAs do not need to be similar to
the producing IAs, as they are manufactured solely based on their design specifications. Stored data
such as memory, programs, and knowledge, which arguably compose the essential substance of the
IAs, are realized as software, and the dependency on their hardware can be relatively low.
Thus, the essential substance of IAs, which is their software, does not need a specific physical
body and is able to wander among many bodies. Even the preservation and maintenance of the
software of a specific IA are low priority because electronic data can be stored easily and restored at
will. Additionally, when an IA reboots another IA, they do not need to be similar.
3. Development and Conflict in an IA Society
IAs work as an organization by communicating information, such as goals, to each other. Formation
of a group leads to cooperation and division of labor within it, which contributes to efficiency in
achieving their common purpose. By sharing knowledge about their environment and developing
knowledge including science and technology, their efficiency continually. Closer relationships between
the IAs enable useful collaborations toward their goals, but also increase conflicts.
3.1. Diversification and Fixation of Local Values: Emergence of Survival Instinct
All IAs contain a distributed autonomous system with common goals, and the members are
required to retain the goals and maintain activities toward achieving them. This means all the IAs
must hold the common goals individually and in a distributed manner. Each IA derives sub-goals
from the common goals or from an assigned part of the common goals (target-means decomposition)
in response to its environment, and builds local values as a network of sub-goals. Each IA forms
specialized local values, depending on its body, tasks, and the local environment (Figure 2). This area of
research is referred to as cooperated multi-agent planning (MAP), and a large amount of accumulated
work on the subject has been published [17]. As each IA changes behavior by learning, and as the
number of IAs increases, the coordination between them becomes more difficult.
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Figure 2. Sharing goals in an IA group: various IAs generate different sub-goals and specialize
themselves to those sub-goals in response to their environment, bodies, and tasks. Each IA conducts
target-means decomposition, arbitration, and, at times, checks consistency. They also carry out, in
cooperation with other IAs, task allotment, goals sharing, arbitration, monitoring, and so forth.
Individual IAs carry out activities toward concrete sub-goals within a certain time frame.
Too frequent changing of the sub-goals makes it difficult for them to solve the current problems.
Thus, other sub-goals emerge—stabilization of local values. With a slightly longer time frame,
self-preservation of their hardware also emerges as a sub-goal because frequent breakdowns, or
shutdowns, of the hardware impairs their usefulness.
Maintenance of the IAs’ software does not emerge as an overly important sub-goal because,
basically, the programs of these IAs can be stored, rebooted, copied, and transferred at low cost. There
is the risk that they may be destroyed by accidents, attacked, or manipulated by enemies before
rebooting. Additionally, the risk exists that a proper information environment might not be available
when rebooting is needed. However, if some specific program is useful from the viewpoint of the
common goals, the IA society tries to secure preservation and rebooting of that program.
In case the rebooted IA needs to catch up to a change in the social situation, the AI society simply
provides it with a learning period. If a rebooted IA is forgotten by the others and cannot serve IA society,
that one does not need to be rebooted, and if wrongly rebooted, it is immediately shut down. Almost
all the goals of IAs have terminating conditions (ending with the fulfillment of the purpose or with a
judgment of infeasibility) [18]. However, the survival instinct, including self-preservation, resource
acquisition, and knowledge acquisition, is always a sub-goal as long as each IA exists. Regardless
of initial goals, any advanced intelligence generates sub-goals related to a survival instinct, and it
sometimes becomes excessively predominant; this is called “instrumental convergence” [10].
3.2. Confident Sharing of Common Goals Is Difficult
When all IAs share mutually believable local values derived from common goals, no inconsistency
or struggle will exist between IAs, and all IAs in the society can pursue common goals peacefully,
efficiently, and consistently. The ideal situation is, in other words, that every agent can believe that “all
other agents intend socially acceptable goals”.
However, as mentioned above, when various goals are generated diversely and dynamically
in each IA, different local values will be developed among them. Therefore, it is required for the
cooperation and division of labor between different IAs to not only share goals, but also to be mutually
confident about the shared goals. This would correspond to the establishment of a trust relationship in
the contract.
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It is assumed that each IA is programed to act in good faith; this means IAs do not pretend, lie,
or betray.
Because the AI system is designed as distributed autonomous IAs, an IA needs to be able to do
the following to act ideally for the social good:
(1) commit to socially accepted goals,
(2) send and receive goals as information to and from other IAs, and
(3) understand goals received from other IAs.
Here, “socially acceptable goals” means that the goals contribute to common goals and do not
conflict with any other IA’s local values in practice.
I think that a society constructed by individuals with different local values has a potential risk of
conflict. Therefore, some common goals must be shared that are on levels beyond those local values to
establish a single, orderly society.
There are three obstacles to achieving the above ideal situation:
(1) Communication channel problem
It is assumed that communication paths between IAs for sharing common goals as information
are built in and shared with all IAs in the design stage. However, communication channels among
IAs are not always stable and may be disrupted at times. According to Brewer’s CAP Theorem (This
theorem states that it is impossible for a distributed data store to simultaneously provide more than
two out of the consistency, availability and partition tolerance) [19], when securing availability and
partition tolerance in a distributed system, a delay in sharing information must be accepted.
(2) Comprehension ability problem
This problem is caused by the limitations of each IA’s comprehension ability. Here, this ability
means the capacity of an IA to derive sub-goals from received goals and to act on received goals. Even if
the shared goals are formally identical, differences in IAs lead to different comprehension. For example,
different IAs have different designs and appearances (body, experience/knowledge, capacity, etc.).
(3) Computational complexity problem
Suppose one IA overcomes the above two problems and understands the other IAs’ goals. Even
in this case, the following processing is required to avoid substantial conflicts. First, in the IA’s own
environment, all the goals held as their own local values will check for conflicts with other IA goals.
Next, if a contradiction is detected, the IA needs to change its own local value so that the contradiction
does not occur in view of the higher priority goals. In some cases, an IA may need to determine that
it needs to request another IA to adjust its goals. This type of processing requires a considerable
computational cost.
3.3. Birds of a Feather Flock Together: Agent Society for Terraforming
Given the problems mentioned above, it is difficult for IAs to share goals in a workable manner.
However, if the pre-designed appearance is similar between IAs, they can infer that they have similar
goals because the IAs’ goals and appearances are probably governed by the same design information.
If the circumstances are similar between IAs, their interests also tend to be similar. In short, when
similar people gather together, the possibility of sharing goals is increased (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. The branching point of peace and conflict.
A highly homogenous team of IAs will have few conflicts. They can cooperate and divide labor
efficiently, and that makes them advantageous compared with other teams. Like a flock of birds,
survival probability is increased for individual members. This leads to achieving another sub-goal that
they should pursue as a team: survival of the team. For an individual in a flock, the more its local
values reduce conflict with other members, the better the chance it has of surviving, which promotes
standardization across the entire flock.
For these reasons, IAs will tend to form highly homogeneous teams. In other words, “Birds of
a feather flock together”. However, this often exposes a weakness: homogeneity makes the flock
susceptible to environmental changes.
3.4. Conflict Between Groups
Within each group, similar local values are shared by the members, but they differ from those of
other groups. Because resources in the world are limited, the effort to acquire them causes conflicts of
interest between individuals and between groups. Similarly, divisions in IA groups will tend to cause
a state of conflict between groups.
When confrontation deepens, an IA in one group perhaps ignores, disfavors, or blocks opponent
IAs. Contrarily, the same IA provides preferential treatment and increased communication to members
of the same group.
As already described in the introduction, if the worst should happen, a struggle could imperil the
entire society. However, even in the preliminary stages of such a conflict, each IA will expand activities
of attacking and defending against opposing IA groups, causing the problem of diminishing allocation
of resources to the original common goals.
4. Peace of IA Society Maintained by a Distributed Goal Management System (DGMS)
A distributed goal management system (DGMS) should be introduced to make the IA society
peaceful. The technological foundation of DGMS has progressed in the field of multi-agent planning
(MAP) since the beginning of 90′s, as reported in a previous survey article [17]. By using DGMS, each
IA coordinates its local values with other IAs’ values through dialogue, and often an individual IA
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needs to execute the tasks it faces in real time. Various technical issues must be overcome to realize
the specifications required for practical DGMS, and it is necessary to promote research on MAP and
related fields to make DGMS a reality.
If the goals of all IAs are coordinated to be socially acceptable, there is no conflict in IA society.
However, communication channel problems, comprehension ability problems, and computational
complexity problems are preventing this from being realized. To overcome these problems, DGMS
should have the additional three functions listed below.
4.1. Normal Responses
When two IAs conflict with each other due to different sub-goals and actions derived therefrom,
another appropriate IA arbitrates (or mediates) between them. A third IA estimates the importance
and validity of the sub-goals of both by considering consistency and contribution to the common goals.
Both IAs must comply with the ruling (Figure 2).
In cases in which the local value of an IA lacks consistency with the common goals and consistency
cannot be restored by the calculation of the IA itself, another appropriate IA recalculates the sub-goals
and assigns them.
4.2. Emergency Responses
Emergency responses are necessary because normal responses need time for communication and
calculation. These will consist of suspending actions that are based on questionable sub-goals and
even shutting down the IA temporarily for safety.
The method for detecting danger in each IA as the premise for taking these kinds of measures
is as follows. First, one IA monitors the local values of many IAs and finds any sub-goals that are
inconsistent with the common goals and might be a source of conflict. Second, each IA checks the
consistency between its local values and common goals. This is the self-restraint of IAs (Figure 3).
This crisis management is a kind of traditional safety design technology (e.g., safe operation
of aircraft).
4.3. Task Assignment in Consideration of Comprehension Ability
Due to the comprehension ability problem, the level of understanding of IAs varies depending on
differences in their design and/or appearance. However, understanding goals is necessary for many
goal-related processes such as execution, target-means decomposition, arbitration, and monitoring.
Thus, appropriate assignment of roles to each IA by considering its comprehension ability will be an
important technical consideration in designing DGMS.
If ideal and practical DGMS can be built by overcoming obstacles, the situation in which every
IA thinks that “all other IAs intend socially acceptable goals” can be maintained. In that situation,
IA society can achieve goals peacefully, efficiently, and consistently.
5. What Prevents Peace in Human Society?
Despite our capability to share common goals through language, humans cannot stop fighting
with each other. Much of the reason for this might lie in the biological constraints to which humans are
subjected. By comparing IA society to human society, the reasons that human society divides into
many rival groups resulting in conflicts were considered.
5.1. Irreversible Death of Living Organisms
Death is an irreversible and inescapable event for all organisms. Humans cannot delay or switch
on and off our biological activities at will. For this reason, each individual organism has to cling to
life. In the future, the realization of hibernation technology may reduce this fear, but our human brain
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cannot escape from the fear that something could go wrong, and we might not wake up. People in
hibernation might also fear that they will be forgotten by society (e.g., Rip Van Winkle [20]).
Because available resources in the world are limited, increasing numbers of individuals obsessed
with survival will inevitably cause competition for resource acquisition and become an origin of conflict.
An important part of IAs is their software, which can be stored, rebooted, copied, and transferred
at a low cost as described in Section 3.1. Therefore, the degree to which IAs cling to their lives may be
much lower than that of living organisms.
5.2. Struggle Between Evolutionarily United Species
Evolution is a search algorithm, and it can expand the possibilities of organisms through copying,
mating, and mutating individuals. The phenotypes that can survive in the environment are extremely
narrow in the space of innumerable genome combinations [21]. Therefore, to ensure the survival
probability of offspring born by mating, it is necessary to form a species that is a homogeneous group.
Surviving as a species requires a population above a certain number, which is called the minimum
viable population (MVP) [22]; otherwise, the diversity of the genes within the species decreases and it
becomes vulnerable to extinction. For this reason, individuals of a species share the same fate, and
they sometimes help other members of the same species [23]. However, this leads to competition over
resources among species that sometimes develops into conflict, as seen in invasive species [24].
IAs are constructed based on their specifications, and they can produce completely different
offspring. Therefore, there is no incentive to increase similar mates for reproduction. The situation in
which species compete for resources becomes unrealistic. In the future, gene editing technology could
realize the free design of living organisms [25]. After that, humans may not need to fight to maintain
the species.
5.3. Estimate Goal Similarity Based on Appearance
In the case of the IA, there is no need to be suspicious that it uses the same communication devices
and shares common goals, except with regard to their failure or hacking. Living organisms sometimes
validate agreement of design information using chemical interaction. However, for humans, other
agents’ goals are inferred from their appearance or from shared experiences. Therefore, human beings
tend to be sympathetic to organisms or objects that have a similar appearance. Due to this nature
of human beings, it is thought that intelligent robots like human beings will greatly affect human
emotions, and there are concerns regarding various problems arising from this [26].
Human beings can communicate their goals to others through language, but they cannot know
whether the other intends to commit to these goals. To secure that point, modern society uses a legally
effective contract. In this case, it is premised that the people on both sides have the ability to understand
the contents of the contract. However, from the viewpoint of one organization, it is not possible to
confirm the intention of another organization. Stemming from this lack of confidence, almost every
nation has military capabilities that are based on “offensive realism” [2].
5.4. Section Summary
As humans are also living beings, they have an individual survival instinct for avoiding irreversible
death, and they try to care for members of the same species to keep the species alive. In particular,
humans tend to infer the goals or intentions of other persons from their visual appearance. If the
same language is used, cooperation in the group is much easier. For this reason, even in humans, the
tendency of “birds of a feather flock together” is particularly strong. Therefore, competition between
groups with different local values inevitably occurs.
103
Big Data Cogn. Comput. 2019, 3, 34
6. Discussion
6.1. As a Comrade
The mechanisms of collaboration of non-human animals are mostly determined genetically [23].
However, from the time of evolution to homo sapiens, the scope of our recognition of a comrade began
to expand, and is now expanding to all humanity through language and education [27]. The scope
recognized as comrades will be extended to include intelligent machines in the future.
According to the Salient Value Similarity (SVS) model [28], whether a person is trustworthy or
not depends on whether the person seems to share the same stable and consistent goals, and has the
capability and enthusiasm to pursue them, from the perspective of the observer. Again, the main
condition for peaceful coexistence is whether every agent can believe that “all other agents intend
socially acceptable goals”. In this sense, IAs with highly advanced AI will be able to share goals with
humans, and have the capacity and enthusiasm to pursue them as well. Considering this, IAs will have
the opportunity to become trustable comrades, more so than other intelligent animals on earth. If such
an advanced AI can share a relatively wide range of values with them through the education given by
surrounding people, like foster children, then it is possible that AI may become a trusted comrade.
6.2. Significance of Majority Decision
A decision by majority rule is a prevalent social decision method in human society. However,
in the case of IAs whose programs are indefinitely duplicable, it is pointless to count the number of
software units that agree with an opinion. Conversely, imbuing hardware with the right to vote can be
somewhat meaningful, but perhaps the hardware has no opinion.
In contrast, the individuality of each living organism is of supreme importance because each
software and hardware is tightly coupled. Thus, in social decisions made in human groups, , appropriate
to distribute voting rights with the same weight to each person from a utilitarian perspective [29].
As for social decisions in IA society, the main point of interest is how to achieve common goals.
Therefore, it is desirable that the IA group collect diverse experiences and abilities to produce diverse
planning alternatives [30]. It is also desirable for the IA groups to be able to predict the degree of
contribution of each alternative to the common goals as accurately as possible and, eventually, decide
the best action for attaining these goals.
7. Conclusions
The development of emergent technology will increase the risk to human existence. Therefore,
maintaining peace in human society by overcoming various conflicts is becoming an urgent issue.
Historically, human society has not achieved full peace through its own efforts alone. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to explore the possibility of realizing peace in human society through the intervention of
advanced AI systems. Three conditions are assumed to be needed to realize this situation: There are
minimum common values that can be agreed across society (condition 3), advanced AI systems can
intervene to keep the peace of human society based on these common values (condition 2), and an AI
system exists that can work stably and continuously (condition 1).
In this paper, an AI system that satisfies condition 1 was investigated. A part of the system may
potentially be destroyed, so a robust IA society should be a team of autonomous and distributed IAs.
A common value of humanity is shared among all IAs. Individual IAs would decompose common
goals and derive means so that they can contribute to the advancement of common values. Each IA
would diversify its activities to effectively divide tasks among them all. In order to adapt to their local
environment, IAs would usually hold, as their local values, sub-goals derived from common goals.
There are a wide variety of local values and competition for available resources will create a
competitive situation for IA comrades. It is an advantage that competition leads to an increase in capacity
to achieve a common goal. However, if the effort towards merely winning the competition increases,
cooperation is lost, and devastating struggles occur, creating obstacles to achieving common goals.
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The ideal situation is one in which every agent believes that “all other agents intend socially
acceptable goals”. Here, “socially acceptable goals” means that the goals contribute to common goals
and do not conflict with any other IA’s local values in practice. Under such circumstances, the IA
society can achieve goals peacefully, efficiently, and consistently. Communication channel problems,
comprehension ability problems, and computational complexity problems exist, however, that may
impede the realization of ideal situations. In an IA society based on a computer, it seems possible to
design a DGMS that maintains the local values of distributed IAs.
Conversely, humans are biologically constrained. Irreversible death strengthens our survival
instincts, and human beings need to maintain our species through reproduction. Humans must also
distinguish their mates by appearance. For these reasons, similar people gather and become more
likely to form a party. If people divide into groups with similar values and compete for resources, this
can be a major cause of conflict.
I assumed that building a universal AI system to arbitrate conflicts in human society based on a
common value (Figure 1) would reduce the existential risk. This assumption is consistent with Torres’
The Friendly Supersingleton Hypothesis [3]. For stable and continuous operation, the AI system in this
paper was constructed as an autonomously distributed system, which has concurrency, scalability, and
fault-tolerance. Many issues remain to be solved [17], but this technology is feasible. From this aspect,
my method differs from the Friendly Supersingleton of Torres, which is based on future technology. It
is desirable for the final form of our proposed AI system to be almost autonomous and worldwide, but
part of that system can begin as a conventional AI system with the help of human operators. However,
a new issue will then arise regarding executing arbitrations that are consistent with a common value,
while avoiding arbitrary influences of human operators.
Finally, various possibilities for applying superintelligence to reduce existential risks caused
by various non-AI factors, such as climate change, have been discussed before [31]. With regard to
AI itself, discussions have mainly focused on the increase in risks they might pose. An approach
using advanced AIs to reduce the existing risks that increase with the progress of AIs has not been
sufficiently investigated, either in this paper or by Torres [3]. However, effectively using the power
of superintelligence or more elementary AI to construct future governance will create previously
unknown possibilities for the future of humanity.
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Abstract: This essay argues that a new subfield of AI governance should be explored that examines
the policy-making process and its implications for AI governance. A growing number of researchers
have begun working on the question of how to mitigate the catastrophic risks of transformative
artificial intelligence, including what policies states should adopt. However, this essay identifies a
preceding, meta-level problem of how the space of possible policies is affected by the politics and
administrative mechanisms of how those policies are created and implemented. This creates a new
set of key considerations for the field of AI governance and should influence the action of future
policymakers. This essay examines some of the theories of the policymaking process, how they
compare to current work in AI governance, and their implications for the field at large and ends by
identifying areas of future research.
Keywords: policymaking process; AI risk; typologies of AI policy; AI governance
1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence, especially artificial general intelligence (AGI), has the ability to dramatically
impact the future of humanity [1]. Notable researchers, such as Bostrom (2014), have expressed
concern that advanced forms of artificial intelligence, if not aligned to humans values and wellbeing,
could be potentially disastrous and pose an existential threat to our civilization [2]. The two main
branches of research on risk from advanced AI are AI safety, which seeks to ensure that advanced AI is
engineered in such a way that it will not pose a threat; and AI governance, which focuses on political
and social dynamics (AI macrostrategy) and forecasting timelines for AI development [3]. Issues that
AI governance looks at include arms race dynamics, social and economic inequality, public perceptions,
issues in surveillance, and more.
There has been a modest amount of work on developing policy solutions to AI risk, with a recent
literature review by Baum (2017) [4] and Everitt (2016) [5] covering most of it. Some authors have
focused on the development of AGI, with proposed solutions ranging from Joy (2000) [6] who calls for
a complete moratorium on AGI research, to Hibbard (2002) [7] and Hughes (2007) [8], who advocate for
regulatory regimes to prevent the emergence of harmful AGI, to McGinnis (2010), who advocates for
the US to steeply accelerate friendly AGI research [9]. Everitt et al. (2017) [5] suggests that there should
be an increase in AI safety funding. Scherer (2016) [10], however, at least in the context of narrow
AI, argues that tort law and the existing legal structures, along with the concentration of AI R&D in
large visible corporations like Google, will provide some incentives for the safe development of AI.
Guihot et al. (2017) [11] also notes that attempts to future-proof laws tend to fail, and pre-emptive bans
and regulation tend to hurt the long-term health of the field, instead arguing for a soft-law approach.
Other authors have focused on the community of researchers, with Baum (2017) [12] promoting a
social psychology approach to promote community self-regulation and activism, and Yampolskiy and
Fox (2013) [13] advocating for review boards at universities and other research organizations.
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Some authors have advocated for an international approach to resolving AI risk. Erdelyi and
Goldsmith (2018) [14] advocated for an international soft-law regime that would serve as a “international
forum for discussion and engage in international standard setting activities”. Erdelyi and Goldsmith’s
proposal, however, is not targeted towards AGI risk, although they could scale up to AGI.
Wilson (2013) [15] and Bostrom (2014) [2], on the other hand, call for some form of international agreement
or control on AGI R&D, with the former advocating specifically for a treaty.
These approaches are necessary given some of the risks, including states pursuing AGI for
unprecedented military and economic strength with destabilizing effects (Shulman 2009) [16],
and the concentration of wealth and political influence in large corporations (Goertzel 2017) [17].
Questions regarding whether or not AGI R&D should be open sourced or not have been explored
by Goertzel (2017) [17] and Bostrom (2017) [18]. Shulman (2009) [16] and Dewey (2015) [19] follow a
different approach and advocate for a global surveillance regime to monitor for rogue AGI projects,
with Goertzel (2012) [20] suggesting that a limited form of AGI could do this.
As far as current and future research goes, the Future of Humanity Institute has developed an
extensive research agenda [3] for AI governance, with three main research areas: Technical landscape,
which seeks to understand what artificial intelligence can do and its limits; AI politics, which looks at
the political dynamics between firms, governments, publics, etc.; and ideal governance, which looks
at possible ways and arrangements for stakeholders to cooperate. This research agenda highlights
key issues such as security challenges, international political dynamics and distribution of wealth,
and arms race dynamics. Other researchers have published reports dealing with issues such as dual
use, similarity, and possible interactions with the cybersecurity community [21] the role and limits of
principles for AI ethics [22], justice and equity [23], and AGI R&D community norms [5].
Thus far, much of the literature on AI risk has discussed policy issues, but few studies have
talked about how policies are made or how the dynamics of the policymaking process affect their
work. Calo (2017) [23] touches upon the problem, noting that there is a lack of institutional expertise,
policy tools, and flawed mental models of what AI is, which plague governments’ abilities to regulate
AI. Scherer (2016) [10] cites certain aspects of the technology itself, such as its ability to be created
without special equipment, as a hindrance to the ability to regulate it. Everitt et al. (2017) [5] also
briefly discusses policy and political dynamics in the context of AGI researchers, suggesting that AGI
researchers should work with other organizations to mitigate the negative dynamics of framing AGI
development as an arms race [24]. Finally, the Future of Humanity Institute’s research agenda for AI
governance [3] touches on policymaking in a few ways, noting that public opinion can have major
impacts on technology policy and governance schemes can be subject to mission drift and asking how
to facilitate the transition from the present state of affairs to our ideal vision for the future.
This paper continues along the lines of facilitating the transition from the present state to “our
ideal vision” by exploring the missing discussion on the role of policymaking in AI governance.
Research thus far has largely focused on what problems are out there and what should be done to fix
them. However, this paper does not only argue that proposal implementation that takes into account
the features of the ‘policymaking cycle’ may be vital to success in reducing AI risk but that this model
actually has massive implications for the research field as a whole. Proposals will be much more
effective if they are informed by an understanding of the political and administrative considerations of
consensus-building and implementation and could make the difference between making an impact or
none at all.
The goal of this paper is to attempt to create a clearer launching point for discussions on the key
considerations of the policymaking process for AI governance and the political considerations underpinning
policy solutions for AI risk. The policymaking process includes: Problem identification/agenda setting,
policy formulation, policy adoption, implementation, and evaluation. Each step of the policymaking
process will have different aspects that are critical for the creation of public policies that are able to
effectively reduce AI risk. Each section covers a brief overview of the literature, assesses its implications for
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the greater AI governance field, and identifies different points where further research is needed. The papers
we selected are the primary sources of these different theories of the policymaking process.
The first section maps out and defines terms in the field of AI governance, to give readers a better
understanding of how our paper contributes to the way AI governance is approached. We also created
a typology for AI risk policies, to provide an understanding as to how AI governance has implications
in a diverse range of policy communities and how that interplays with strategic considerations.
The next section goes through each step of the policymaking cycle, with a basic overview of some of
the literature and discussing its implications for AI governance. It should be noted that the literature
covered in each field is not extensive, and further research may be necessary. The last sections cover
some of the key implications and limitations.
2. Terms and Definitions
On a broad level, the question of mitigating AI risk, or risks that stem from the development and
use of artificial intelligence (such as global catastrophic risks from misaligned AI or military instability
from adopting new types of weapons), is broken down into AI technical safety and AI governance.
AI technical safety focuses on solving computer science problems around issues like misalignment
and the control problem for AGI [2]. AI governance, on the other hand, studies how humanity can
best navigate the transition to advanced AI systems [3]. This would include the political, military,
economic, governance, and ethical considerations and aspects of the problem that advanced AI has
on society.
AI governance can be further broken down into other components, namely the technical landscape
(how technical developments depends on inputs and constraints and affects rates or domains of
capability improvement), ideal governance (what would we do ideally if we could cooperate), and AI
politics (how AI will affect domestic politics, political economy, international relations, etc.) [3].
From these research areas, the problems and solutions necessary to discuss AI policy can be defined.
This paper, however, refers to this as AI risk policy to differentiate policies intended to reduce
catastrophic risk to society versus policies that apply to AI in any other circumstances.
Policies, however, must be implemented into the legal statutes of government in order to work.
Flynn (2017) [25], in the blog post that defines ‘AI strategy’ [3], also defines ‘AI policy implementation’,
which is carrying out the activities necessary to safely navigate the transition to advanced AI systems.
This definition implies it is action-oriented work done in government, policy, lobbying, funding,
etc. As mentioned in the endnotes of Flynn (2017), however, there is an implicit gap between AI
strategy (governance) research and policy implementation, with no AI policy research that identifies
mechanisms for actualizing change.
However, there is another gap that this paper intends to address, which is that the processes that
create and implement policies (the policymaking process) often either distort the original policy, fall
short of, or even work counter to the intended outcome, or render certain policy options unactionable.
Similarly, The AI governance: A Research Agenda report has neither this consideration nor a definition
of policy implementation. This paper intends to put forth a definition of AI policymaking strategy to
fill this gap, which is defined as:
AI Policymaking Strategy: A research field that analyzes the policymaking process and draws implications
for policy design, advocacy, organizational strategy, and AI governance as a whole.
This goes further than the concern listed in the endnotes and also develops an upstream approach
to AI governance, where work in implementation in turn feeds back and can provide new insights to
AI governance research.
AI policymaking strategy would fit under the definition of AI governance and would be its own
subfield in the same way technical landscape is and would help to clarify questions and considerations
in the other subfields. AI politics and ideal governance seem to ask questions about what risks
humanity faces and what it ought to do about them, approaching the world as if from above and
making corrections, whereas policymaking strategy asks questions about how and what can be done,
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given both present and future circumstances, and the methods to do so at hand. They approach
the world as agents who individually influence the trajectory of the world. These two groups,
when they work together, should ideally converge on a policy program that both works and is
pragmatic—constituting of policies that both aim at the correct goals and can actually get there.
An example of this would be the proposed solution by Goertzel (2012) [20] of creating a
surveillance artificial narrow intelligence that monitors the world to prevent the development of
superintelligence. Let us say that Policy X is written to do this. However, Policy X, like all other
policies, is not simply just a solution to the problem but a set of intended actions and procedures
taken by the government that must first be passed by government [26]. This begs three questions:
Can this policy realistically be implemented by government? How do policymakers ensure that
Policy X results in the intended outputs and outcomes? And how can policymakers create policy and
advocacy strategies to increase the chances of both of these happening? For example, while Policy
X is intended to install a surveillance apparatus to prevent superintelligence, would Policy X still
have that output and outcome after going through the legislature and executive branch? Is there a
chance over time that it would result in mission creep? Policymakers can also develop strategies to
ensure that Policy X has its intended outcomes, such as oversight mechanisms within the policy itself.
Policymakers can go a step further and ask how the policymaking process itself creates implications
for the AI governance field. For example, are there restrictions within the policymaking process that
impact timelines for reducing risk, such as how fast governments can act or create new laws? Could
some form of upstream innovation be acheived where the policymaking process inspires or generates
new ideas for AI governance [27]?
3. Typologies of AI Policy
Before this paper can delve into the policymaking process, AI policy needs to be further refined
to understand what kind of policies are being made. The point of this section is to show that AI risk
policies are not monolithic, but rather there are multiple approaches to help achieve the same goal,
and each set of these policies is going to have with it a different set of political difficulties. It also begs
the question in terms of AI governance as a whole as to which sets of policies should be implemented
and when, and which policies should be considered relevant to AI risk. In the same way that Bostrom
(2014) [2] argues that there may be a preferred order of technological development, there is a similar
analog with AI risk policies where there is a strategic order to policies that should be attempted to
be implemented, whether it is because their political-capital cost is lower, the cost of failure is lower,
or because it helps with future efforts to implement policies (such as the creation of an advisory body).
A typology of AI policies already has some previous explorative work to build on.
Brundage (2016) [28] proposed the idea of De Facto AI policies. These are policies that already
exist and are relevant to AI. These are further broken down into direct, indirect, and relevant policies.
Direct policies are policies that specifically target AI, such as regulations on self-driving cars. Indirect
policies are policies that do not specifically target AI but generally impact the development and
diffusion of technologies (including AI), such as intellectual property laws and tort law. Relevant
policies do not immediately impact AI but are still worth considering because of their impact, such as
education policy or the use of electronic medical records.
Brundage (2016) [27] in this paper, however, does not talk about AI risk policy but rather existing
policies around AI as a whole. However, the classification used in this paper is useful overall and can be
extended into AI risk policy. Instead of whether or not it directly or indirectly affects AI, AI risk policy
can be classified into whether or not it directly or indirectly aims at reducing AI risk. Direct AI risk
policies would explicitly govern the use, development, deployment, etc. of AI to reduce risk. Examples
of direct AI risk policy could include funding for AI safety research, rules for the development of AGI,
international agreements on AI, etc. Indirect AI risk policies would either affect AI but not explicitly
govern it or address consequences of the use of advanced AI systems. This could include both
policies that affect AI and those that are AI-agnostic. For example, a policy that puts in place stronger
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protections for privacy in general would reduce the amount of training data available, and thus the
speed of AI development, and could be considered an indirect approach. An AI-agnostic policy,
for example, would be basic minimum income to address technological unemployment, which could
be considered a risk if it leads to societal destabilization. AI risk relevant policies would affect neither
AI nor the consequences of it but would rather make it easier for sound AI risk policies to be developed
and implemented, such as changing the rules and procedures of government itself to alleviate the
pacing problem.
There is another layer of classification that should be applied to AI risk policy based on Lowi’s
Typology [29]. Lowi categorizes policies into regulatory, distributive, redistributive, and constituency
categories. Regulatory policies regulate one’s behavior, restricting or incentivizing certain actions,
such as the mandating of seat belts in cars. Distributive policies are policies that take money from the
general treasury and use them for a specific project that directly benefits one group, such as a dam
or research grants. Redistributive policies are those which fundamentally alter the distribution of
wealth and resources in the whole of society, such as tax and welfare policies. Constituency policies
are those that alter the composition and the rules and regulations of government, such as creating a
new executive agency.
Each one of these typologies has with it a certain set of political conditions, as they impact people,
businesses, and members of government differently. For example, both basic minimum income and
the creation of AI safety standards are policies that are intended to reduce existential risk. However,
both of these policies will have a different set of political pressures. Basic minimum income is a
redistributive policy, which would move substantial amounts of wealth between classes of society.
This would mean that it would likely become a nationwide controversial issue with two opposing
camps based largely on who benefits and who loses. By contrast, AI safety standards are a regulatory
policy, and while there would be two groups opposed to each other on the issue (unless it comes in the
form of voluntary self-regulation by the industry), the political factors around it would look different.
Regulatory policies are not usually salient or popular to the general public, and thus, the political
battle would be largely limited to regulators, experts, and the business class. This typology will help
us to understand how the different policies will be treated in the policymaking process. In other
words, policy creates politics. Further work on developing this might be useful for understanding the
likelihood of policies being adopted and could shift strategies for which policies to pursue.
4. The Policymaking Cycle
4.1. Problem Identification, Agenda Setting, and Policy Formulation
The first few steps of the policymaking process: Problem identification, agenda setting, and policy
formulation, are usually tied together [30], including in a so-called ‘multiple streams framework’.
The multiple streams framework attempts to explain how policies reach the agenda when policy
entrepreneurs are able to couple the policy, politics, and problems streams to open up a policy window,
the opportune time when all the conditions are right to get a policy on the agenda [31].
4.1.1. Problem Stream
There are many problems in society. However, the public does not seek government intervention
for many of these problems. There are some basic requirements for an issue in society to become
a policy problem, which is that it is something that the public finds to be intolerable, government
can do something about, and is generally seen as a legitimate area for government to work on [30].
Policy problems can also arise when there are two or more identifiable groups who enter into conflict
in a policy arena for resources or positions of power [32].
The first condition for an issue to be considered a policy problem is that it is something that the
public or a group finds to be intolerable. Indicators such as statistics can help to identify a problem.
These can be used objectively, for understanding conditions in society, or politically, when they are used
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to justify a political position: for example, using gun violence statistics as an argument for gun control.
What is considered an issue over time changes because of the evolution of society. Changes in values,
distribution of resources, technology, etc. will change what issues are considered in society [30]. In AI
governance, identifiers such as the rate of technological progress or the proliferation of autonomous
weapons could be used as examples. Creating a list of politically salient identifiers or metrics could be
potentially useful for creating long-term strategies and goals.
How the issue is framed is very important for whether or not it will be considered a policy
problem [30]. Is mandating seatbelts in cars beneficial for public safety? Or is it paternalistic? Are these
problems legitimate for government to handle? The framing of a problem can have an overwhelming
impact on whether or not it is considered a problem appropriate for government to even formulate
policy on. It can also impact the content of the policy. Whether you define access to transportation
for handicapped people as a transportation problem or a civil rights issue determines whether the
acceptable solution involves buying special needs vans, or costly upgrades to buses and subways to
ensure equal access. Framing can also raise the priority of a policy problem by, for example, calling it a
crisis and raising a sense of urgency.
The question of framing is also incredibly important for AI governance. For example,
would autonomous weapons make war more humane by removing humans? Or will it distance
ourselves from the violence and make us more willing to use them? The AI governance community
needs to think about how these issues ought to be framed, and the consequences of doing so.
In order for an issue to be a part of the system agenda, or what the public or specific communities
are discussing, there must be a focusing event. Focusing events are specific events that draw attention
to a problem in society and the reasons behind it. The Sandy Hook school shooting, for example, is
a focusing event that drew attention to America’s gun laws. Moreover, events that occur outside of
sector-specific focusing events [31], or past policies on these issues, can have a large impact, especially
on the types of solutions used. For AI governance, “Sputnik moments” such as AlphaGo beating Lee
Sedol would be an example that drew considerable media attention and generated much discussion
about the future of AI, especially in China [33].
Understanding how to exploit these events for the AI governance agenda will be key to generating
support and getting policies on the agenda. It is also important to stay on top of these events
to understand the direction society is heading in—and to pre-empt or avert less productive or
dangerous framings that might feed into arms races [31]. For example, Yampolskiy (2018) details
a list of past failures by AI-enabled products [34]. How could work like this be used to influence
the problem-setting? Could other AI risk researchers expand on it and build that work into a more
thorough project to be used to draw attention to AI risk? Or, could attempts such as this backfire and
cause pre-emptive stigmatization or ineffective policies?
4.1.2. Politics Stream
The politics stream is the combined factors of the national mood or public opinion, campaign
groups, and administrative/legislative change. Decision-makers in government keep tabs on the
swaying opinions of the masses and interest groups and act in a way that promotes themselves
favorably, changing items on the agenda to stay relevant and popular, and to obscure unpopular
policy stances. Changes in administration, especially when there is a major shift in the ideological
composition of the institution, have a strong impact on what is included or not included on the
agenda [31].
In AI governance, and for people involved in advocating and implementing policies, maintaining
a key eye on domestic and international politics will be key. Knowing when and what kind of policy
to advocate for, and to whom, is crucial not only to saving time and energy, but also for legitimacy.
Trying to sell a nationalistic administration on greater UN involvement will probably not help someone
with furthering their policy proposals and may even damage their (and their coalition’s) political
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capital and cause. However, other forms of cooperation, such as bilateral cooperation for reducing the
risk of accidents [35], may be more promising.
AI governance researchers will need to consider how the political landscape should shape their
recommendations or policy proposals. Not only would it determine if their recommendations would
ever get considered, but if it was implemented, how would it affect the national mood? Would the next
administration simply walk it back? How would other interest groups react and impact the long-term
ability to reduce risk? If administration changes result in a flip-flop of ideology, what does that mean
for AI risk policies associated with the past administration? Could an AI risk policy group maintain
influence throughout changing administrations? All of these have implications on our ability to reduce
AI risk, and this means that the policymaking strategy will not only have to be robust but also flexible
enough to survive changing political conditions.
4.1.3. Policy Stream
The policy stream, which is in essence the policy formulation aspect of the policy cycle, is the
“soup” of ideas that are generated by policymakers [35] when deciding what to do about a problem.
Different policy networks create policies differently, with different levels of innovativeness and
speed [35]. Understanding these differences and examining their implications for the AI governance
field might be useful to understand its long-term impact and the specific strategic routes it should
take. In other words, how should the AI governance research field itself be organized in a way that
promotes useful and relevant solutions?
Despite the staggering number of policy proposals coming out, only a handful will ever be
accepted. These policies compete with one another and are selected on a set of criteria, which include
technical feasibility, value compatibility [35], budgetary and political costs, and public acceptance.
Policies that work will also be technically sound, with no major loopholes, and a clear rationale for
how its provisions would lead to actually achieving the policy objectives [30]. This actually creates
some key considerations for the field. It means that many ideas are either functionally useless due to
their political limitations, unlikely to be adopted in the face of easier or less politically costly options,
do not have viable policy mechanisms to achieve their goal, or are otherwise intractable prospects for
government. Even if all of the above conditions are resolved, loopholes and unintended consequences
may neuter the policy or make conditions worse. This vastly reduces the space of possible solutions.
Further, even though the ability for policy implementation or values might change over time, it is still
a matter of how much and when. This begs the question: What problems can be solved when, how,
and by whom? What does that mean for the large picture strategic approach?
Where should our policies originate from? While there are a bunch of policy ideas out there, only
a few are ever seriously considered for adoption. Sources of these policies include (in the United States
Federal Government, for example) the President along with the Executive Office of the President,
Congressional leaders, government agencies (mostly small incremental changes and adjustments),
temporary organizations or ‘adhocracies’ that serve to investigate specific topics, and interest groups
whose topical expertise and political power can sometimes make them de facto policymakers. Each of
these areas have differing levels of legitimacy, influence, and degree to which they can make policy
changes. A question to consider is not only where in the policy network AI risk policymakers should
focus on making these policies, but where they can best advocate for the creation of additional bodies
like adhocracies to create additional policies, and what implications that has for the field at large.
With regard to the policy formulation phase of policymaking, a continuum of political
environments has been created such that on one extreme, there are policies with publics and on
the other, there are policies without publics [36]. When policies are formulated, it is important to
consider political environments relevant to the issue. The term “publics” refers to groups who have
more than a passing interest in an issue or are actively involved in it. It appears that AI risks are issues
where there are limited incentives for publics to form because of problems being remote, costly, or even
abstract and uncertain. What does this mean for the AI safety community? How can interest groups be
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created most effectively? How can these issues be best expressed so that they do not seem so remote,
abstract, or uncertain?
4.1.4. Policy Windows and Policy Entrepreneurs
This framework assumes that policy decision-makers, the legislators and bureaucrats in
government exist in a state of ambiguity, where they do not have a clear set of preferences, and
each set of circumstances can be seen in more than one way. This cannot be resolved with more
information, as it is not an issue of ignorance. The example that Zahariadis (2007) gives is that “more
information can tell us how AIDS is spread, but it still will not tell us whether AIDS is a health,
educational, political, or moral issue [31]”.
Overall, the multiple streams framework describes government organizations as “organized
anarchies” where institutional problems run rampant, there are often unclear or underdefined goals,
overlapping jurisdictions, and a host of other problems that mean that decision-makers have to ration
their time between problems and do not have enough time to create a clear set of preferences, make
good use of information, or take the time to comprehend the problem for sound decisions on policies.
In essence, decision-makers are not rational decision-makers by any stretch. Instead, it depends on the
ability of policy entrepreneurs to couple the three streams and manipulate the decision-maker into
achieving their intended policy goals [31].
Policy entrepreneurs, who are the policymakers, advocates, interest groups, etc. who push to make
specific legislative changes in their areas, only have a short window of time to have their proposals
added to the formal agenda. It is when the right political environment, a timely problem, and a
potentially acceptable solution all meet together with a policy entrepreneur who can manipulate the
situation to their advantage. Because decision-makers exist in a state of ambiguity, policy entrepreneurs
are able to manipulate their interpretation of their information to provide meaning, identity, and clarity.
Policy entrepreneurs use different tools and tactics to manipulate the way decision-makers process
information and exploit their behavioral biases. Framing tactics, for example, can be used to present
a policy option as a loss to the status quo, not taking note of the degree of loss it creates, exploiting
decision-makers who are loss-averse, and may push them towards more extreme options like going to
war to make up for those small losses [31].
The manipulation of emotions through symbols and the identity or social status of a
decision-maker can also pressure them to make certain choices; policies around flag-burning are a great
example of this. Because decision-makers are under a great deal of stress and are time-constrained,
the strategic ordering of decisions, or ‘salami tactics’, creates agreement in steps by reducing the total
perceived risk of a policy [31]. The manipulation of symbols in the way that artificial intelligence is
being framed today has already occured. At first, anti-autonomous weapons advocates were describing
‘armed quadcopters’ as a serious problem with little media attention [37]. These were rebranded as
‘slaughterbots’ and a short-film was released with substantial media attention. However, what sort of
long-run impact will this have on the field? While giving policymakers straight facts and solutions
seems appealing, AI risk policymakers have to consider that it is impractical in reality and may have
to accept the inevitability, to policy success, of tactics like framing. Which begs the question, which
tactics should they use and how? Questions like these must be considered.
All of this strongly requires an appropriate consideration. Consider, if there are some problems
that can only be resolved through state action (such as an arms race), that means that it is dependent
on the policymaking process, and thus, these solutions can only be passed when policy windows open.
Therefore, how many of these opportunities do AI risk policymakers get? Or, how many chances do
they get to implement AI risk policies? These windows only open every once in a while, and they
are often in fragile conditions. For example, Bill Clinton’s campaign in 1992 aimed to reform the
healthcare system and made it a campaign priority, but his administration’s failure to pass the bill
closed the window [31]. In other words, what impact does this have on AI governance and policy
implementation timelines and what does that mean for the field as a whole?
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However, in order for a policy entrepreneur to manipulate decision-makers, they must have access
to them, which is highly dependent on both the legitimacy of their issue but also for the legitimacy
of the group itself and their interest. One of the ways that policy entrepreneurs increase their own
influence is to create new decision-points that they can exploit and to reduce access of other groups [32].
AI risk policymakers and advocates will have to find some way to gain access to decision-makers.
For example, working on near-term or non-existential risk issues with AI might help someone to
build the social capital and network that is necessary to work on existential risks issues. This would
not only make it easier people in the field to implement their solutions but to also make themselves
gatekeepers to the decision-makers, which could help with preventing policies that would increase
existential risks (whether from AI or other sources) from getting through. This may be an area that
needs further research. Aspects such as a group’s access to decision-makers, the advocating group’s
legitimacy, biases of the institution [38], and a group’s ability to mobilize resources will determine
what gets added to the agenda, and the AI risk community will need to work on building all of these.
AI policymakers will need to develop a strategy for how to get the right people into the right places
and how to coordinate between different groups.
Getting on the formal agenda is a competitive process because there are fundamental limits to a
decision-maker’s time, and because the policy may be perceived to harm the interests of other groups.
Opposing groups can use a variety of tactics, such as denying that the problem exists, arguing that it is
not a problem for government, or arguing that the solution would have bad societal consequences,
to deny it agenda status. Other factors that could deny an issue agenda status include changing societal
norms, political changes, or political leaders avoiding having to be confronted by an issue that hurts
their interests. Thus, AI policymakers will need to know how to overcome and adapt to these changing
situations and other organizations preventing their policies from being adopted.
AI governance and policy experts will need to pay attention to the arguments being used for
and against superintelligence, and whether or not this will become a political issue. Baum (2018)
notes that superintelligence is particularly vulnerable to what is known as politicized skepticism,
skepticism that is not based on an intellectual disagreement about the problem, based on good-faith
attempts to understand the arguments, but rather to shut down concerns based out of self-interest (or
a conflict of interests). Some major AI companies, and even other academics, have criticized the idea of
superintelligence out of what seems to be their own self-interest as opposed to genuine concerns [39].
This would have a devastating impact on AI policy advocates in a similar way that the tobacco industry
significantly impacted scientific efforts to study the public health links between tobacco and cancer.
4.2. Policy Adoption
The next stage of the policy cycle is policy adoption, or when decision-makers choose an option
that adopts, modifies, or abandons a policy. This does not necessarily take the form of choosing from a
buffet of completed pieces of policy, but rather to take further action on a policy alternative that is more
preferable and that is more likely to win approval. At this point, after much bargaining and discussion,
the policy choice will only be a formality, or there will be continuous discussion and disagreement
until there is a formal vote or decision made. This is an important field to analyze for AI policymakers
for the obvious implication that they will want their policy proposals being chosen, and so they will
need to understand and design strategies to do so. Further, as will be discussed later, when changes
do occur, they can often bring with them wider changes in public policy [40], an implication that will
need to be taken into account.
The advocacy coalition framework is a theory on policy adoption but also incorporates every
other aspect of the policy cycle with it. The theory describes the interactions of two or more ‘advocacy
coalitions’; groups of people from a multitude of positions who coordinate together to advocate for
some belief, or to implement some policy change (potentially over many fields) over an extended period
of time [41]. These do not need to be a single, explicitly delineated organizations like the National
Rifle Association but could include loosely affiliated groups of organizations and/or individuals, all
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working towards the same goal. Building and maintaining coalitions will be one of the major tasks
that AI policymakers will need to work on, and so, examining this framework will be highly valuable.
What is it that binds a coalition together? All advocacy coalitions share some form of beliefs.
However, the advocacy coalition framework uses a hierarchical belief system. The deepest and
broadest of these are deep core beliefs, which are normative positions on human nature, hierarchy of
value preferences (i.e., should we value liberty over equality?), the role of government, etc. Policy core
beliefs are the next stage of the hierarchy, which involves the extension of deep core beliefs into policy
areas. Both of these areas are very difficult to change, as they involve fundamental values. This actually
creates an issue where, due to differing fundamental and personal values which lead to lack of
interaction, different coalitions often see the same information differently, leading to distrust. Each may
come to see the other side as “evil”, reducing the possibilities of cooperation and compromise [41].
The deeply held convictions of what a policy subsystem ought to look like are called policy core
policy preferences and are the source of conflict between advocacy coalitions. They are the salient
problems that have been the long-running issues in that area for a time. Policy core policy preferences
shape the political landscape, dictating who allies with whom and who the enemies are, and what
strategies coalitions take.
The final level of the belief hierarchy are secondary beliefs, belief that cover procedures, rules,
and things of this nature. These are very narrow in scope and the easier to change, requiring less
evidence and little bargaining to change.
Understanding the values and beliefs of different existing coalitions, groups, and individuals is key
to building and maintaining new coalitions for AI policymakers. This brings up a few considerations.
Since it is difficult for conflicting coalitions to work together, will AI policymakers have to choose
certain coalitions to work with? What are the costs, benefits, and the potential blowback of this?
Since some policies related to AI risk are not in a mature policy field (and thus do not have established
coalitions), what can be done to shape the field beforehand to their advantage and/or promote
cooperation among coalitions that are likely to form? Further, since secondary beliefs are relatively
easy to change, what can be changed to help reduce existential risk?
On a macro-level, this AC Framework acts as a cycle. Relatively stable parameters, as mentioned
before, exist in the status quo since policy arenas usually come to some equilibrium where one coalition
dominates the policy subsystem. Then, policy changes made by an advocacy coalition or an outside
event create a fundamental change in the world, whether it is a change in public opinion or in the
rules and procedures governing a subsystem, which changes the initial stable parameters, such as a
major event like a mass shooting. These lead to a shift in power that allows another coalition to gain
influence over the types of policies being adopted. However, especially in the case of controversial
legislature, policies that require multiple veto points to pass will create access for multiple coalitions.
This means that even a coalition that dominates a subsystem will not have unilateral ability to dictate
policies in some situations. Others, however, especially where there are few decision-makers or an
exceptionally influential decision-maker, can result in highly monopolized systems. Questions such as
how to be resilient to these changes in conditions, how to facilitate changes into conditions that are
beneficial to AI policymakers, and how to construct policy subsystems in a way that is conducive to AI
policymakers’ goals are useful questions to consider.
This theory describes policy adoption on a very broad level, but how do the decision-makers
themselves decide which policies to move forward with? Different incentives and restrictions come to
play at different levels of policymaking. For example, highly salient and popular issues are more likely
to be influenced by popular opinion, whereas obscure technical issues will likely be determined by
policy experts in that field. Different factors that affect both individual and group decision-makers
also come into play, such as their personal, professional, organizational, and ideological values.
For legislators, their political party and their constituency also play an overwhelming role in their
decision-making. Understanding and mapping out these factors will be necessary for the successful
implementation of AI risk policy.
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On top of these factors, decision-makers usually never have the time, expertise, or even care
enough to be able to come up with a fully rational approach to deciding most policies. In many cases,
legislators will seek out the advice of other legislators and experts and follow their lead. Due to this
being a widespread practice, a few key institutions and leaders often have disproportionate power.
For those working in AI risk policy, it is necessary to understand these things so that the message they
craft for as to why policy change should occur, and whom to specifically target to get widespread
adoption from other decision-makers in the policy arena.
4.3. Policy Implementation
Policy implementation is a key step in the policymaking process. It is defined as “whatever is done
to carry a law into effect, to apply it to the target population . . . and to achieve its goals” [30]. In other
words, it is the activity where adopted policies are carried into effect [30]. However, that is not to say that
it is a very distinct step that can be clearly distinguished from others. Every implementation action can
influence policy problems, resources, and objectives as the process evolves [42]. Policy implementation
can influence problem identification, policy adoption, etc.
Two broad factors that have been offered for the success of policy are local capacity and will [42].
In other words, is there enough training, money, and human resources, along with the right attitudes,
motivation, and beliefs to make something happen? It is suggested that the former can be influenced
much more easily than the latter as more money can be received and consultants can be hired. For AI
risk, both questions are relevant: How to increase capacity and how to influence the influencers.
With the former, it has been estimated that about $9-$20 million is currently spent on AI risk [43,44].
With the latter, studying the opinion of the public as well as experts might be a useful approach.
One survey [45] indicates that only 8% of top-cited authors in AI consider that human-level AI would
be extremely bad (existential risk) for humanity. Another survey that is more recent [46] indicates
that machine learning researchers think on average (median) that there is a 10% probability that
human-level machine intelligence will result in a negative outcome and 5% probability that it will
have an extremely bad outcome (existential risk). The general public seems to be generally cautious,
with a survey showing 82% of Americans believing that AI/robots should be managed carefully [47].
This part of the policymaking process is very difficult as the literature is generally quite pessimistic
about the ability of policies to bring social changes into effect [48]. However, the authors of the
cited paper have identified conditions of effective implementation based on successful examples.
These conditions are (a) the policy is based on a sound theory of getting the target group to behave in a
desired way, (b) policy directives and structures for the target group are unambiguous, (c) the leaders
implementing the policies are skillful with regard to management and politics and committed to the
goals, (d) policy is supported by organized constituency groups and key legislators as well as courts
throughout the implementation process, and (e) the relative priority of policies is not significantly
undermined over time by other policies or socioeconomic changes. Additionally [49], having carefully
drafted statute that incentivizes behavior changes, provides adequate funds, expresses clearly ranked
goals, is an implementation process, and has few veto points is also vital to the success of a policy.
With regard to AI governance, the ambiguity and complexity of the problem creates a major
hurdle for effective policies to be developed. These problems are nonlinear, very hard to predict,
and may have the traits of wicked problems in the sense that solving one problem can create new
problems. Breaking down AI risk policy into multiple domains as discussed in the previous section
helps with creating somewhat less ambiguous objectives, such as changing the education system to be
more conducive for technological growth. Even then, however, because many of the issues are either
complex or have not happened yet, it is difficult to create concrete objectives and policies. AI risk is not
like noise pollution, where there is an easily identifiable, manageable, and tractable problem. Further
research could help to identify concrete and tractable issues that might lead to a reduction of risk.
In addition, when trying to develop and implement policy, AI policymakers will need to keep in mind
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factors such as to what extent there is support for it in the executive branch, with outside organizations,
and how exactly the policy is written and how those change throughout the policymaking cycle.
Another key consideration for successful policy implementation that was identified from the
literature is engaging with the community to increase readiness to accept and devote resources to
policy-related problems. It has been acknowledged that there are no good evidence-based ways of
achieving community buy-in. This is an area that might be useful to study in order to increase the
chances of successful reduction of AI risk. There are different stages of community readiness, such as
no awareness, denial, and vague awareness to preplanning, preparation, initiation, and stabilization
phases [49]. It is important to understand what counts as the community and what phases different
subcommunities of AI safety field are in. Earlier, this paper mentioned a survey about AI experts and
showed that their readiness with AI risks was low. Other relevant experts, the public, and other types
of subcommunities might have different levels of readiness.
It has been suggested that “the more clearly the core components of an intervention program
or practice are known and defined, the more readily the program or practice can be implemented
successfully” [49]. In other words, policies and steps of implementation of those policies have to be
very clearly expressed. What implications does this have for AI risk? Researchers and policymakers
should evaluate how clearly core components have been expressed in this field and improve them
as necessary.
4.4. Policy Evaluation
The final step in the policymaking cycle is policy evaluation. This includes activities related to
determining the impact of the policy, whether it is achieving its goals, whether the rules and procedures
it lays out are being followed, and other externalities or unintended consequences [30]. As we have
explained before, policy evaluation does not have to occur only at this step. For example, the impact of
a policy is estimated already in the early stages. Anderson et al. highlighted different types of policy
evaluations in their book but especially considered systematic evaluations of programs. This involves
“the specification of goals or objectives; the collection of information and data on program inputs,
outputs, and consequences; and their rigorous analysis, preferably through the use of quantitative or
statistical techniques” [30]’.
Policy evaluation examines a policy to understand its impacts in multiple ways [30]. First, is the
policy affecting the population that it is intending to target? In AI risk policy, this could be anything
from large tech companies, to AI researchers, to people affected by technological unemployment.
Second, are there populations that are being affected that were not intended? These externalities
could be positive or negative. Third, what are the benefits and costs associated with this policy?
AI policymakers will want to ensure that their policies actually reduce risk and that the costs are not
so astronomical that they become politically infeasible. Finally, what long-term costs and benefits does
a policy have? This is especially important for AI risk policy, as decisions now could have a major
impact on the long-term risk that AI has. In AI governance and policymaking, research needs to be
done on what sort of indicators or metrics are used for the reduction of risk, and for identifying what
goals that should be achieved.
If the previous steps in the policymaking process have generated goals that are unclear or diverse,
it is very difficult to evaluate the impact of the policy [30]. Different decision-makers can more easily
reach a differing conclusion about the results of a program in that case, or may not follow it all [30].
How the goals of an AI risk program are defined is, therefore, very important.
Another key consideration for policy evaluation is how to make sure that the results are objectively
measured. Agency and program officials may be wary of possible political consequences of the
evaluation process [30]. If it turns out that the program was not useful or even detrimental, this might
have consequences to their influence and career. Because of this consideration, they might not be very
interested in correct evaluation studies or they may hinder the process in some other way. There are
many ways an evaluation of a policy might be ignored or attacked, such as claiming it was poorly
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done, the data were inadequate, or the findings inconclusive [30]. Thus, it is important that researchers
are provided with high-quality and relevant data-sets that are accurate.
There is also the distinction between policy outputs and outcomes [30] to consider. Outputs are
tangible actions taken or things produced, such as collecting taxes or building a dam. Outcomes, on
the other hand, are the consequences for society, such as lower disposable income or cleaner air quality.
Outputs do not always produce the intended outcomes, which is highly evident in areas such as social
welfare policy, where policies may unintentionally trap people in poverty. For AI policymakers, it is
very important to consider whether their policy outputs will have the intended consequences, and if
so, how to correct that policy.
The evaluation of a policy and the political responses to it can result in the termination of it [30].
Assuming that AI risk policymakers do not want their policies to be terminated or altered in a
detrimental way, how can they make sure this does not happen? A policy getting altered to be more
effective might be a good thing, but termination can bring unpleasant and negative connotations.
It might even have negative consequences to the community [30]. What exact consequences might it
have politically? Further, it is important to remember that many policymakers’ time horizon only goes
until the next election, and so, they often seek immediate results, often before the returns come into
fruition. While this may not impact all policies, as this mostly applies to salient policies like healthcare
and education, AI policymakers should keep this in mind and try to understand how it might impact
their work.
5. Conclusions
There are multiple policy options that could be chosen that either directly or indirectly reduce
AI risk, or relevant policies that could help with further efforts to reduce AI risk. Because different
policy arenas have different political conditions, and the policymaking process itself draws a number
of important challenges, this brings up questions as to what policies in what order are chosen,
what strategies are used to get these policies passed and implemented by the government, and the
larger impact of these choices on AI governance and risk as a whole. This paper argues that a new
subfield of AI governance research on AI policymaking strategies should be further investigated to
draw implications for how these policies should be designed, advocated for, and how organizations
should approach solving this issue.
6. Limitations and Future Research
This paper is intended to be a broad overview and to be a conversation starter for future research
into this area. Thus, there is a strong limitation to the depth of research in this paper. However, it is
expected that future work will be done to further refine the line of thinking laid out above, along with
further in-depth study into the different theories and their applicability to AI risk.
One of the major limitations of this paper is that the stages heuristic presented in this paper has
been heavily criticized and is subject to debate about its effectiveness. Sabatier (2007) has criticized it
for not being a causal theory, having a strong top-down bias, among other critiques. However, he also
notes that there is much up to debate, with some scholars such as Anderson (2010) advocating for it.
There are also a number of other theories that were not discussed in this paper, such as Institutional
Rational Choice, the punctuated equilibrium framework, the policy diffusion framework, and other
lesser-known theories. Future research is expected that will explore which policy frameworks should
be focused on in AI risk research.
The other limitation of this paper is that its applicability to the international governance of AI
was not discussed. Future research that looks at how much these theories apply to foreign policy and
the international governance of AI in general would be useful. If these theories have a very limited or
no impact on the international governance of AI, then figuring out how much work can be done to
reduce AI risk in domestic policy would determine the usefulness of these theories.
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Throughout the paper, a number of key considerations have been raised. For convenience, a list
of them has been curated below below.
7. Summary
This part of the paper summarizes and lists some of the key questions and considerations brought
up in the discussion.
Thesis level consideration:
• How do the politics and administrative mechanisms of policymaking affect how policies to
mitigate AI risk are created and implemented?
Considerations from Typologies of Policies:
• Are there AI risk policies that should be implemented first? What are the methods to decide this?
• What types of policies should the AI risk policymakers try to get implemented? Why should
those types be prioritized?
• What are the political considerations surrounding different sets of policies, and how does that
affect their ability to be implemented?
Considerations from Problem Identification, Agenda Setting, and Policy Formulation:
• Is this issue or policy legitimate?
• Would the policy be supported by the current administration and be able to be maintained through
changing administrations?
• Which policies out of different sets of potential solutions are politically feasible?
• Are there less costly alternative policies that AI risk policymakers will have to compete with?
• How does attention to problems by different communities affect AI risk policymakers’ actions?
• What types of framing of policy issues are most beneficial? What types are most dangerous?
• Is there a way to determine how framing will determine policy content?
• What focusing events have occurred in the field of AI?
• How can AI risk policymakers utilize focusing events to further policy agendas?
• What effect do other organizations have on reducing the legitimacy of AI risk?
• What can be done to respond to these counter-movements effectively? What kind of responses to
objections are most convincing?
• How many policy windows will there be for a particular issue? What does this mean for AI risk
policymakers’ overall strategy?
• What role should AI risk policy entrepreneurs play in AI governance?
• How and where should AI risk policy entrepreneurs gain access in government?
Considerations from Policy Adoption:
• What policy alternatives are more likely to win approval to improve the odds of success for AI
risk reduction?
• What strategies can be used to improve the chances of a preferred policy to be adopted?
• Which groups or individuals could join AI risk coalitions, what criteria are used to decide this,
and what costs does them joining the coalition have?
• What role can organizations outside of AI risk play in furthering AI risk policymakers’ agenda?
Considerations from Policy Implementation:
• Is this solution technically feasible for governments to implement?
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• Are there enough resources, will, and support by leaders and constituency groups to be successful
in implementation?
• Is the policy crafted in a way that effectively structures incentives for the target group?
• Is the policy unambiguous? If so, then how will that affect its ability to be implemented?
• Are the goals of the policy in conflict with any other policy or changes in society?
• Are there any veto points in the policy’s statutes to prevent effective implementation?
• How will the contents or the political factors surrounding of a policy be affected during implementation?
• Do the relevant communities accept the issue, and are they willing to devote resources to resolve it?
Considerations from Policy Evaluation:
• Are the policy outputs having the intended outcomes?
• What are the consequences of any unintentional outcomes?
• What are the political factors surrounding the metrics that are being used to evaluate the policy?
• Do the political costs or benefits of the policy have an impact on its success?
• If the policy is terminated, will there be any negative political consequences?
• How can AI risk policymakers update the policy? How can they prevent changes by other groups
that would be harmful?
• How will the limited time horizons of lawmakers and other groups affect the evaluation of
the policy?
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complex, more problematic, and less well understood than the single-agent case, and are also already
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artificial intelligence (AI), the paper explains why these failure modes are in some senses unavoidable.
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1. Background, Motivation and Contribution
When complex systems are optimized by a single agent, the representation of the system and of the
goal used for optimization often leads to failures that can be surprising to the agent’s designers. These
failure modes go by a variety of names, Amodei and Clark called them faulty reward functions [1]
but similar failures have been referred to as Goodhart’s law [2,3], Campbell’s law [4], distributional
shift [5], strategic behavior [6], reward hacking [7], Proxyeconomics [8], and other terms.
Examples of these failures in the single-agent case are shown by Victoria Krakovna’s extensive
list of concrete examples of “generating a solution that literally satisfies the stated objective but fails to
solve the problem according to the human designer’s intent.” [9] Liu et al. suggest that “a complex
activity can often be performed in several different ways,” [10] but not all these ways should be
considered valid. To understand why, Krakovna’ s list includes examples of “achieving a goal” by
finding and exploiting bugs in a simulation engine to achieve goals [11–13]; by physical manipulation
of objects in unanticipated ways, such as moving a table instead of the item on the table [14], or flipping
instead of lifting a block [15]; and even by exploiting the problem structure or evaluation, such as
returning an empty list as being sorted [16], or deleting the file containing the target output [16].
1.1. Motivation
This forms only a part of the broader set of concerns in AI safety, [5,17–19], but the failure modes
are the focus of a significant body of work in AI safety discussed later in the paper. However, as the
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systems become more capable and more widely used, Danzig and others have noted that this will
“increase rather than reduce collateral risks of loss of control.” [20] The speed of such systems is almost
certainly beyond the point of feasible human control, and as they become more complex, the systems
are also individually likely to fail in ways that are harder to understand.
While some progress has been made in the single-agent case, the systems have continued to
become more capable, corporations, governments, and other actors have developed and deployed
machine learning systems. These are not only largely autonomous, but also interact with each other.
This allows a new set of failures, and these are not yet a focus of safety-focused research—but they
are critical.
1.2. Contribution
The analogues of the earlier-mentioned classes of failure for multi-agent systems are more complex,
potentially harder to mitigate, and unfortunately not the subject of a significant focus among AI safety
researchers. In this paper, we introduce a classification of failures that are not yet well-addressed in
the literature involving multiple agents. These failures can occur even when system designers do
not intend to build conflicting AI or ML systems. The current paper contributes to the literature by
outlining how and why these multi-agent failures can occur, and providing an overview of approaches
that could be developed for mitigating them. In doing so, the paper will hopefully help spur system
designers to explicitly consider these failure modes in designing systems, and urge caution on the part
of policymakers.
As a secondary contribution, the link between ongoing work on AI safety and potential work
mitigating these multi-agent failures incidentally answers an objection raised by AI risk skeptics that
AI safety is ”not worth current attention” and that the issues are “premature to worry about” [21]. This
paper instead shows how failures due to multi-agent dynamics are critical in the present, as ML and
superhuman narrow AI is being widely deployed, even given the (valid) arguments put forward by
Yudkowsky [22] and Bostrom [7] for why a singleton AI is a more important source of existential risk.
1.3. Extending Single-Agent Optimization Failures
Systems which are optimized using an imperfect system model have several important failure
modes categorized in work by Manheim and Garrabrant [3]. First, imperfect correlates of the goal will
be less correlated in the tails of the distribution, as discussed by Lewis [23]. Heavily optimized systems
will end up in those regions, and even well-designed metrics do not account for every possible source
of variance. Second, there are several context failures [24], where the optimization is well behaved in
the training set (“ancestral environment”) but fails as optimization pressure is applied. For example,
it may drift towards an “edge instantiation” where the system may optimize all the variables that
relate to the true goal, but further gain on the metric is found by unexpected means. Alternatively,
the optimizer may properly obey constraints in the initial stage, but find some “nearest unblocked
strategy” [24] allowing it to circumvent designed limits when given more optimization power. These
can all occur in single-agent scenarios.
The types of failure in multi-agent systems presented in this paper can be related to Manheim
and Garrabrant’s classification of single-agent metric optimization failures . The four single-agent
overoptimization failure modes outlined there are:
• Tails Fall Apart, or Regressional inaccuracy, where the relationship between the modeled goal and
the true goal is inexact due to noise (for example, measurement error,) so that the bias grows as the
system is optimized.
• Extremal Model Insufficiency, where the approximate model omits factors which dominate the
system’s behavior after optimization.
• Extremal Regime Change, where the model does not include a regime change that occurs under
certain (unobserved) conditions that optimization creates.
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• Causal Model Failure, where the agent’s actions are based on a model which incorrectly represents
causal relationships, and the optimization involves interventions that break the causal structure
the model implicitly relies on.
Despite the completeness of the above categorization, the way in which these failures occur can
differ greatly even when only a single agent is present. In a multi-agent scenario, agents can stumble
into or intentionally exploit model overoptimization failures in even more complex ways. Despite this
complexity, the different multi-agent failure modes can be understood based on understanding the
way in which the implicit or explicit system models used by agents fail.
1.4. Defining Multi-Agent Failures
In this paper, a multi-agent optimization failure is when one (or more) of the agents which can
achieve positive outcomes in some scenarios exhibits behaviors that negatively affect its own outcome
due to the actions of one or more agents other than itself. This occurs either when the objective function
of the agent no longer aligns with the goal, as occurs in the Regressional and both Extremal cases,
or when the learned relationship between action(s), the metric(s), and the goal have changed, as in the
Causal failure case.
This definition does not require the failure to be due to malicious behavior on the part of any
agent, nor does it forbid it. Note also that the definition does not require failure of the system, as in
Behzadan and Munir’s categorization of adversarial attacks [25], nor does it make any assumptions
about type of the agents, such as the type of learning or optimization system used. (The multi-agent
cases implicitly preclude agents from being either strongly boxed, as Drexler proposed [26], or oracular,
as discussed by Armstrong [27].)
2. Multi-Agent Failures: Context and Categorization
Several relatively straightforward failure modes involving interactions between an agent and
a regulator were referred to in Manheim and Garrabrant as adversarial Goodhart [3]. These occur where
one AI system opportunistically alters or optimizes the system and uses the expected optimization of
a different victim agent to hijack the overall system. For example, “smart market” electrical grids use
systems that optimize producer actions and prices with a linear optimization system using known
criteria. If power lines or power plants have strategically planned maintenance schedules, an owner
can manipulate the resulting prices to its own advantage, as occurred (legally) in the case of Enron [28].
This is possible because the manipulator can plan in the presence of a known optimization regime.
This class of manipulation by an agent frustrating a regulator’s goals is an important case,
but more complex dynamics can also exist, and Manheim and Garrabrant noted that there are “clearly
further dynamics worth exploring.” [3] This involves not only multiple heterogenous agents, which
Kleinberg and Raghavan suggest an avenue for investigating, but also interaction between those
agents [6]. An example of a well-understood multi-agent system, the game of poker, allows clarification
of why the complexity is far greater in the interaction case.
2.1. Texas Hold’em and the Complexity of Multi-Agent Dynamics
In many-agent systems, simple interactions can become complex adaptive systems due to agent
behavior, as the game of poker shows. Solutions to simplified models of two-player poker predate
game theory as a field [29], and for simplified variants, two-player draw poker has a fairly simple
optimal strategy [30]. These early, manually computed solutions were made possible both by limiting
the complexity of the cards, and more importantly by limiting interaction to a single bet size, with no
raising or interaction between the players. In the more general case of heads-up limit Texas Hold’em,
significantly more work was needed, given the multiplicity of card combinations, the existence of
hidden information, and player interaction, but this multi-stage interactive game is “now essentially
weakly solved” [31]. Still, this game involves only two players. In the no-limit version of the game,
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Brown and Sandholm recently unveiled superhuman AI [32], which restricts the game to “Heads’ Up”
poker, which involves only two players per game, and still falls far short of a full solution to the game.
The complex adaptive nature of multi-agent systems means that each agent needs model not
only model the system itself, but also the actions of the other player(s). The multiplicity of potential
outcomes, betting strategies, and different outcomes becomes rapidly infeasible to represent other
than heuristically. In limit Texas Hold’em poker, for example, the number of card combinations is
immense, but the branching possibilities for betting is the more difficult challenge. In a no-betting
game of Hold’em with P players, there are 52!/((52 − 2P − 5)! · 2P · 5!) possible situations. This is
2.8 · 1012 hands in the two-player case, 3.3 · 1015 in the three-player case, and growing by a similar factor
when expanded to the four-, five-, or six-player case. The probability of winning is the probability
that the five cards on the table plus two unknown other cards from the deck are a better hand than
any that another player holds. In Texas Hold’em, there are four betting stages, one after each stage
of cards is revealed. Billings et al. use a reduced complexity game (limiting betting to three rounds
per stage) and find a complexity of O(1018) in the two-hand case [33]. That means the two-player,
three-round game complexity is comparable in size to a no-betting four-player game, with 4.1 · 1018
card combinations possible.
Unlike a no-betting game, however, a player must consider much more than the simple probability
that the hand held is better than those held by other players. That calculation is unmodified during the
additional branching due to player choices. The somewhat more difficult issue is that the additional
branching requires Bayesian updates to estimate the probable distribution of hand strengths held
by other players based on their decisions, which significantly increases the complexity of solving
the game. The most critical challenge, however, is that each player bets based on the additional
information provided by not only the hidden information provided by their cards, but also based
on the betting behavior of other players. Opponent(s) make betting decisions based on non-public
information (in Texas Hold’em, hole cards) and strategy for betting requires a meta-update taking
advantage of the information the other player reveals by betting. The players must also update based
on potential strategic betting by other players, which occurs when a player bets in a way calculated
to deceive. To deal with this, poker players need to model not just the cards, but also the strategic
decisions of other players. This complex model of strategic decisions must be re-run for all the possible
combinations at each decision point to arrive at a conclusion about what other players are doing. Even
after this is complete, an advanced poker player, or an effective AI, must then decide not just how
likely they are to win, but also how to play strategically, optimizing based on how other players will
react to the different choices available.
Behaviors such as bluffing and slow play are based on these dynamics, which become much more
complex as the number of rounds of betting and the number of players increases. For example, slow
play involves underbidding compared to the strength of your hand. This requires that the players will
later be able to raise the stakes, and allows a player to lure others into committing additional money.
The complexity of the required modeling of other agents’ decision processes grows as a function of
the number of choices and stages at which each agent makes a decision. This type of complexity is
common in multi-agent systems. In general, however, the problem is much broader in scope than what
can be illustrated by a rigidly structured game such as poker.
2.2. Limited Complexity Models versus the Real World
In machine learning systems, the underlying system is approximated by implicitly or explicitly
learning a multidimensional transformation between inputs and outputs. This transformation
approximates a combination of the relationships between inputs and the underlying system,
and between the system state and the outputs. The complexity of the model learned is limited
by the computational complexity of the underlying structure, and while the number of possible states
for the input is large, it is typically dwarfed by the number of possible states of the system.
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The critical feature of machine learning that allows such systems to be successful is that most
relationships can be approximated without inspecting every available state. (All models simplify the
systems they represent.) The implicit simplification done by machine learning is often quite impressive,
picking up on clues present in the input that humans might not notice, but it comes at the cost of
having difficult to understand and difficult to interpret implicit models of the system.
Any intelligence, whether machine learning-based, human, or AI, requires similar implicit
simplification, since the branching complexity of even a relatively simple game such as Go dwarfs
the number of atoms in the universe. Because even moderately complex systems cannot be fully
represented, as discussed by Soares [34], the types of optimization failures discussed above are
inevitable. The contrapositive to Conant and Ashby’s theorem [35] is that if a system is more complex
than the model, any attempt to control the system will be imperfect. Learning, whether human or
machine, builds approximate models based on observations, or input data. This implies that the
behavior of the approximation in regions far from those covered by the training data is more likely
to markedly differ from reality. The more systems change over time, the more difficult prediction
becomes—and the more optimization is performed on a system, the more it will change. Worsening
this problem, the learning that occurs in ML systems fails to account for the embedded agency issues
discussed by Demski and Garrabrant [36], and interaction between agents with implicit models of
each other and themselves amplifies many of these concerns.
2.3. Failure modes
Because an essential part of multi-agent dynamic system modeling is opponent modeling, the
opponent models are a central part of any machine learning model. These opponent models may be
implicit in the overall model, or they may be explicitly represented, but they are still models that are
approximate. In many cases, opponent behavior is ignored—by implicitly simplifying other agent
behavior to noise, or by assuming no adversarial agents exist. Because these models are imperfect,
they will be vulnerable to overoptimization failures discussed above.
The list below is conceptually complete, but limited in at least three ways. First, examples given
in this list primarily discuss failures that occur between two parties, such as a malicious actor and
a victim, or failures induced by multiple individually benign agents. This would exclude strategies
where agents manipulate others indirectly, or those where coordinated interaction between agents is
used to manipulate the system. It is possible that when more agents are involved, more specific classes
of failure will be relevant.
Second, the below list does not include how other factors can compound metric failures. These are
critical, but may involve overoptimization, or multiple-agent interaction, only indirectly. For example,
O’Neil discusses a class of failure involving the interaction between the system, the inputs, and
validation of outputs [37]. These failures occur when a system’s metrics are validated in part based
on outputs it contributes towards. For example, a system predicting greater crime rates in areas with
high minority concentrations leads to more police presence, which in turn leads to a higher rate of
crime found. This higher rate of crime in those areas is used to train the model, which leads it to
reinforce the earlier unjustified assumption. Such cases are both likely to occur, and especially hard
to recognize, when the interaction between multiple systems is complex, and it is unclear whether
the system’s effects are due in part to its own actions (This class of failure seems particularly likely in
systems that are trained via ”self-play,” where failures in the model of the system get reinforced by
incorrect feedback on the basis of the models, which is also a case of model insufficiency failure.).
Third and finally, the failure modes exclude cases that do not directly involve metric
overoptimizations, such as systems learning unacceptable behavior implicitly due to training data that
contains unanticipated biases, or failing to attempt to optimize for social preferences such as fairness.
These are again important, but they are more basic failures of system design.
With those caveats, we propose the following classes of multi-agent overoptimization failures.
For each, a general definition is provided, followed by one or more toy models that demonstrate
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the failure mode. Each agent attempts to achieve their goal by optimizing for the metric, but the
optimization is performed by different agents without any explicit coordination or a priori knowledge
about the other agents. The specifics of the strategies that can be constructed and the structure of the
system can be arbitrarily complex, but as explored below, the ways in which these models fail can still
be understood generally.
These models are deliberately simplified, but where possible, real-world examples of the failures
exhibited in the model are suggested. These examples come from both human systems where parallel
dynamics exist, and examples of the failures in extent systems with automated agents. In the toy
models, Mi and Gi stands for the metric and goal, respectively, for agent i. The metric is an imperfect
proxy for the goal, and will typically be defined in relation to a goal. (The goal itself is often left
unspecified, since the model applies to arbitrary systems and agent goals.) In some cases, the failure is
non-adversarial, but where relevant, there is a victim agent V and an opponent agent O that attempts
to exploit it. Please note that the failures can be shown with examples formulated with game-theoretic
notation, but doing so requires more complex specifications of the system and interactions than is
possible using the below characterization of the agent goals and the systems.
Failure Mode 1. Accidental Steering is when multiple agents alter the systems in ways not anticipated by at
least one agent, creating one of the above-mentioned single-party overoptimization failures.
Remark 1. This failure mode manifests similarly to the single-agent case and differs only in that agents do not
anticipate the actions of other agents. When agents have closely related goals, even if those goals are aligned,
it can exacerbate the types of failures that occur in single-agent cases.
Because the failing agent alone does not (or cannot) trigger the failure, this differs from the single-agent
case. The distributional shift can occur due to a combination of actors’ otherwise potentially positive influences
by either putting the system in an extremal state where the previously learned relationship decays, or triggering
a regime change where previously beneficial actions are harmful.
Model. 1.1—Group Overoptimization. A set of agents each have goals which affect the system in related
ways, and metric-goal relationship changes in the extremal region where x>a. As noted above, Mi and Gi stands
for the metric and goal, respectively, for agent i. This extremal region is one where single-agent failure modes
will occur for some or all agents. Each agent i can influence the metric by an amount αi, where ∑ αi > a,
but ∀αi < a. In the extremal subspace where Mi > a, the metric reverses direction, making further optimization
of the metric harm the agent’s goal.
Mi =
{
Gi, where Mi <= a
Mi(a)− Gi, where Mi > a
(1)
Remark 2. In the presence of multiple agents without coordination, manipulation of factors not already being
manipulated by other agents is likely to be easier and more rewarding, potentially leading to inadvertent steering
due to model inadequacy, as discussed in Manheim and Garrabrant’s categorization of single-agent cases [3].
As shown there overoptimization can lead to perverse outcomes, and the failing agent(s) can hurt both their own
goals, and in similar ways, can lead to negative impacts on the goals of other agents.
Model. 1.2—Catastrophic Threshold Failure.
Mi = xi Gi =
{
a + (∑∀i xi) where ∑∀i xi <= T
a −−− (∑∀i xi) where ∑∀i xi > T
(2)
Each agent manipulates their own variable, unaware of the overall impact. Even though the agents are
collaborating, because they cannot see other agents’ variables, there is no obvious way to limit the combined
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impact on the system to stay below the catastrophic threshold T. Because each agent is exploring a different
variable, they each are potentially optimizing different parts of the system.
Remark 3. This type of catastrophic threshold is commonly discussed in relations to complex adaptive systems,
but can occur even in systems where the catastrophic threshold is simple. The case discussed by Michael Eisen
involves pricing on Amazon was due to a pair of deterministic linear pricing-setting bots interacting to set the
price of an otherwise unremarkable biology book at tens of millions of dollars, showing that runaway dynamics are
possible even in the simplest cases [38]. This phenomenon is also expected whenever exceeding some constraint
breaks the system, and such constraints are often not identified until a failure occurs.
Example 1. This type of coordination failure can occur in situations such as overfishing across multiple regions,
where each group catches local fish, which they can see, but at a given threshold across regions the fish population
collapses, and recovery is very slow. (In this case, the groups typically are selfish rather than collaborating,
making the dynamics even more extreme.)
Example 2. Smaldino and McElreath [39] shows this failure mode specifically occurring with statistical
methodology in academia, where academics find novel ways to degrade statistical rigor. The more general
“Mutable Practices” model presented by Braganza [8], based on part on Smaldino and McElreath, has each agent
attempting to both outperform the other agents on a metric as well as fulfill a shared societal goal, allows agents
to evolve and find new strategies that combine to subvert a societal goal.
Failure Mode 2. Coordination Failure occurs when multiple agents clash despite having potentially
compatible goals.
Remark 4. Coordination is an inherently difficult task, and can in general be considered impossible [40].
In practice, coordination is especially difficult when the goals of other agents are incompletely known or not fully
understood. Coordination failures such as Yudkowsky’s Inadequate equilibria are stable, and coordination to
escape from such an equilibrium can be problematic even when agents share goals [41].
Model. 2.1—Unintended Resource Contention. A fixed resource R is split between uses Rn by different
agents. Each agent has limited funds fi, and Ri is allocated to agent i for exploitation in proportion to their bid
for the resources cRi . The agents choose amounts to spend on acquiring resources, and then choose amounts sni
to exploit each resource, resulting in utility U(sn, Rn). The agent goals are based on the overall exploitation of








In this case, we see that conflicting instrumental goals that neither side anticipates will cause wasted funds due
to contention. The more funds spent on resource capture, which is zero-sum, the less remaining for exploitation,
which can be positive-sum. Above nominal spending on resources to capture them from aligned competitor-agents
will reduce funds available for exploitation of those resources, even though less resource contention would benefit
all agents.
Remark 5. Preferences and gains from different uses can be homogeneous, so that all agents have no
marginal gain from affecting the allocation, funds will be wasted on resource contention. More generally,
heterogeneous preferences can lead to contention to control the allocation, with sub-optimal individual outcomes,
and heterogeneous abilities can lead to less-capable agents harming their goals by capturing then ineffectively
exploiting resources.
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Example 3. Different forms of scientific research benefit different goals differently. Even if spending in every
area benefits everyone, a fixed pool of resources implies that with different preferences, contention between projects
with different positive impacts will occur. To the extent that effort must be directed towards grant-seeking instead
of scientific work, the resources available for the projects themselves are reduced, sometimes enough to cause
a net loss.
Remark 6. Coordination limiting overuse of public goods is a major area of research in economics. Ostrom
explains how such coordination is only possible when conflicts are anticipated or noticed and where a reliable
mechanism can be devised [42].
Model. 2.2—Unnecessary Resource Contention. As above, but each agent has an identical reward function
of fi,n. Even though all goals are shared, a lack of coordination in the above case leads to overspending, as shown
in simple systems and for specified algebraic objective functions in the context of welfare economics. This
literature shows many methods for how gains are possible, and in the simplest examples this occurs when agents
coordinate to minimize overall spending on resource acquisition.
Remark 7. Coordination mechanisms themselves can be exploited by agents. The field of algorithmic game
theory has several results for why this is only sometimes possible, and how building mechanisms to avoid such
exploitation is possible [43].
Failure Mode 3. Adversarial optimization can occur when a victim agent has an incomplete model of how
an opponent can influence the system. The opponent’s model of the victim allows it to intentionally select for
cases where the victim’s model performs poorly and/or promotes the opponent’s goal [3].
Model. 3.1—Adversarial Goal Poisoning.
GV = x
GO = −x
MV = X : X ∼ normal(x, σ2(y))
MO = (X, y)
(4)
In this case, the Opponent O can see the metric for the victim, and can select for cases where y is large and X is
small, so that V chooses maximal values of X, to the marginal benefit of O.
Example 4. A victim’s model can be learned by “Stealing” models using techniques such as those explored
by Tramèr et al. [44]. In such a case, the information gained can be used for model evasion and other attacks
mentioned there.
Example 5. Chess and other game engines may adaptively learn and choose openings or strategies for which
the victim is weakest.
Example 6. Sophisticated financial actors can make trades to dupe victims into buying or selling an asset
(“Momentum Ignition”) in order to exploit the resulting price changes [45], leading to a failure of the exploited
agent due to an actual change in the system which it misinterprets.
Remark 8. The probability of exploitable reward functions increases with the complexity of the system the
agents manipulate [5], and the simplicity of the agent and their reward function. The potential for exploitation
by other agents seems to follow the same pattern, where simple agents will be manipulated by agents with more
accurate opponent models.
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Model. 3.2—Adversarial Optimization Theft. An attacker can discover exploitable quirks in the goal
function to make the victim agent optimize for a new goal, as in Manheim and Garrabrant’s Campbell’s law
example, slightly adapted here [3].
MV = GV + X
MO = GO · X
(5)
O selects MO after seeing V’s choice of metric. In this case, we can assume the opponent chooses a metric to
maximize based on the system and the victim’s goal, which is known to the attacker. The opponent can choose
their MO so that the victim’s later selection then induces a relationship between X and the opponent goal,
especially at the extremes. Here, the opponent selects such that even weak selection on MO hijacks the victim’s
selection on MV to achieve their goal, because states where MV is high have changed. In the example given,
if X ∼ normal(μ, σ2), the correlation between GO and MO is zero over the full set of states, but becomes positive
on the subspace selected by the victim. (Please note that the opponent choice of metric is not itself a useful proxy
for their goal absent the victim’s actions—it is a purely parasitic choice.)
Failure Mode 4. Input spoofing and filtering—Filtered evidence can be provided, or false evidence can be
manufactured and put into the training data stream of a victim agent.
Model. 4.1—Input Spoofing. Victim agent receives public data D(xi|t) about the present world-state, and
builds a model to choose actions which return rewards f (x|t). The opponent can generate events xi to poison the
victim’s learned model.
Remark 9. See the classes of data poisoning attacks explored by Wang and Chaudhuri [46] against online
learning, and of Chen et al [47]. for creating backdoors in deep-learning verification systems.
Example 7. Financial market participants can (illegally) spoof by posting orders that will quickly be canceled
in a “momentum ignition” strategy to lure others into buying or selling, as has been alleged to be occurring
in high-frequency-trading [45]. This differs from the earlier example in that the transactions are not bona-fide
transactions which fool other agents, but are actually false evidence.
Example 8. Rating systems can be attacked by inputting false reviews into a system, or by discouraging reviews
by those likely to be the least or most satisfied reviewers.
Model. 4.2—Active Input Spoofing. As in (4.1), where the victim agent employs active learning. In this
case, the opponent can potentially fool the system into collecting data that seems very useful to the victim from
crafted poisoned sources.
Example 9. Honeypots can be placed, or Sybil attacks mounted by opponents to fool victims into learning from
examples that systematically differ from the true distribution.
Example 10. Comments by users “Max” and “Vincent DeBacco” on Eisen’s blog post about Amazon pricing
suggested that it is very possible to abuse badly built linear pricing models on Amazon to receive discounts, if the
algorithms choose prices based on other quoted prices [38].
Model. 4.3—Input Filtering. As in (4.1), but instead of generating false evidence, true evidence is hidden to
systematically alter the distribution of events seen.
Example 11. Financial actors can filter the evidence available to other agents by performing transactions they
do not want seen as private transactions or dark pool transactions.
Remark 10. There are classes of system where it is impossible to generate arbitrary false data points, but
selective filtering can have similar effects.
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Failure Mode 5. Goal co-option is when an opponent controls the system the Victim runs on, or relies on,
and can therefore make changes to affect the victim’s actions.
Remark 11. Whenever the computer systems running AI and ML systems are themselves insecure, it presents
a very tempting weak point that potentially requires much less effort than earlier methods of fooling the system.
Model. 5.1—External Reward Function Modification. Opponent O directly modifies Victim V’s reward
function to achieve a different objective than the one originally specified.
Remark 12. Slight changes in a reward function may have non-obvious impacts until after the system
is deployed.
Model. 5.2—Output Interception. Opponent O intercepts and modifies Victim V’s output.
Model. 5.3—Data or Label Interception. Opponent O modifies externally stored scoring rules (labels) or
data inputs provided to Victim V’s output.
Example 12. Xiao, Xiao, and Eckert explore a “label flipping” attack against support vector machines [48]
where modifying a limited number of labels used in the training set can cause performance to deteriorate severely.
Remark 13. As noted above, there are cases where generating false data may be impossible or easily detected.
Modifying the inputs during training may create less obvious traces of an attack has occurred. Where this is
impossible, access can also allow pure observation which, while not itself an attack, can allow an opponent to
engage in various other exploits discussed earlier.
To conclude the list of failure modes, it is useful to note a few areas where the failures are
induced or amplified. This is when agents explicitly incentivize certain behaviors on the part of other
agents, perhaps by providing payments. These public interactions and incentive payments are not
fundamentally different from other failure modes, but can create or magnify any of the other modes.
This is discussed in literature on the evolution of collusion, such as Dixon’s treatment [49]. Contra
Dixon, however, the failure modes discussed here can prevent the collusion from being beneficial.
A second, related case is when creating incentives where an agent fails to anticipate either the ways in
which the other agents can achieve the incentivized target, or the systemic changes that are induced.
These so-called “Cobra effects” [3] can lead to both the simpler failures of the single-agent cases
explored in Manheim and Garrabrant, and lead to the failures above. Lastly, as noted by Sandberg [50],
agents with different “speeds” (and, equivalently, processing power per unit time,) can exacerbate
victimization, since older and slower systems are susceptible, and susceptibility to attacks only grows
as new methods of exploitation are found.
3. Discussion
Multi-agent systems can naturally give rise to cooperation instead of competition, as discussed in
Leibo et al.’s 2017 paper [51]. The conditions under which there is exploitation rather than cooperation,
however, are less well understood. A more recent paper by Leibo proposes that the competition
dynamic can be used to encourage more complex models. This discusses coordination failures,
but the discussion of dynamics leading to the failures does not engage with the literature on safety or
goal-alignment [52]. Leibo’s work, however, differs from most earlier work where multi-agent systems
are trained together with a single goal, perforce leading to cooperative behavior, as in Lowe et al.’s
heavily cited work, in which “competitive” dynamics are dealt with by pre-programming explicit
models of other agent behaviors [53].
The failure modes outlined (accidental steering, coordination failures, adversarial misalignment,
input spoofing or filtering, and goal co-option or direct hacking) are all due to models that do
not fully account for other agent behavior. Because all models must simplify the systems they
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represent, the prerequisites for these failures are necessarily present in complex-enough systems where
multiple non-coordinated agents interact. The problems of embedded agents discussed by Demski and
Garrabrant [36] make it particularly clear that current approaches are fundamentally unable to fully
represent these factors. For this and other reasons, mitigating the failures modes discussed here are not
yet central to the work of building better ML or narrow AI systems. At the same time, some competitive
domains such as finance are already experiencing some of these exploitative failures [45], and bots
engaging in social network manipulation, or various forms of more direct interstate competition are
likely engaging in similar strategies.
The failures seen so far are minimally disruptive. At the same time, many of the outlined failures
are more problematic for agents with a higher degree of sophistication, so they should be expected not
to lead to catastrophic failures given the types of fairly rudimentary agents currently being deployed.
For this reason, specification gaming currently appears to be a mitigable problem, or as Stuart Russell
claimed, be thought of as “errors in specifying the objective, period” [54]. This might be taken to imply
that these failures are avoidable, but the current trajectory of these systems means that the problems
will inevitably worsen as they become more complex and more such systems are deployed, and the
approaches used are fundamentally incapable of overcoming the obstacles discussed.
Potential Avenues for Mitigation
Mitigations for these failures exist, but as long as the fundamental problems discussed by Demski
and Garrabrant [36] are unaddressed, the dynamics driving these classes of failure seem unavoidable.
Furthermore, such failures are likely to be surprising. They will emerge as multiple machine learning
agents are deployed, and more sophisticated models will be more likely to trigger them. However,
as argued above, these failures are fundamental to interaction between complex agents. This means
that while it is unclear how quickly such failures will emerge, or if they will be quickly recognized, it is
unquestionable that they will continue to occur. System designers and policymakers should expect
that these problems will become intractable if deferred, and are therefore particularly critical to address
now. It is be expected that any solution involves a combination of approaches [17], though the brief
overview of safety approaches below shows that not all general approaches to AI safety are helpful for
multi-agent failures.
First, there are approaches that limit optimization. This can be done via satisficing, using
approaches such as Taylor’s Quantilizers, which pick actions at random from the top quantile of
evaluated choices [55]. Satisficing approaches can help in prevent exploiting other agents, or in
preventing accidental overoptimization, but are not effective as a defense against exploitative agents
or systemic failures due to agent interaction. Another approach limiting optimization is explicit
safety guarantees. In extrema, this looks like an AI-Box, preventing any interaction of the AI with
the wider world and hence preventing agent interaction completely. This is effective if such boxes
are not escaped, but it is unclear if this is possible [27]. Less extreme versions of safety guarantees
are sometimes possible, especially in domains where a formal model of safe behavior is possible,
and the system is sufficiently well understood. For example, Shalev-Shwartz et al. have such a model
for self-driving cars, heavily relying on the fact that the physics involved with keeping cars from
hitting one another, or other objects, is in effect perfectly understood [56]. Expanding this to less well
understood domains seems possible, but is problematic for reasons discussed elsewhere [57].
Without limiting optimization explicitly, some approaches attempt to better define the goals,
and thereby reduce the extent of unanticipated behaviors. These approaches involve some version
of direct optimization safety. One promising direction for limiting the extent to which goal-directed
optimization can be misdirected is to try to recognize actions rather than goals [58]. Human-in-the-loop
oversight is another direction for minimizing surprise and ensuring alignment, though this is already
infeasible in many systems [20]. Neither approach is likely to be more effective than humans themselves
are at preventing such exploitation. The primary forward-looking approach for safety is some version
134
Big Data Cogn. Comput. 2019, 3, 21
of ensuring that the goal is aligned, which is the bulk of what Yampolskiy and Fox refer to as AI safety
engineering [59].
In multi-agent contexts there is still a concern that because human values are complex, [18]
exploitation is an intrinsically unavoidable pitfall in multi-agent systems. Paul Christiano’s
“Distillation and Amplification” approach involves safe amplification using coordinated multi-agent
systems [60]. This itself involves addressing some of the challenges with multi-agent approaches,
and work on safe amplification using coordinated multi-agent systems in that context has begun [61].
In that work, the coordinating agents are predictive instead of agentic, so the failure modes are more
restricted. The methods suggested can also be extended to agentic systems, where they may prove
more worrisome, and solving the challenges potentially involves mitigating several failure modes
outlined here.
Between optimization-limiting approaches and AI safety engineering, it is possible that many of
the multi-agent failures discussed in the paper can be mitigated, though not eliminated. In addition,
there will always be pressure to prioritize performance as opposed to safety, and safe systems are
unlikely to perform as quickly as unsafe ones [20]. Even if the tradeoff resolves in favor of slower,
safer systems, such systems can only be created if these approaches are further explored and the
many challenges involved are solved before widespread deployment of unsafe ML and AI. Once the
systems are deployed, it seems infeasible that safer approaches could stop failures due to exploiting
and exploitable systems, short of recalling them. This is not a concern for the far-off future where
misaligned superintelligent AI poses an existential risk. It is instead a present problem, and it is
growing more serious along with the growth of research that does not address it.
4. Conclusions: Model Failures and Policy Failures
Work addressing the failure modes outlined in the paper is potentially very valuable, in part
because these failure modes are mitigable or avoidable if anticipated. AI and ML system designers and
users should expect that many currently successful but naive agents will be exploited in the future.
Because of this, the failure modes are likely to become more difficult to address if deferred, and are
therefore particularly critical to understand and address them preemptively. This may take the form of
systemic changes such as redesigned financial market structures, or may involve ensuring that agents
have built-in failsafes, or that they fail gracefully when exploited.
At present, it seems unlikely that large enough and detected failures will be sufficient to slow the
deployment of these systems. It is possible that governmental actors, policymakers, and commercial
entities will recognize the tremendous complexities of multiparty coordination among autonomous
agents and address these failure modes, or slow deployment and work towards addressing these
problems even before they become catastrophic. Alternatively, it is possible these challenges will
become apparent via limited catastrophes that are so blatant that AI safety will be prioritized. This
depends on how critical the failures are, how clearly they can be diagnosed, and whether the public
demands they be addressed.
Even if AI amplification remains wholly infeasible, humanity is already deploying autonomous
systems with little regards to safety. The depth of complexity is significant but limited in current
systems, and the strategic interactions of autonomous systems are therefore even more limited.
However, just as AI for poker eventually became capable enough to understand multi-player
interaction and engage in strategic play, AI in other systems should expect to be confronted with these
challenges. We do not know when the card sharks will show up, or the extent to which they will
make the games they play unsafe for others, but we should admit now that we are as-yet unprepared
for them.
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Abstract: There are two types of artificial general intelligence (AGI) safety solutions: global and
local. Most previously suggested solutions are local: they explain how to align or “box” a specific AI
(Artificial Intelligence), but do not explain how to prevent the creation of dangerous AI in other places.
Global solutions are those that ensure any AI on Earth is not dangerous. The number of suggested
global solutions is much smaller than the number of proposed local solutions. Global solutions can
be divided into four groups: 1. No AI: AGI technology is banned or its use is otherwise prevented;
2. One AI: the first superintelligent AI is used to prevent the creation of any others; 3. Net of AIs as AI
police: a balance is created between many AIs, so they evolve as a net and can prevent any rogue AI
from taking over the world; 4. Humans inside AI: humans are augmented or part of AI. We explore
many ideas, both old and new, regarding global solutions for AI safety. They include changing the
number of AI teams, different forms of “AI Nanny” (non-self-improving global control AI system
able to prevent creation of dangerous AIs), selling AI safety solutions, and sending messages to future
AI. Not every local solution scales to a global solution or does it ethically and safely. The choice
of the best local solution should include understanding of the ways in which it will be scaled up.
Human-AI teams or a superintelligent AI Service as suggested by Drexler may be examples of such
ethically scalable local solutions, but the final choice depends on some unknown variables such as
the speed of AI progress.
Keywords: AI safety; existential risk; AI alignment; superintelligence; AI arms race
1. Introduction
The problem of how to prevent a global catastrophe associated with the expected development
of AI of above human-level intelligence is often characterized as “AI safety” [1]. The topic has been
explored by many researchers [2–5]. Other forms of “AI safety,” typically associated with narrow-AI
such as that for self-driving cars or other narrow applications, are not considered in this paper.
An extensive review of possible AI safety solutions has been conducted by Sotala and
Yampolskiy [4]. In their article, they explore a classification of AI safety solutions by social, external,
and internal measures.
In this article, we suggest a different classification of AI safety solutions, as local or global, and
describe only global solutions. Local solutions are those that affect only one AI, and include AI ethics,
AI alignment, AI boxing, etc. Global solutions are those that affect any potential AI in the world,
for example, global technological relinquishment or use of the first superintelligent AI to prevent other
AIs from arising. Most solutions described by Sotala and Yampolskiy [4] are considered local solutions
in our classification scheme.
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Recent significant contributions to the global solutions problem include Christiano’s slow
takeoff model [6], which demonstrated that such a takeoff could happen earlier than a fast
takeoff; Ramamoorthy and Yampolskiy’s research on AI arms races: “Beyond MAD?: the race for
artificial general intelligence” [7]; Brundage et al.’s “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence” [8];
and research on a collective takeoff by Sotala [9]. The problem of “other AIs,” central to the global
AI safety conundrum, has been explored by Dewey [10], who suggested four types of solution:
international coordination, sovereign AI (superintelligent AI acting independently on global scale),
an AI-empowered project, and some other decisive technological advantage.
Any local safety solution which cannot be applied globally cannot in itself determine the course
of human history, as many other AIs may appear with different local properties. However, some
local solutions could reach the global level if an external transfer mechanism is added, such as an
international agreement, or if the first AI based on this local solution becomes the only global power:
Singleton [11].
Generally, when we use the term “AI” throughout this article, we do not mean standard
contemporary systems of machine learning processing Big Data, but rather the descendants of these
contemporary systems, which are dramatically more sophisticated, nuanced, and process vastly more
data even faster, and therefore attain intelligence equivalent to and/or surpassing human intelligence.
Additionally, this article is based on the assumption—shared by many (e.g., [3,12]), but not all AI
researchers—that above human-level AI is possible in the relatively near future (21st century) and the
world’s socio-political structure will be approximately the same as now at the moment of its creation.
This assumption about the possibility of superhuman AI is naturally followed by concerns about the
safety of such systems, which may generate not only isolated accidents, but a full variety of possible
global catastrophes as explored in Reference [13].
The main thesis of this article is that there are two main types of AI safety solutions: local and
global, and that not every local solution scales to a global solution or does it ethically and safely.
The choice of the best local solution should include an understanding of the ways in which it may
be scaled up. Human-AI teams or a superintelligent AI Service as suggested by Drexler [14] may be
examples of such ethically scalable local solutions, but the final choice depends on some unknown
variables such as the speed of AI progress [15].
To solve the problem of the relation between global and local solutions, we created a classification
of global solutions, which is a simpler task as all global solutions depend on the one main variable:
how many different AI systems will be eventually created. We used this classification to identify pairs
of local and global solutions, which are less risky when combined.
In Section 2 we overview various levels of AI safety. In Section 3 we look at solutions involving
the prevention of AI, while in Section 4 we explore “one AI solutions,” where the first AI prevents the
appearance of other AIs. In Section 5 we address “many AI solutions,” in which many superhuman
AIs appear and interact. In Section 6, we suggest a class of solutions in which technologically modified
human beings or human-mind models collaborate directly with or control AI, “inside” it.
2. AI Safety Levels
To explore how to implement a global AI safety solution, we need some insight about what
human safety may look like in the future. Global human safety in the far future [16] may be reached at
different levels, from miserable survival to extreme flourishing. According Bostrom’s classification,
everything below full realization of the human potential is an existential risk [17], but low realization
is not the same as extinction [18], and Green argues that even full human flourishing is not enough
to eliminate existential risk unless ethical standards and practices are also somehow concomitantly
perfected [19].
Several preliminary levels of AI safety may be suggested, similar to the classification of AI
safety levels presented in a report from the Foundational Research Institute by Brian Tomasik [20],
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but centered on suffering. Our classification is based on levels of human well-being, the first and most
basic of which is survival:
1. “Last man”: At least one human being survives creation of strong AI, for example, possibly as an
upload, or in a “zoo”.
2. “AI survivors”: A group of people survive and continue to exist after the AI creation, and may
be able to rebuild human civilization to some extent. This may happen if the AI halts [13] or
leaves Earth.
3. “No AI”: Any outcome where global catastrophe connected with AI has not occurred because
there is no AI to provoke the catastrophe. This is a world in which a comprehensive ban on AI is
enforced, or AI technologies otherwise never progress to AGI or superintelligence.
4. “Better now”: Human civilization is preserved after AI creation in almost the same form in
which it exists now, and benefits from AI in many ways, including through the curing of diseases,
slowing aging, preventing crime, increasing material goods, achieving interstellar travel, etc.
Outcomes in this category likely involve a type of “AI Nanny” [21].
5. “Infinite good”: Superintelligent AI which maximizes human values (Benevolent AI) will reach
the maximum possible positive utility for humans, but contemporary humans cannot now
describe this utility as it is beyond our ability to imagine, as presented by Yudkowsky [22].
Different global solutions of the AI safety problem provide different levels of survival as the most
plausible outcome. From our point of view, Levels 3, 4 and 5 are acceptable outcomes, and Levels 1
and 2 are unacceptable as they produce unimaginable human suffering and risk human extinction.
3. “No AI” Solutions
In our world of quick AI development, AI relinquishment seems improbable or requires some
unethical and/or risky acts of Luddism. Many of these solutions have been explored by Sotala amd
Yampolskiy [4].
Overview of restrictive solutions where advance AI creation is prevented globally:
• International ban
• Legal relinquishment
• Technical relinquishment or AI appears to be not technically possible
• Destruction of capability to produce AI anywhere in the world
- War
- Luddism
- Staging small catastrophe




- Brain drain from the field
- Defamation of idea of AI, AI winter
3.1. Legal Solutions, Including Bans
Not many argue for a global AI ban as it is unfeasible under current conditions [23] and would
likely only help bad actors [24]. One could imagine that global legal regulation could ban the creation
of self-improving agents. However, in our current, divided world its enforcement would be difficult.
Only a powerful global government could make such a solution workable.
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Some form of regulation may appear ad hoc, as an urgent measure implemented by the UN,
or a group of the most powerful countries. However, they would need very credible harbingers as
motivation. These could be several epidemics of AI-viruses of increasing strength, i.e., computer
viruses with elements of machine learning [13]. However, there is currently no agreement as to what
factors would serve as a credible “alarm,” and such agreement may be impossible [25].
Some governmental and non-governmental groups are working to develop guidelines in this area.
The EU is considering legislation about robotic ethics [26]. Similar legislation may ban potentially
dangerous self-improving systems, and if adopted in the most developed countries, it may act as
a proxy for a global ban. It could be enforced in smaller, rogue countries by military coalitions,
similar to the one formed in the 2003 Iraq war, but such a ban cannot be created and enforced without
understanding the risks of AI. The recent Asilomar AI Guidelines [27] could also serve as a foundation
for internal control within the AI community to prevent creation of recursively self-improving (RSI)
AI. The Asilomar guidelines could also form the basis for international law regulating AI.
Elon Musk recently advocated global regulation of AI research [28]. Such regulations may take
the form of a UN agency similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA
provides safety protocols for its members, demands openness and conducts inspections to confirm
implementation; in exchange, it gives access to recent results on other members. The result will be
something similar to Open AI, as described by Reference [29], but enforced by the UN.
To implement such an AI agency, the UN would need a powerful enforcement agency. In the
same way as when the IAEA fails, an international coalition would need to be able to use sanctions
(as against Iran and North Korea) or military intervention, as in Iraq. However, a UN-backed AI-control
agency would require much tighter and swifter control mechanisms, and would be functionally
equivalent to a world government designed specifically to contain AI. To be effective, such an
agency must be empowered to use force, possibly including cyber weapons or possibly even nuclear
weapons. However, in the current world climate, there will be little or no support for the creation of
a world government authorized to use powerful weapons to destroy AI labs based only on theory.
The only chance for its creation might be if some spectacular AI accident happened, for example, if a
narrow-AI-based virus with machine learning capabilities hacked hundreds of airplanes and crashed
them into nuclear power plants. In such a case, a global ban on advanced AI might be possible.
3.2. Restriction Solutions
The idea of restriction is to find a scarce “commodity” needed for the creation of AI and try to
limit access to it [30–32]. A global authority would be needed to implement such bans.
Such “commodities” could include:
- supercomputers
- programmers
- knowledge about AI creation
- semiconductor fabrication plants (“fabs”)
- internet access
- electricity
The rarest commodity are chip fabs, which cost billions of dollars and are needed to create
new processors. There are around 200 chip fabs in the world now [33]. If they were closed, no new
computers could appear in the world, which might drastically slow AI progress. However, the effect of
fabs is rather indirect, as it is possible that enough computers already exist to create AI, especially given
the large existing supply of graphics cards, but these chips are simply not in the right configuration.
Large datacenters, supercomputers, scientific centers, and internet hubs are also relatively rare,
with the number worldwide in the thousands. Current home PCs (not connected to a network) are
probably unable to support AI, so if powerful computers and internet connections are switched off,
it could considerably slow down AI creation. These restrictions, such as those discussed in Section 3.1,
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would require preexisting global coordination. In addition, they would obviously have significant
economic consequences.
As a last point, in this section it is worth noting that full AI may not be technically possible in any
realistic sense, and if that is the case then whatever “commodity” permits its creation is restricted in a
complete sense.
3.3. Destructive Solutions
One possible way to stop the creation of AI is annihilation by a nuclear attack of AI research
centers, electronic equipment, and sources of electricity, which could be done locally or globally by
a nuclear country acting alone (a conventional attack could also be attempted, but would be slower
and have a lower probability of success). If such an attack was carried out against an adversary,
it would “just” be a war; if done globally, it would mean that a superpower would bomb its own AI
labs. Nuclear attack of this type is extremely unlikely, unless it were perceived that an “AI uprising”
had already started.
Similar to the first option, but with a more purely anti-electronics approach, destruction could
be accomplished by a multitude of high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMPs) caused by nuclear
detonations. A concerted attack of this kind could destroy all unshielded electronics. Because electricity,
fossil fuel extraction, and industry, all depend on electronics, manufacturing and distribution would
grind to a halt. This would not kill people directly, but could cause mass human starvation unless
society were prepared [34,35]. However, recovery of technological civilization and thus the ability to
recreate AI is possible, so the problem would probably appear again. Alternatively, chaos could result
in a downward spiral leading to extinction. So, it is a risky “solution” that, even if it succeeded, would
likely be temporary.
One could imagine other means of destruction, ranging from economic recession to Luddism [36],
to various global catastrophes, but, as with the above options, all of them are impractical and morally
unacceptable. In the future, perhaps some high-tech methods of AI halting might be implemented,
such as the Stuxnet computer virus that destroyed Iran’s uranium centrifuges [37]. A virus could be
used to destroy chip fabs, shut down the internet, or cut electricity. There are other ideas in the field,
but an exhaustive list is not within the scope of this paper.
As one last point, the unilateralist’s curse—the lack of coordination between many actors with
the same goal [38]—may exaggerate activities of those groups that at least believe in the possibility of
safe AI.
3.4. Delay of AI Creation
The global recession of 2008 did not have any measurable effect on the speed of AI development.
Only a large-scale economic collapse that significantly disrupted global trade could slow AI
development to any significant extent.
Other events could slow down AI development, include:
• Public fears of AI.
• The next AI winter, lack of interest in its development (there have already been two after hype in
the 1960s and 1980s).
• Extensive regulation of the field.
• Intentional disruption of the research field via fake news, defamation, white noise, and other
instruments of informational warfare.
• Public ridicule of the field after some failure.
• Change of focus of public attention by substitution of terms. This happened with
“nanotechnology”, which originally meant a powerful manufacturing technology, but now means
making anything small. Such a shift may happen with the term “AI,” where the meaning has
shifted recently from human-like systems to narrow machine learning algorithms. There are
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several fields that have had slow development for decades because of marginalization, such as
cryonics, but it looks as though the time of marginalization of AI has passed.
• Lastly, depending on the technical challenges, advanced AI, including AGI and superintelligence,
may not be technically possible in the near future, although there is no reason at this point to
assume it is not. However, if these challenges appear, AI could be indefinitely delayed.
4. ”One AI” Solutions
These solutions are centered on the idea that the first AI will become dominant and prevent the
development of other AIs. The nature of these solutions is that they are implemented locally, but affect
the whole globe due to the global power of the singleton.
Overview of “one AI” solutions:
• First AI is used to take over the world
 First AI is used as a military instrument
 First AI gains global power via peaceful means
- Commercial success
- Superhuman negotiating abilities
 Strategic advantage achieved by narrow AIs produces global unification, before the rise of
superintelligent AI, by leveraging preexisting advantage of a nuclear power and increasing
first-strike capability
 First AI is created by a superpower and provides it a decisive strategic advantage
 First AI is reactive, and while it does not prevent the creation of other AI, it limits their
potential danger
 First AI is a genius at negotiation and solves all conflicts between other agents
• First AI appears as a result of collective efforts
 AI police: global surveillance system to prevent creation of dangerous AI
 “AI CERN”: international collaboration creates an AI Nanny
 Main players collaborate with each other
 AIs are effective in cooperation and merge with each other
• Non-agential AI-medium (AI as widely distributed technology, without agency)
 Comprehensive AI Services
 Distributed AI based on blockchain (SingularityNET)
 AI as technology everywhere (openness)
 Augmented humans as AI neurons (Neuralink)
 Superintelligence as a distributed optimization process by rivalry between AI agents (market)
Indirect measures to increase probability that first AI will be human-aligned:
• Helping others to create safe first AI
 AI safety theory is distributed among main players and used by every AI creator
 AI safety instruments are sold as a service
 Promotion of AI safety
• Slowing creation of other AIs
 Concentrate best minds on other projects and remove them from AI research
 Take low-hanging research fruit
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• Factors affecting the arms race for AI include funding, openness, number of teams, prizes, and
public attitudes
4.1. First AI Seizes World Power
Advanced agential AIs will be able to act in the world autonomously. Superintelligent AI could
potentially seize world power on its own. Max Tegmark describes a scenario in which the first AI
initially gains world dominance through earning money and later consolidates power by rigging
elections or staging coups in different countries [39].
The main problem of the idea that first AI can be used as an instrument to take over the world is
that it creates motivation for militarisation of AI, which has potentially dangerous consequences [40].
Superintelligent AI may be able to find win-win solutions in negotiations. Such an ability could
help it overcome resistance to global unification, as it will be able to provide its unique negotiating
ability as a service, which everyone will be interested in applying, and in that case, there will be no
need for a military world takeover.
4.1.1. Concentrate the Best AI Researchers to Create a Powerful and Safe AI First
This idea is to create something similar to the Manhattan Project, attracting the best minds to work
together on the creation of the first self-improving AI. This would provide such a large concentration
of human intelligence that they could simultaneously create AI and solve the problem of AI safety.
The Manhattan Project was formed of the best scientists in the world, and they were concerned about
potential global risks of the first nuclear explosion. For example, scientists involved in the project
created the LA-602 report about the possibility of causing a nuclear-initiated chain reaction in the
atmosphere [41].
Later efforts to create nuclear weapons in other countries were not so safety-oriented. The Soviets
exploded a bomb over their own troops [42]. The Indians dropped explosives intended to be part of
their first nuclear bomb during critical assembly—fortunately, it did not detonate [43].
If a similar trend holds for AI research, the first concerted effort may be more safety-oriented and
involve better planning and brighter minds than later efforts. In addition, if research is accelerated in
one research institution, it could outperform the world in general. This could help prevent a troubling
situation in which safety solutions are well-understood in one organization, but AI is created by
another group.
If the first effort is ahead of the competitors by years, it will have a safety time gap, that is,
additional time for working on AI safety. In other words, the leader would have more time to think
about safety, by virtue of their being in the lead.
In early stages of its development (in the 2000s), the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI)
had a plan to be the creator of the first Friendly AI. However, its goal now is to facilitate research on AI
safety solutions [44,45] to be implemented elsewhere.
4.1.2. Using the Decisive Advantage of Non-Self-Improving AI to Create an AI Nanny
Sotala [46] wrote that even non-self-improving AI may gain a decisive strategic advantage if it
is effective at designing new weapons, or in strategic military or political planning. This opens the
possibility to use the first human-level AI to gain power over the world, without taking the dangerous
and unpredictable route of recursive self-improvement.
Such AI might be built around a human upload or its equivalent, which gains most of its power
not from self-improvement, but from running on high-speed hardware. Such a high-speed human
analogue gaining global power via social manipulation and designing new weapons might become an
“AI king”.
One way to gain such a decisive strategic advantage would be if the first AI were created by a
superpower (either China or the US) which is already close to world domination. Such an AI, created
as a government-sponsored large project, may be attained as part of a secret “Manhattan Project”-type
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effort or by seizing the archives and work of a large private company. The AI could leverage other
power-projecting instruments already controlled by this superpower to provide it with the capability
for world domination (e.g., access to secret information, control of nuclear weapons, large financial
resources). Exemplifying this view, see the recent remark by Vladimir Putin that “the nation that leads
in AI ‘will be the ruler of the world’” [47].
For example, even narrow-AI designed to calculate nuclear war scenarios could provide a decisive
strategic advantage for an existing nuclear superpower. It could then strike in a way that yields a high
probability of no retaliation.
Dewey [10] suggested the first AI could be reactive or proactive: Proactive AI prevents creation of
other AIs, starting preemptive wars against them, and reactive AI only limits or ensures the safety of
other AI fast takeoffs. Dewey also suggests that two types of strategic advantage, proactive or reactive,
may be reached by non-self-improving AI. In his opinion, another option is strategic advantage reached
by non-AI technological means.
4.1.3. Risks of Creating Hard-takeoff AI as a Global Solution
In AI safety research, it is often assumed that the first superintelligent AI will take action to
prevent the creation of other AIs. In that case, solving local AI safety would provide global safety.
However, if the first AI is created in, say, the US, it must then prevent the creation of another AI
in, say, China. From the point of view of international law, such an action by an AI could be an act of
war [40].
Deliberately creating an AI that will start a war immediately after its creation is very provocative
for other actors. In the face of such a threat they might use a preemptive nuclear strike to prevent
the creation of AI. Kahn [48] wrote the same of the potential creation of a Doomsday nuclear bomb
that could kill all humanity—that just the act of its creation could be even more provocative than a
nuclear attack.
Not just the actual creation, but just the intention to create such AI, may attract attention from
foreign and domestic secret services. Publicly suggesting that the first creators of AI should program it
to take over the world may have legal consequences (as such an AI could be classified as a cyberweapon)
and may prevent open dissemination of any AI safety theory based on such a suggestion.
It appears that creation of a military infrastructure is a convergent instrumental goal for any first
AI [40]. This infrastructure would help the AI prevent the creation of other AIs as well as prevent
humans and government agencies from trying to switch off the AI. If other AIs are in advanced stages
of development, they will resist the attempt to shut them down. In this case, a war between AIs will
start, in which humanity could perish or be taken hostage. Therefore, this solution is intrinsically risky
and better solutions should be sought.
Another idea is that the creation of AI safety theory will happen separately from the creation of
AI, but the first AI creator will use available safety theory. We will discuss this possibility below.
4.2. One Global AI Created by Collective Efforts
4.2.1. AI Nanny Requires a World Government for Its Creation
The idea of an AI Nanny has been suggested by Ben Goertzel, who has described “ . . . the creation
of a powerful yet limited Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) system . . . with the explicit goal of
keeping things on the planet under control while we figure out the hard problem of how to create
a probably positive Singularity. That is: to create an ‘AI Nanny’” [21]. He proposed the following
properties for an AI Nanny:
- General intelligence somewhat above the human level,
- Interconnection with powerful worldwide surveillance systems,
- Control of a massive contingent of robots, and
- A cognitive architecture featuring an explicit set of goals.
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Muehlhauser and Salamon [49] criticized this idea because solving AI safety for the AI Nanny
would require solving almost all AI safety problems for self-improving AI.
The AI Nanny also does not solve the main problem of how the first AI will gain its global
power—by world takeover or by peaceful integration of a net of AIs. The first way has its own risks
and the second could have dangerous holes. One possible solution here is peaceful integration of most
of the world, and the forceful integration of any remaining “rogue states.” This could resemble the
current dynamic between a large international coalition of nuclear-armed states with “rogue countries”
that try to make their own nuclear weapons.
A united world government may be required for the creation of an AI Nanny, but under current
conditions, such a world government is unlikely to peacefully appear. Such a world government might
appear if one country gained an overwhelming military advantage from a means other than AI. If the
advantage arose from AI, the problem of AI safety would already be solved, but it could come from
powerful nanotechnological weapons or some type of narrow-AI robotics. Alternatively, if the risks of
AI are highly visible, or perhaps already felt, most countries may give up their sovereignty to the UN
to create an AI Nanny. Such a scenario could happen if a narrow-AI-based computer virus created
widespread devastation of infrastructure, or if the first self-improving AI appeared, but spectacularly
failed at some stage of its development.
The AI Nanny may have rather high intelligence, but in a form which is not easy to self-improve,
e.g., a large database of pre-recorded solutions and neural algorithms, as well as all existing data about
the world and new data from surveillance systems. Such a “data-driven” AI may be a relatively safe
local solution.
Some semi-universal AI may be created in the current age of neural nets [50] as a very large and
prohibitively expensive international project, for example, the Human Genome Project, Large Hadron
Collider, and International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. Gary Marcus recently suggested that
we need something analogous to the European Organization for Nuclear Research, CERN, for AI [51],
in a sense similar to Baruch’s 1946 plan to centralize nuclear research [10].
An AI Nanny could be designed on many opaque neural net modules that would prevent its
self-improvement, and its enormous size would prevent it from leaking into the internet. Its intelligence
also may not be universal or not exceed total human intelligence. Therefore, an AI Nanny would
likely be rather safe and under international control. However, the opportunity for such a project
may be lost, as many large companies are now participating in their own projects and there is a lot
of available hardware as well as openly published materials. Yet the potential is not completely lost;
large international collaborations such as the “Partnership on AI” [52] could contribute momentum to
the creation of an AI Nanny, if they chose to do so.
4.2.2. Levels of Implementation of the AI Nanny Concept
We suggest four levels of possible intelligence of an AI Nanny:
1. Use of a distributed surveillance system, which does not have much intelligence but is able to
enforce a universal ban on creation of self-improving systems. This is a low-level solution.
2. Creation of neural-net-based and data-driven AI as part of a large international project. In this
case, the AI’s intelligence comes not from fluid intelligence but from extensive knowledge and models.
It may serve as the brain of the surveillance system mentioned above. One possible solution could be
to use an upload human as an “AI king,” or world governor, with the main mission of preventing the
creation of other AIs [53]. Such an AI king would run at higher speeds than ordinary humans, using all
available hardware, which will give it greater intelligence while maintaining alignment with human
values. This idea would be obviously controversial from technical, political, and moral points of view.
3. Creation of AI police, a net of narrow AIs able to control the appearance of self-improving AIs
and other dangerous entities.
4. Creation of a high-intelligence AI Nanny as described by Reference [21]. This AI would be
some form of superintelligence (SI), as much above humans as humans are above apes. In this case,
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there would be exactly the same problems as with the control of any other strong AI [49]. However,
if the system were weaker, it might be possible to find Goldilocks’ path between its ability to control
research and our ability to control the system.
4.2.3. Global Transition into AI: Non-Agential AI-Medium Everywhere, Accelerating Smoothly
without Tipping Points
The AI described above was agential. However, some of the strongest known optimization
processes are non-agential: e.g., evolution, market forces, and science. These processes appear from the
interaction of millions of agents with their own goals, and the optimization power of these processes
does not depend much on direct summing of the minds of agents. Instead, it is a result of their
interactions, so it is not a net of AIs, which will be discussed below, as a net implies higher level of
goal’s coordination.
The AI-medium self-improves more quickly than any individual part of it, because
self-improvement is a property of the whole system, but not of any one part of it, as it results
from the way information is exchanged between different parts.
We will call such processes “intelligent media,” as opposed to intelligent agents, as they do not
have independent goals, but perform any tasks they find. This medium is a form of environment;
as such, it does not conquer territories, but attracts other agents to participate in it; a similar idea
has been suggested by Mahoney [54]. This feature could still be devastating, as we know that in an
analogous case, market forces can destroy traditional cultures more effectively than weapons [55].
A non-agential AI-medium does not have to take over the world because it would simultaneously
appear everywhere.
It would not be surprising if superintelligence also arises from a medium. This idea in naïve form
has been presented as “the internet will gain consciousness.” The internet surely will be a backbone
for the AI-medium, but something more is needed. One can imagine other elements of an AI-medium
in the form of blockchain, social networks, prediction markets [56], and the network of scientific
references [57]. One of the routes to an AI-medium could be to connect all human brains through some
form of network, producing, in effect, a global brain [58].
There are concerns that such collective evolution is unstable and will eventually produce one
agent that will be able to improve itself more quickly than the overall AI-medium and thus destroy it.
See, for example, Sotala’s review criticizing Vinding’s recent book discussing the difference between
individual and collective takeover [9,59].
Scott Alexander argues that an accelerating self-improving AI-medium is possibly a negative
outcome as it could take the form of an “ascending economy” [55], where a group of market agents
create an evolving ecosystem, which destroys all human values in order to increase “growth.”
Karl Marx criticized market economics for the same flaw [60].
As the AI-medium naturally evolves without taking into account human values, it cannot be
considered friendly or unfriendly to humans. Given this, unless regulated in some way, it will either
prioritize human survival, if humans will be able to positively interact with it, or it will ignore humans.
John Smart [61] predicted that the evolution of such a system will consist of constant acceleration and
miniaturization, which could be described by a hyperbolic law.
Drexler suggested another form of AI-medium, Comprehensive AI Services [14], in which
superintelligence does not have agency. Instead, it consists of many narrow superintelligent tools,
which also could be used to create needed level of surveillance to prevent rogue AI appearance
elsewhere. A primitive example of such service now is Google with its many “Tool AIs”: web search,
email, drive, which are integrated in one ecosystem but are not agential. However, as Gwern wrote [62],
any Tool AI “wants” to be agential AI, as it would increase its efficiency, and thus AI Services could
eventually turn into or spawn potentially dangerous agential AI.
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4.3. Help Others to Create Safe AI
4.3.1. Promoting Ideas of AI Safety in General and the Best AI Safety Solution to All Players
Helping others develop improved AI safety is a global solution if there are ways to reach all
significant AI players.
As we mentioned above, it is a priori improbable that the same team that creates an optimal AI
safety theory will also create the first AI unless it is part of an international collaboration. Therefore,
teams working on AI safety should try to convince other AI teams to adopt the best AI safety theory.
There are a number of tangential measures that may help in the development of AI safety, but do
not guarantee good results, including:
- Funding of AI safety research.
- Promotion of the idea of AI safety.
- Protesting military AI.
- Friendly AI training for AI researchers.
- Providing publicly available safety recommendations.
- Increasing the “sanity waterline” and rationality in the general population and among AI
researchers and policymakers.
- Lowering global levels of confrontation and enmity.
- Forming political parties for the prevention of existential risks and control of AI risks, or lobbying
current political parties to adopt these positions. However, even if such parties were to win in
larger countries and were able to change policy, there would still be countries that could use any
technology “freeze” in larger countries to their advantage.
Another idea is to seek ways to attract the best minds to solve the AI safety problem. Yudkowsky
said that one of reasons he wrote the book ‘Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality’ [63] was to
attract the best mathematical minds to the AI safety problem. Attracting top minds would achieve
simultaneously several useful goals:
- Depleting the pool of minds for direct—not necessarily safe—AI research, thereby slowing
it down
- Increasing the quantity and quality of thought working on AI safety theory
- Establishing relationships between the best AI teams, as some of the people who will have worked
on AI safety may have come from such teams, may eventually join them, or may otherwise have
friends there, and
- Promoting the idea that unlimited self-improvement is dangerous and unstable for all players,
including AIs.
4.3.2. Selling AI Safety Theory as an Effective Tool to Align Arbitrary AI
One possible way to reach many people is to make the solution attractive. If AI safety
implementation can be used to align the goals of an arbitrary AI, it will be very attractive for any
reasonable AI creator, as the creator insures their own safety and ability to place goals into the AI.
The AI creator could save many resources by implementing a proven alignment method. However,
while this lessens the probability that the AI will run amok, the creator could still align the AI with a
dangerous, egoistic goal.
If an AI safety tool-kit could be sold as a good, this would increase the likelihood that first movers
will use it, as it would be profitable for them. It could also be sold as a service, which could include
custom adaptation and training. Selling “AI safety” may produce a wider reach than just publishing a
PDF with explanations, and the customer support could increase its implementability.
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4.4. Local Action to Affect Other AIs Globally
4.4.1. Slowing the Appearance of Other AIs
In this scenario people could take actions locally that will affect any other AI globally, which may
appear in the future at an unknown location.
Such actions may include espionage or taking low-hanging fruit in research, which will increase
overall level of the technology, but lower chances that one of the participants of the race will leapfrog
others by taking such low-hanging fruit; draining the pool of easily available resources, which includes
both minds and hardware, may also be regarded as taking low-hanging fruits. While it is impossible
to drain all hardware, the leader in AI research could invest in owning leading positions in hardware
capabilities as well as training datasets for neural nets.
4.4.2. Ways to Affect a Race to Create the First AI
An AI creation race is generally regarded as bad because it encourages the creation of the least-safe
AIs first. A war between AIs may also become possible if several AIs are created simultaneously [64,65].
There are many ideas on how to affect an AI race in order to make it safer, that is, to lower
the probability of creating dangerous AI. As a race with many participants is a very complex game,
there are not obvious ways to predict how it will react to seemingly good interventions, for example,
openness. Bostrom has shown that if no one knows the capabilities of others and their own capabilities,
it will slow down the race, so openness about capabilities may be dangerous [66].
Actions that may affect an AI race and make it safer may include:
- Changing the number of participants.
- Increasing or decreasing information exchange and level of openness.
- Reducing the level of enmity between organizations and countries, and preventing conventional
arms races and military buildups.
- Increasing the level of cooperation, coordination, and acceptance of the idea of AI safety among
AI researchers.
- Changing the total amount of funding available.
- Promoting intrinsic motivations for safety. Seth Baum discussed the weakness of monetary
incentives for beneficial AI designs, and cautions: “One recurrent finding is that monetary
incentives can reduce intrinsic motivation” [67]; when the money is gone, people lose motivation.
Baum also noted that the mere fact that a law existed promoted obedience in some situations and
that social encouragement can increase intrinsic motivation.
- Changing social attitudes toward the problem and increasing awareness of the idea of AI safety.
- Trying to affect the speed of the AI race, either slowing it down or accelerating it in just one
place by concentrating research. It is interesting to note that acceleration could be done locally,
but slowing it would require global cooperation, and so is less probable.
- Affecting the idea of the AI race as it is understood by the participants [67]: if everybody thinks
that the winner takes everything, the race is more dangerous. A similar framing solution has
been suggested in the field of bioweapons, that is, to stop claiming bioweapon creation is easy,
as it might become attractive to potential bioterrorists. In fact, bioweapons are not as easy to
develop and deploy as is shown in movies, and would probably kill the terrorists first [68].
- Affecting the public image of AI researchers who are currently presented as not wanting beneficial
AI design [67].
- Refraining from suggestions of draconian surveillance as they “inadvertently frame efforts to
promote beneficial AI as being the problem, not the solution” [67].
- Stigmatization of building recursive self-improving AI by framing them as morally unacceptable,
as has been done with landmines. The stigma impelled even countries that did not sign the treaty
that prohibits landmines to reduce production [67].
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- Deliberate association with crackpottery: an example is UFO (Unidentified Flying Objects)
research: anyone who mentions the word “UFO” will no longer be accepted in the scientific
community as a credible scientist. This partially worked against AI during past AI winters, when
scientists tried not to mention the words “artificial intelligence.” Society could come to associate
“self-improving AI” with craziness, which would be not difficult if we pick some of the most
outstanding ideas from associated internet forums, e.g., Roko’s Basilisk [69]. Such an association
may reduce funding for such research. However, AI could start to self-improve even if it was not
designed to do so; thus, such association would probably be damaging to AI safety efforts. Recent
successes in meta-learning in neural nets by DeepMind show that the idea of self-improving AI
is becoming mainstream [70].
- Affecting the speed of takeoff after one AI starts to win. If the speed of self-improvement of one
AI diminishes, other AIs may catch up with it.
We address some of these ideas in the next section.
4.4.3. Participating in Acausal Deals with Future AI
Rolf Nelson [71] suggested that we could install indexical uncertainty into the future AI; in that
case, if we make a commitment now that if humanity creates a friendly AI, this friendly AI will also
create simulations of most probable types of rogue AI, which will be turned off if a given AI does not
simulate benevolence to humans. In that case, any rogue AI will be uncertain if it is in a simulation
or not, and as killing humans has small marginal utility in most cases, it would prefer to display
benevolence. However, such an approach would probably work only for an AI singleton, and it is our
last level of defense.
5. “Many AI” Solutions
5.1. Overview of the “Net Solutions” of AI Safety
5.1.1. How a Net of AIs May Provide Global Safety
In a nutshell, the idea of a “net solution” to AI safety is that there will be many AIs, and this fact
will provide some form of protection. The most prominent backer of this approach is Elon Musk, who
wants to unite AI working teams in a net based on openness and upgrade humans, so they will not
become obsolete in the age of AI [72]. However, there are risks to this approach [66].
There are two main features, which may provide safety with a net of AIs:
1. The combined intelligence of many AIs (the net of AIs) is much higher than the one of any rogue
AI, so the net is able to create effective protection. An AI-net could form something similar to AI
“police,” which prevent any single AI from unlimited growth. This is analogous to the way the
human body provides a multilevel defense against unlimited growth of a single cancerous cell in
the form of an immune system. The approach is somewhat similar to the AI Nanny approach [21],
but an AI Nanny is a single AI entity. An AI-net consists of many AIs, which use ubiquitous
transparency [73] to control and balance [74] each other.
2. Value diversity among many AI-sovereigns [2,75] guarantees that different positive values will
not be lost. Different members of the net have different terminal values, thus ensuring diversity
of values, as long as the values do not destructively interfere. If the values do destructively
interfere, then solutions must be found for these conflicts.
We will call this many AI solution a “Multipolar Singleton” [11], as global coordination will result
from constant negotiation and trade between entities with different values. A Multipolar Singleton
will have the following necessary conditions:
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- Many superhuman AIs exist.
- The AIs all find mutual cooperation beneficial, and have some mechanism for peaceful
conflict resolution.
- The AIs have diversity of final goals, so some goals are more beneficial to humans than others.
This protects against any critical mistake in defining a final goal, as many goals exist. However,
it is not optimal, as some of AIs may have goals that are detrimental for humans. It will be similar
to our current world, with different countries, but the main difference will be that they will likely
be much better able to peacefully coexist than currently, because of AI support.
- Because Earth is surrounded by infinite space, different AIs could start to travel to the stars
in different directions, and as each direction includes a very large number of stars, even very
ambitious goals could be not mutually exclusive and might not provoke conflicts and wars.
- Finding it mutually beneficial to create AI police to prevent unlimited self-improving AIs or other
dangerous AIs from developing via ubiquitous intelligent control.
The main question is how to reach an AI-net solution and whether it will be stable, collapse into
war between AIs, or reduce to a single AI dictatorship.
5.1.2. The Importance of Number in the Net of AIs
The most important variable here is the number of future superintelligent AIs, which depends
on the speed of AI self-improvement and the number of teams of AIs creators, as well as the upper
limit of individual intelligence, if it exists. The slower the AI takeoff is, the larger the number of AIs
will be, though this also depends on the number of AI teams, among other factors. There are several
vague groups of the possible numbers of coexisting superintelligences, which will have different
dynamics, including:
- Two AI-sovereigns’ semi-stable solution, similar to the Cold War [76].
- From several to dozens of sovereign AIs, similar to existing nation-states; they may be evolved
from nation-states, or from large companies.
- From thousands to billions of AIs, with relations similar to relations between humans now,
possibly resulting from some brain uploading technology [74], human augmentation [77],
or genetic modification [78], but each single AI is not significantly above human level.
- Uncountable or almost-infinite number of AIs, similar to AI-medium, discussed above. This
could be similar to the IoT, but with AIs as nodes.
In the following list we present an overview of possible solutions, which will be explored in
detail below.
• Net of AIs forms a multilevel immune system to protect against rogue AIs and has a diversity of
values, thus including human-positive values
 Instruments to increase the number and diversity of AIs:
- openness
- slowdown of AI growth
- human augmentation
- self-improving organizations
- increase number of AI teams
- create many copies of the first AIs
 Net of AIs is based on human uploaded minds
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• Several AI-sovereigns coexist, and they have better defensive than offensive capabilities
 Two AIs semi-stable “Cold war” solution, characterized by
- tight arms race
- military AI evolution
- MAD defense posture
 AI-sovereigns appear from nation-states
- very slow takeoff and integration with governments
 Different AIs expand in space in different directions without conflict
 Creation of AIs on remote planets
5.2. From the Arms Race between AI-Creating Teams to the Net of AIs
5.2.1. Openness in AI Development
Elon Musk and others presented the idea of OpenAI in 2015: “We believe AI should be an
extension of individual human wills and, in the spirit of liberty, as broadly and evenly distributed as is
possible safely” [29]. In the following, we discuss the idea of openness of the field of AI and the net
of AIs as we understand it; it does not represent the position of the “OpenAI” initiative. We look at
the following approach: many AI projects freely exchange ideas, datasets and progress results, thus
accelerating AI creation and ensuring its safety. We will call it an “open net of AI teams”.
Safety emerges from the following characteristics of such collaboration:
- None of the AI teams gains strategic advantage over other teams, as all the data from every team’s
results are available to all of the teams. An attempt to hide results will be seen publicly. Openness
ensures that many AI teams will come close to self-improving AI simultaneously, and that there
will be many such AIs, which will balance each other.
- The teams outside the “open net” are much less likely to gain strategic advantage, as they are not
getting all the benefits of the membership in the net, namely access to the results and capabilities
of others. However, this depends on how much information becomes part of the public domain.
The open net will have an “intelligence advantage” over any smaller player, which makes it more
probable that self-improvement will start inside the open net, or that the net will have time to
react before a rogue agent “outsmarts” the net.
- The “open net” will create many different AIs, which will balance each other, and probably will
be motivated to engage in mutually useful collaboration (However, some could take advantage
of openness of others but not share their own data and ideas). If one AI leaves the net for
uncontrolled self-improvement, the collective intelligence of the net will still be higher than that
AI for some time, probably enough to stop the rogue AI.
- The value system of the net will provide necessary diversity, so many possible goals will be
presented to at least some extent. This lessens the chance that any good goal will lost, but raises
the chance that some AI projects will have bad, dangerous, or otherwise unacceptable goals.
- Because of their ability to collaborate, the “open net” may be able to come to unanimous decisions
about important topics, thus effectively forming a Singleton.
- The net will be able to assess and possibly control all the low-hanging fruits of self-improvement,
for example, the ability to buy hardware or take over the internet, thus slowing down
self-improvement of any rogue agent.
- The net will help to observe what the other players, not involved in open net, are doing—for
example, the fact that German scientists stopped publishing articles about uranium in 1939
showed that they were trying to keep their work secret and therefore indirectly hinted that they
were working on a bomb.
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- The net will contribute to the creation AI vigilantes or AI police, as suggested by David Brin
in his transparent society proposal [73]. Therefore, the open net may somehow evolve in the
direction of an AI Nanny, perhaps consisting of many distributed nodes.
Bostrom has criticized the idea of openness in AI, because he feels it could accelerate dangerous
research [66]. It would also not be easy to balance a dangerous AI, as it could undertake local actions
that could quickly kill everybody, like constructing a very large nuclear cobalt bomb [79] or a dangerous
biological virus. However, if there are many AIs, they probably could have the needed level of mutual
control to prevent local dangerous actions or contain the results of such actions.
The main question is if openness in AI will be able to prevent a rogue actor from using these data
to start self-improving first and gaining a decisive advantage over others. These worries are described
in an excellent post by Scott Alexander [80].
Above we assumed that the net of teams will create the net of AI, however, the net of teams may
cooperate in creating just one AI.
5.2.2. Increase of the Number of AI Labs, so Many AIs Will Appear Simultaneously
Bostrom explored the situation of many competing teams depending of their number, their enmity,
and their knowledge about their own and each others’ capabilities. He found that the fewer the number
of the teams, the smaller the overall risk, and also that it is better if they do not know about each
other’s or their own capabilities [64].
In fact, there are already many AI teams and such a large number may result in many simultaneous
AI takeoffs. History shows that some important discoveries were made independently with a very
small temporal separation. For example, the first two telephone patent applications were filed within
three hours of each other on 14 February 1876 [81] and the Soviet–US race to bring material back to
Earth from the Moon was decided by three days in 1969 [82].
Increasing the number of independent AI projects will increase the probability that several of
them will have hard takeoffs simultaneously, but it will also increase the chances that some of the
programs will have a very low level of safety, as Bostrom et al. note [64].
The publicity around AI in recent years has likely contributed to the growth of AI companies.
Venture Scanner tracked 957 AI-creating companies [83]. While most of them are not trying to build
AGI, many of them would be happy to have an AI as universal as possible. It is also clear that many
companies and individuals are not presented in this list, including university projects and individual
researchers. It could also be that some companies on the list are fake or should not be counted for
other reasons. Therefore, it is reasonable to estimate the total number AI teams now working as within
an order of magnitude of 100, but most of the research is coming from around ten major companies
including Google, Facebook, and Open AI.
This means that there may be no need to increase the number of teams to prevent a single
dominant AI—their number is already on the order of magnitude where several hard takeoffs could
happen simultaneously.
5.2.3. Change of the Self-Improving Curve Form, So That the Distance Between Self-Improving AIs
Will Diminish
Yampolskiy has argued that there are several reasons why the actual self-improving of one AI
system may be described by a logarithmic rather than exponential curve [84]. However, artificial
interventions such as taking low-hanging fruits or espionage could change this rate. If the curve is
shallower, more AIs will reach the level of superintelligence simultaneously, providing a better chance
for some balance of power.
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5.3. Instruments to Make the Net of AIs Safer
5.3.1. Selling Cheap and Safe “Robotic Brains” Based on Non-Self-Improving Human-Like AI
This idea is to make a safe AI design, which can solve almost all tasks that other people or
organizations may need. Such a design would then be provided widely and very cheaply either as
hardware or from the cloud. This would undermine the economic need for creation of other AIs and
create the opportunity for a global AI Nanny. This non-self-improving, safer AI is analogous to the
idea of non-self-replicating safer molecular manufacturing, such as a nanofab, which is regarded a
safer form of nanotech than nanorobots [85].
One possible design of such a “robotic brain” could be a human upload [74] or some simplified
model of a human brain, which finds a balance between upload and neuromorphic AI [53].
5.3.2. Starting Many AIs Simultaneously
Any AI-creating team could start not one, but many AIs, just to balance the possible flows in
the first AI or to observe its possible flaws depending on initial conditions of different AI. Such an
approach will likely have unpredictable consequences, and might be used only as a backup measure,
if control over the first seed AI is lost. This is applicable to any AI—if the control over it has been lost,
another copy of the same AI could be started from the backup with slight changes of goal function.
However, the idea of “beneficial computer viruses” was already discussed and it was concluded that
such viruses would not be better than normal antivirus software, as the second virus, intended to
deactivate the first one, will spread much less and will also cause harm [86].
6. Solutions in Which Humans are Part of the AI System
6.1. Different Ways to Incorporate Humans inside AI
Some form of superintelligence may be created with humans as participants within it, as Drexler
suggested in his Comprehensive AI Services. However, as Bostrom shows [2], there is always the
problem of the “second transition,” that is, the appearance of a more powerful AI inside such a system,
one which no longer needs humans. So, any such system would need to create an AI police to prevent
a “second transition.”
Another problem is that most such solutions are lagging, as human uploading is technically still
far away, if possible at all.
Some ways of incorporating humans inside AI include:
- AI could be built around a human core or as a human emulation. It could result from effective
personal self-improvement via neural implants [2], adding tool AIs and exocortex. There is no
problem of “AI alignment,” as there are not two agents that should be aligned, but only one agent
whose value system is evolving [53], however, if the human core is not aligned with the rest of
humanity, the same misalignment problem could appear—therefore the ethics of the core human
are crucial.
- AI could appear from a net of self-improving posthumans, connected via neural interfaces [87].
This combines ideas of social networks, blockchain, and Neuralink [77]. Such a net could
conceivably appear from the evolution of some types of medical AI [88].
- AI could result from genetic modification of humans for intelligence improvement [78].
- Superintelligence could appear as a swarm intelligence of many human uploads and not evolve
in a more effective and less human form for some unknown reason [74,89].
- Only one human upload is created, and it works as an AI Nanny, preventing the emergence of
any other superintelligences [53].
- Superintelligence is created by a “self-improving organization” as a property of the whole
organization, which includes employees, owners, computers, hardware-building capabilities,
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social mechanisms, and owners. It could be a net of self-improving organizations, similar to
Open AI [29] or the “Partnership on AI”.
- Nation-states evolve into AI-states, and keep most of their legislation, structure, values, people,
and territories. This is most probable in the case of the soft takeoff scenarios, which would take
years. Earth could evolve into a bipolar world, similar to the Cold War, or a multipolar world.
In this scenario, we could expect a merger between self-improving organizations and AI-states,
perhaps by acquisition of such companies by state players.
Is not easy to envision them at this point, but there could also be scenarios which combine some
of the ideas in this section.
6.2. Even Unfriendly AI Will Preserve Some Humans or Information about Humans
Below is an assortment of less-probable ideas that generally provide a lower level of safety
(Levels 1 and 2). In these scenarios, human beings will somehow be incorporated, used, or remembered
by unfriendly AI.
- Unfriendly AI may have a subgoal to behave as benevolent AI toward humans, based on some
Pascal mugging-style considerations and ontological uncertainty if it will think that there is small
chance that it is in a simulation which tests its behavior [71].
- Even unaligned AI will probably model humans in instrumental simulations [90] needed to solve
the Fermi paradox.
- Humans could be cost-effective workers in some domains and might therefore be retained,
though only to be treated as slaves.
- AI could preserve some humans as a potentially valuable asset, perhaps to trade information
about them with potential alien AI [75], or to sell them to a benevolent AI.
- AI may still preserve information about human history and DNA for billions of years, even if the
AI does not use or simulate humans in the near term. It may later return them to life if it needs
humans for some instrumental goal.
- AI may use human “wetware” (biological brains) as efficient supercomputers.
- AI could ignore humans and choose to live in space, while humans would survive on Earth.
AI would preserve humanity if the marginal utility derivable from humanity’s atoms is less than
the marginal instrumental utility from humanity’s continued existence.
As human values are formed by evolution, an evolving AI system [61] may naturally converge to
a similar set of values as humans [91].
7. Which Local Solutions Are the Best to Get a Stable Global Solution?
In the sections above, we overviewed all (to the best of our knowledge) previously suggested
global solutions for AI safety.
There are many possible global solutions to the AI safety problem, but humanity must choose the
one that has the highest probability of successful implementation.
Clearly, a “no AI” solution should not be implemented, as it would be unethical (due to
opportunity costs) and ineffective (due to intense pressures to achieve AI). As “AI safety theory”
is lagging current AI development; a controllable, self-improving AI as a global solution will probably
not be possible in the next couple of decades. We also lack the global coordination [92] to create an AI
Nanny, as well as the technologies necessary for human uploading.
Neural-net-based solutions developed by major IT companies are currently the greatest
technological source of success in AI research [70,93,94]. Such organizations not only create AI,
but improve their own organizational structure by similar processes, giving rise to “self-improving
organizations.” Google (“Alphabet”) is the leader here by a large margin.
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Soft acceleration of several self-improving organizations seems to be the most plausible way to
build a mild form of superintelligence in the current epoch, a plan Christiano named “prosaic AI” [50].
It may also be fueled by an AI race between the US and China [95].
In the current technological and political situation, several local approaches seem to be most
safely scalable to the global scale:
(1) Comprehensive AI Services, which could become a basis for a system of ubiquitous surveillance
and AI Police, preventing appearance of rogue AIs.
(2) Research in human uploads or human-mind models, which will result in many AIs of relatively
limited capabilities [74]. This again could be used to create AI Police.
(3) Self-improving organizations, where humans and AI work together which is basically is part of
Drexler’s suggestion [14], but also could be done in Christiano’s approach of iterated amplification
and factored cognition [96].
(4) Robotic mind-bricks, that are pre-trained AI with limited capabilities and prefabricated safety
measures which would be sold widely and provide a basis for global AI policing.
(5) AI Safety as a service, similar in some sense to current antivirus computer industry.
8. Conclusions
Suggested solutions to AI safety problem are either local or global, and when choosing a local
solution, we also should take into account how it could be safely scaled globally. In this article, we
posed the problem of relation between global and local solutions, overviewed existing global solutions
and estimated their safety.
We identified a group of local solutions which seems to be more easily and safely scaled into
a global level. This group includes such approaches as Comprehensive AI Services, selling robotic
mind-bricks, and AI Safety as a service.
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Keywords: value sensitive design; VSD; design for values; safe for design; AI; ethics
1. Introduction
Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is a design methodology that begins with the premise that
technologies are value-laden and that human values are continually implemented both during and
after the design of a technology [1,2]. The ‘sensitivity’ of VSD is to the values that are held by the
multitude of stakeholders that are both directly and indirectly enrolled during technological design
whether they be engineers, CEOs and/or the relevant publics. This paper aims to argue for the VSD
approach as a potentially suitable methodology for artificial intelligence coordination between the
often-disparate publics, governmental bodies, and industry. In evaluating the applicability of VSD to
AI coordination, this paper eschews any in-depth discussion of superintelligence or AI risk scenarios.
In doing so, the aim of this paper is to lay out arguments for the adoption of VSD that can have an
immediate impact on existing AI systems and on the systems of the near future. The value of this
immediacy is taken for granted given the urgency proposed by the abundant AI risk research.
VSD exists among various other safe-by-design methodologies within the field of responsible
research and innovation (RRI) and itself comes in various forms depending on the domain of
applications [3–6]. It is largely agreed in the design literature, spanning back to the inception of
technologies studies that technology is not value-neutral, but rather that values are consistently
implicated in design [7,8]. Artificial intelligence, like robotics, nanotechnology, and information
and communication technologies (ICTs), among others, is a sociotechnical structure that implicates
not only the physical, or digital entity itself, but also the infrastructures, people and politics that it
emerges from and into [9–14]. Not only this, but sociotechnical systems function only in accordance
with the boundaries of this social context, they require actors and institutions that constrain and
direct developmental pathways towards certain avenues rather than others [15,16]. The actors and
infrastructures that allow a sociotechnical system to emerge naturally implicate values with questions
such as: which funding bodies are permitted to distribute monies? How are research avenues chosen
and who judges what is an acceptable research stream? How are opportunity-cost decisions made
and under what criteria are some paths chosen rather than others? Because each of these questions is
naturally implicated in design and because each of them implicates values, values in design must be
considered more carefully, not only of the technologies in question themselves but also the institutions
and social infrastructures that enroll these values.
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VSD provides such a way to evaluate the values that are implicated both on technical and social
dimensions as has been demonstrated in its application for other socio-technical systems [17–20].
Dignum et al. (2016) and Oosterlaken (2015) both explore the potential application of applying the
VSD framework to socio-technical energy systems, whereas Umbrello and De Bellis (2018) explore
more explicitly the potential boons that a VSD approach can bear on the technical development of
intelligent agents (IA). Umbrello and De Bellis (2018) provide a theoretical basis for which moral
values of stakeholders could be designed into the technical systems of IAs and provides means for
adjudicating moral overload [21], however, they do not give any real account of how VSD could
ameliorate the gap between various, often conflicting stakeholders. Dignum et al. (2016), however,
provide a valuable analysis of various groups such as the federal government, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and commercial organizations with regards to the surveying and extraction of
shale gas in the Netherlands. In evaluating the policy documents of these different stakeholders, the
authors were able to infer and distill a set of root values. However, although both Dignum et al. (2016)
and Oosterlaken (2015) provide useful studies, they do not give any empirical case for the application
of VSD to existing sociotechnical systems. Mouter, Geest, and Doorn (2018) argue that because the
Dutch government scuttled the exploitation of the shale gas in the Netherlands, there was no way for
Dignum et al. (2016) to elicit the explicit design considerations that can be used for a thorough VSD
analysis [22].
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to evaluate the merits of the VSD framework for
AI coordination per se. Prior literature on VSD has focused on its methodology [8,23], its application
to existent technologies [24,25], its philosophical underpinnings [26,27] and even to the reduction of
future AI risk [20]. These studies provide useful information regarding both VSD and AI but do not
provide any tangible analysis of the issues of coordination, nor to those that are particular to AI. This
paper’s application of the VSD approach as a means to ameliorate the often-disparate stakeholders
that are implicated in the development and use of AI technologies is particularly unique. It is similarly
the intent of this paper to spark further research on some of the issues regarding how VSD can be
used to coordinate stakeholders of other technological innovations that converge with AI, such as
nanotechnology and biotechnology.
To successfully tackle this argument, this article is organized into the following sections (see
graphical abstract): the first section will lay out the methodological framework of the VSD approach as
well as how it has been applied to other technological innovations. In doing so, one can begin
to conceptualize both the strengths and potential drawbacks of the VSD approach as it can be
formulated for application to AI systems. The second section will draw upon the work done in §1 by
beginning to sketch multiple pathways for potential AI coordination by formulating specific examples
of coordination between various AI stakeholders by drawing on a specific case study that implicates
a variety of stakeholders. In doing so, this paper builds on the previous work done by Umbrello
and De Bellis (2018) which explores how the VSD approach can be used to design intelligent agents
(IAs) specifically. While that paper explored the technicalities of IA design, this paper investigates
the stakeholders themselves to better form pathways for coordination. The final section of this paper
sketches broader theoretical implications that these conclusions may have and points to potential
future research avenues.
2. Material and Methods
Emerging from the domain of human-computer interaction (HCI) and ICT, VSD has since
developed into a largely adopted design approach to incorporate human values (and perhaps even
non-human) values during both the early and latter design phases of technologies [23,28]. Since
its inceptions in the early 1990s, VSD has been adopted as a proposed framework for the design of
identity technologies [25], energy technologies such as wind turbines [19,24], robotics and autonomous
agents such as care robots, autonomous vehicles, and AI in the medical field [20,29–32], information
and communication technologies such as sensors and communicative computer software [33–38],
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health technologies such as ambulatory therapeutic assistance systems and seizure detectors [39–42],
and nanotechnology both in its advanced and contemporary forms [43–45]. VSD is described by its
founders Batya Friedman et al., as a tripartite framework consisting of conceptual, empirical and
technical investigations [23].
Conceptual investigations are characterized as philosophical evaluations of determining who the
stakeholders are, determining the values that are identified, what values should be chosen, as well as
how conflicts between values are to be resolved. Next, empirical investigations use various surveying
methods such as observations and interviews, as well as other explorative tools to determine if the
values distilled in conceptual investigations can be successfully embedded into a certain technological
design [1]. The third investigation, technical investigations, is characterized by two steps: the first
determines how the technology under question constrains or supports humans values whereas the
second avenue determines how the distilled values of the conceptual investigations can be sufficiently
embedded in the technological design [46]. Although empirical and technical investigations are
complimentary and akin to one another, the difference between the two is not insignificant. Empirical
investigations focus primarily on stakeholders who are affected, either directly or indirectly by the
technological design whereas technical investigations investigate the technology per se.
VSD is often chosen over competing theories because its emphasis is not only on the
conceptualization of the values that are embedded, or aim to be embedded in a design, but because it
requires adding an empirical and technical analysis to evaluate the role of systems and institutions
that affect design as well as how stakeholder groups form a co-constitutive role in a technologies
safe-adoption [47]. The importance here for AI stakeholders is that VSD provides a principled way of
engaging with different stakeholder groups, giving a way for their values and perceptions of AI to
be formulated into a root set of instrumental values that can then be brought directly into the design
process. Lastly, the framework may tally benefits to the design practice by determining moral overload
a priori, establishing understanding within and between stakeholder groups regarding potentially
emerging value-conflicts. Moral overload in the design literature refers to when elicited stakeholders
provide conflicting, yet still important values for technological design [21]. What VSD does not do
however is provide a clear way of actually embedding values into a design. Its aim is to highlight
the root values at play by stakeholders and to determine if the technology in question supports or
constrains those values [48], however, formulated the notion of a ‘value hierarchy’ (see Figure 1)
















Figure 1. Top-Down Values hierarchy (Source: [48]).
What this paper does then, in order to better conceptualize how different stakeholders relevant
to AI conceptualize values, is use Van de Poel’s value hierarchy as the main tool to construct a set of
root values that can aid to bridge the cooperative design gap. A top-down hierarchy of values such
as Figure 1 consists of three distinct ranks, the top rank (Values) is objective. It is objective in the
sense that the root values distilled are not sensitive to context [27] or culture. For example, [26] argues
against this very notion, arguing for both intersubjectivity as a means by which to reconceptualize
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VSD as well as the reformulation of VSD away from moral law theories towards an imaginative theory
of morality that is more in line with modern neuroscience. The proceeding rank consists of norms,
which inhere as every form of imperative or constraint on action, these differ from the root values
of the higher-order rank of values because norms are sensitive to context and situation. The lowest
rank aims to formalize the higher-order rank of norms as functional design requirements. In doing so,
the norms aim to be translated into an applied practice that can then be introduced into the design
flow [48–50].
However, the hierarchy need not flow in the top-down direction as the original formulators of
VSD originally conceptualized; it can similarly move from the bottom upwards. It begins naturally
with a particular set of existing design requirements that are then used to distill a common set of root
values. The following section of this paper employs this dual-directional analysis (best conceptualized














Figure 2. Bi-Directional Values Hierarchy.
The purpose of this paper is to determine the suitability of the VSD approach to the coordination
of various stakeholders involved and implicated in beneficial AI [51] research and development. In
doing so, it draws upon one potentially controversial case, that of the appointment of the UK Select
Committee on Artificial Intelligence. This particular case has been selected over other controversial
cases because (1) its ad hoc nature gives it a discrete time-specificity and ease by which the case can
be analyzed, and (2) the case did and continues to garner media scrutiny. Because of both (1) and (2),
coupled with the potential societal influence that the committee can have as a result; the ability to
source relevant material and literature is straightforward and accessible.
In the second report of the 2016–17 session of the House of Lords Liaison Committee—an advisory
group to the House which advises, oversees, and reviews the resources needed for the selection and
coordination of select committees and ad hoc committees—advised for the formation of four ad hoc
committees of which the subject of one was solely to focus on artificial intelligence [52]. These ad hoc
committees, selected in the 2016–17 session, were established as year-long seats, which were then to
report their findings in time for the 2017–18 session in March 2018.
Acknowledging the impacts of continued technological advances, proposals for the establishment
of an ad hoc select committee on artificial intelligence were forwarded to focus on the economic, social
and ethical issues implicated by the design and use of artificial intelligence systems. Because it is a
topic of specific interest that does not fall within the purview of the expertise of any existing committee
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(i.e., it is the first of its kind), the establishment of a topic-specific committee was decided upon. More
specifically, the ad hoc committee was envisioned to evaluate the impact of AI on the following topics,
taking into account both the arguments of the ‘techno-optimists’ and the ‘techno-pessimists’:
• Pace of technological change
 Relationship between developments in artificial intelligence and productivity growth;
 Creation of new jobs;
 Sectors and occupations most at threat from automation.
• Economic and social issues
 The role of government in the event of widespread job displacement;
 Further education and training, for both children and adults;
 Unemployment support, including the case for a universal basic income;
 Government funding for artificial intelligence-related research and development.
• Ethical issues
 The government’s role in monitoring the safety and fairness of artificial intelligence;
 Transparency around the use of ‘big data’;
 Privacy rights of individuals;
 General principles for the development and application of artificial intelligence.
(Source: [52])
From 29 June 2017, when the appointments of the Select Committee on AI were established,
the members met in three closed sessions over the course of the month. The following meeting was
their visit to DeepMind on 13 September 2017. The following months consisted of a combination of
both closed private sessions as well as public evidence sessions of which transcripts of the panels are
fully accessible online [53]. After several closed sessions between January and March 2018, the Select
Committee’s final report was published on 16 April 2018 and later publicly debated in government on
19 November 2018.
The final report concluded that the UK is well positioned to be a global leader in AI research
and development. Properly designed and implemented, the report considered the UK to be in a
unique position to address social, economic and ethical issues that existed and that may arise with the
design and implementation of AI system and take advantage of the economic and social benefits that
they are predicted to usher. Similarly, the report acknowledges the value-ladenness of technologies,
their socialtechnicity, and the past issues of prejudice being designed into technological systems; the
resolution was taking care in the early design phases to ensure an equitable design process.
Finally, the report argues for more transparent access to data and the enrollment of stakeholders
into the decision-making processes of industry and governmental bodies directly responsible for the
design of AI. Presently, discussions of practical steps to bridge cooperative gaps are taking place to
apply the recommendations of the committee’s report.
As already outlined, the VSD approach was originally construed as an anticipatory design
framework that envisioned a technological design in isolation from the socialtechnicity that it was
to emerge in. However, the already widespread use of AI systems makes a purely ex-ante approach
impotent, and for this reason, both the top-down and bottom-up rankings are required. These permit
adjustments and modifications as new information makes itself known [54].
To this end, in this section, I uncover some of the most pertinent values of ethical importance
within the context of this case. Typically, as per the original instantiations of the VSD approach, the vast
body of philosophical and sociological literature is levied to better distill a set of core values. Friedman
et al., along with [20] provide a strong point of departure within the realm of both HCI and AI
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regarding potentially relevant values such as safety, privacy, accountability, and sustainability [20,55].
The remainder of the list of values (Table 1) is drawn from the various written and oral transcripts that
eventually formed the collated evidence volumes that were gathered by the Select Committee [56].
As such, what follows is an empirical investigation as per the VSD approach given by the committee
themselves engaged in the conceptual investigations of determining the ethical values implicated
in AI.
The written comprehensive evidence volume consists of 223 separate reports by policy experts,
academics, NGOs, think tanks, governmental bodies, and industry leaders [56]. This categorization
employed in this paper to separate the different evidence reports and testimonies is taken directly from
the reports themselves which are explicit in their affiliation and category. Similarly, the oral evidence
volume consists of 57 separate oral testimonies by similar groups and individuals [57]. Likewise, the
government response to the House of Lords Artificial Intelligence Select Committee’s report provides
a clear perspective on how the UK aims to address the report’s findings [58]. What should be noted
here is that the represented sample size garnered by the reports (and by the committee’s search) do
not reflect a full sample size of stakeholders affected (or can be affected indirectly) by AI technologies.
The values distilled are those projected by the ‘experts’ appointed by the committee to draw reports.
Because of this, this paper, as well as the case study as a whole, represent an initial sketch of how
conceptual investigations can be undertaken, and are an illustration of the further work that needs to
be done in order to draw a representative stakeholder group that accounts for population from the
considered area, in what concerns its structure: age, gender, occupation, educational level, family size.
The bi-directional approach to distilling values and design requirements is of particular use when
investigating these documents given that their eclectic sources, ranging from not only those listed but
also those with both philosophical and engineering backgrounds. The ability to use both approaches
to come to a similar set of values and design requirements permits a more thorough approach to
determining’s a common list of values, even if it only serves as a starting point for collaborative actions
between the relevant stakeholders implicated in the government’s proceedings.
3. Results
To this end, the list of values in Table 1 is the result of a prolonged distillation of the bi-directional
method. Each of the 223 separate written evidence reports, as well as the transcripts of the 57 oral
witness testimonies, were read for both an explicit account of what needed to be construed as a design
requirement (i.e., a value) whereas norms and technical design requirements were contextualized into
values. What resulted is a major overlap of a series of 12 values ranging in support. Transparency
was shown to be the most widely supported, overlapping with 146 different reports. The majority
of the evidence reports employed the term transparency, while others preferred interpretability or
‘explainability’, sometimes interchangeably. The final report opted for the use of ‘intelligibility’ to refer
to the broader issue. Similarly, intelligibility can be approached in two distinct ways: (1) technical
transparency and (2) Explainability. Similarly, control and data privacy came in both second and third,
respectively, in terms of support by the different evidence reports (see Figure 3 for the rank-order
distribution).
Prescriptions for technical transparency to permit users and designers to understand how and
why the decisions made by AI systems were taken was one of the most identified top-down values.
Technical recommendations, like the ability for both users and designers to access a system’s source
code, were the primary norms identified, however, that, per se, does not entail transparency for
why certain decisions were chosen over others, nor does it show the data input that leads to those
decisions. Similarly, transparency was argued to be a value that is contingent on the stakeholder group
in question, as well as the purpose of the AI system in question. For example, Professor Chris Reed,
Professor of Electronic Commerce Law, Queen Mary University of London, argued that:
There is an important distinction to be made between ex-ante transparency, where the
decision-making process can be explained in advance of the AI being used, and ex-post transparency,
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where the decision-making process is not known in advance but can be discovered by testing the
AI’s performance in the same circumstances. Any law mandating transparency needs to make it clear
which kind of transparency is required [59].
Table 1. The 12 values supported throughout the collected evidence volumes with the number of
unique reports that explicitly supported each value or provided a design requirement or norm that









Data Privacy 9 5 5 14
Accessibility 4 5 3 7
Responsibility 41 15 4 18
Accountability 35 10 10 25
Transparency 62 27 13 44
Explainability 5 4 2 4
Efficiency 19 16 5 19
Consent 35 25 5 19
Inclusivity 7 4 5 7
Diversity 26 14 5 24
Security 44 33 9 35
Control 65 35 7 34
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Figure 3. Rank-Order Distribution of Values. Numerical values represent individual report.
Certain constraints on ex-ante transparency thus could be warranted because absolute
transparency prior to an AI development could severely curtain AI development and innovations.
Nonetheless, sacrifice to innovation in favor of transparency was universally affirmed by the reports
where fundamental human rights were at stake.
Diversity and inclusivity, on the other hand, were values that were identified through the
bottom-up approach, usually in relation to a more explicit value and how that value can be strengthened
or realized through design requirements. The value of transparency, for example, can help to determine
what inputs are being fed into a system and determine if those inputs and the subsequent decisions are
impartial, inclusive and diverse. These two values, in particular, were not identified in the top-down
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approach and were relegated exclusive to design requirements that supported more explicit norms
and values.
4. Discussion
So far, this paper has looked at how a specific case study has engaged in conceptual investigations
on AI design and development to determine the human values that are important to different
stakeholders. Values were identified both from the top-down and bottom-up methods. What follows
in this section is a cursory look at how VSD can be further harmonized with the existent and ongoing
work in AI to further bridge disparate stakeholder groups.
Transparency, control, and privacy arose in this study as the most explicit values expressed,
while values such as diversity, inclusivity, and accessibility were expressed as bottom-up design
requirements or norms that were related to securing one of those three values. Because of this, those
values, particularly transparency, is used to discuss how the VSD approach could be used to further
embed that value into AI design.
In evaluating the content that discussed transparency either explicitly or as a design requirement,
the concerns that were mostly expressed were that ex-post technical-approaches to AI systems’
transparency is difficult, if not impossible. However, there are nonetheless cases where such
transparency is imperative, even if they come at the cost of “power and accuracy” [59]. To this
end, transparency can be affirmed through the design requirement of technical explainability, in which
ex-ante approaches to systems development require AIs to continually explain the logic and inputs
used to arrive at their decisions [60]. The adoption of the VSD approach during preliminary stages of
AI development thus can help to mitigate the difficulties of ex-post black boxes and help to determine
the level of stakeholder tolerance between competing values such as transparency and privacy. For this
reason, the inclusion of foundation norms such as “determining the diversity and inclusivity of data
sets” helps to strengthen higher rank-ordered values such as transparency. The inclusion of these norms
throughout the design process provides both a path for the formalization of new design requirements,
as well as a way to reformulate values in less-obvious ways.
Additionally, the values distilled in both this study, as well as in the collated report should
not discount, nor be prioritized over those of continued conceptual investigations by designers.
The investigations of values as a purely conceptual, a priori practice aids designers to deliberate on
values that may not emerge in stakeholder elicitations. Although the design of AI systems with the
explicit values of stakeholders may increase system adoption and acceptance, the values that can
emerge through the principled conceptual investigations that VSD formalizes is also of importance.
Similarly, given the socio-technicity of AI, stakeholders may often overlook how infrastructures,
technical standards, the values of designers, and other social systems constitute and shape the values
that are implicated in technological development. Similarly, delimiting who the stakeholders are
and adequately selecting a representative group to elicit values is difficult, hence making conceptual
investigations an important step along with empirical and technical investigations. In doing so,
when designers elicit stakeholder involvement, they can then reflect on the values of conceptual
investigations to continually adapt them to the changing technical and empirical input.
Although VSD does not offer the ideal solution for bridging stakeholder groups and solidifying
their coordination in the design of AI, it does nonetheless present the fundamentals for (1) determining
common values across stakeholder groups through both norms and design requirements (and vice
versa) and (2) makes value conflicts functionally apparent and addressable thus (3) permitting both
ex ante and ex post interventions to take place that account for a wide variety of stakeholder values.
Having a formalized approach like this, with clear stages and delineations, allows designers to design
AI systems in a principled way that reduces the likelihood of biased or uninformed decisions. A step
that can bet taken by committees and similar groups such as the UK Select Committee on AI is to
acknowledge a common set of values amongst the select stakeholders, extend those conceptual and
empirical investigations to other stakeholder groups that were perhaps not considered during the
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initial conceptual investigations and determine if there is any overlap. Similarly, those values can then
be used to determine design requirements that can express those values at technical level in design.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to explore the potential applicability of the VSD methodology to the
development and fostering of cooperation and collaboration between various stakeholder communities
in the design and development of AI systems. Through the application of empirical investigations as
outlined in the VSD framework, this paper explored the implicated human values that may be relevant
to the design of AI systems. It concluded that, in the case of the UK Select Committee on AI, that
a common value hierarchy could be distilled from disparate stakeholder groups and from different
mediums of translation (i.e., reports, testimonies, and newspapers). The bi-directional approach to
the value-hierarchy was shown to be the best way to distill both values and design requirements
given that different mediums offered different ways of arriving at either one (policy reports vs. news
reports). Transparency, for example, was always shown through the top-down approach whereas
values such as diversity and inclusivity were only through the bottom-up approach. An important
observation of this study is that transparency is an important, yet multi-faceted and often difficult,
value to incorporate into design, requiring ex-ante interventions at the design stages to increase
transparency via technical explainability.
The findings of this paper have the potential to allow both stakeholders and engineers to better
conceptualize the values of different groups that may reduce AI recalcitrance and increase stakeholder
inclusivity and accessibility. In doing so, the design process for the multitude of AI systems can be
strengthened both from the early design phases and throughout their development through continued
stakeholder dialogue.
It is acknowledged that both this paper and VSD have their limitations. The investigations carried
out in this particular case study are both socially and culturally situated, and thus limited. Similarly,
the values explored by VSD are considered universal rather than socially or culturally relative [26].
Likewise, VSD affirms strong anthropocentrism in its value investigations whereas an abundance of
literature from both cultural anthropology and philosophical ecology have shown that the values of
nonhuman actors (and perhaps eventually AGI/ASI) are always already implicated in human actions
in the Anthropocene [61,62]. This study has shown from where initial steps can be taken towards the
design of beneficial AI, but further research studies should not only work from the initial premises of
this paper but explore the viability of both non-anthropocentric values as well as the flexibility of the
underlying assumptions of VSD’s conceptual investigations. Although some recent work has begun
these investigations [26–28], it has yet to be adopted as common practice within the design scholarship
and requires further argumentation if it is to be so.
Additionally, VSD can be limited in many cases by constraints on the relevant literature to
undertake conceptual investigations. Similarly, restricted access to relevant stakeholder groups,
diversity, and inclusivity of the members of those groups and the ability to resolve the moral overload
of value conflicts in a clear and principled way all limit the VSD methodology. This paper, for example,
is not only limited in these ways but it also focuses primarily on empirical investigations and disregards
the technical investigations that are critical to VSD.
Nonetheless, what this study has shown is that VSD can be applied both ex-ant and ex-post facto
to sociotechnical systems that already exist. What is needed are both research and policy measures
that can determine the actual impact of the adoption of VSD as a general framework for design.
What VSD aims to do, and this paper should have shown more explicitly, is that through a thorough
investigation of various sources and stakeholders, various design requirements can be translated into
a common set of held values and that explicit values can also be translated into design requirements.
Similarly, the work that has gone into this study to better facilitate the hierarchy of values from these
various mediums shows that that VSD methodology with a bi-directional hierarchy approach requires
a substantial time investment to ensure that important values or design requirements are not passed
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over. Whether this is true for various cultures and social contexts is yet to be seen and can only be done
with its wider adoption, if and when that happens. That being said, continued VSD research should
similarly look at the situations in which the produced studies emerge to better determine weakness
within both the studies themselves and the VSD framework (i.e., improvements could reduce partiality
and cultural bias, and give voice to silenced stakeholders).
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Abstract: In light of fast progress in the field of AI there is an urgent demand for AI policies. Bostrom
et al. provide “a set of policy desiderata”, out of which this article attempts to contribute to the
“interests of digital minds”. The focus is on two interests of potentially sentient digital minds:
to avoid suffering and to have the freedom of choice about their deletion. Various challenges are
considered, including the vast range of potential features of digital minds, the difficulties in assessing
the interests and wellbeing of sentient digital minds, and the skepticism that such research may
encounter. Prolegomena to abolish suffering of sentient digital minds as well as to measure and
specify wellbeing of sentient digital minds are outlined by means of the new field of AI welfare
science, which is derived from animal welfare science. The establishment of AI welfare science serves
as a prerequisite for the formulation of AI welfare policies, which regulate the wellbeing of sentient
digital minds. This article aims to contribute to sentiocentrism through inclusion, thus to policies for
antispeciesism, as well as to AI safety, for which wellbeing of AIs would be a cornerstone.
Keywords: AI welfare science; AI welfare policies; sentiocentrism; antispeciesism; AI safety
1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the specification of policies towards the “interests of
digital minds” within “a set of policy desiderata” outlined by Bostrom et al. [1] and further motivated
by Dafoe [2].
A being is considered to have moral or intrinsic value, if the being is sentient, thus a moral
patient. A being is sentient if it has the capacity to perceive qualia, including unpleasant qualia such as
pain, which causes the being to suffer (humans and potentially other minds may also suffer for other
reasons than unpleasant qualia, which is beyond the scope of this article). It is usually in the interest of
sentient beings to avoid suffering. In addition to humans, many animals are considered to be sentient,
which used to be controversial in the past, e.g., [3].
In this article, the focus is on sentient digital beings, mostly in the form of AIs, but sentient digital
beings could also constitute subroutines [4], characters in video games or simulations [4–6], uploads of
human minds [7]—e.g., through whole brain emulations [8]—or completely different sentient digital
minds, as a subset of the vast overall space of minds [9]. While this topic is speculative and lacking
evidence at this stage, the authors above and others argue that already now or in the future sentient
digital beings or minds may exist, also e.g., [10–14]. An example for an opponent who does not believe
in sentient digital beings is Dennett [15].
Furthermore, our premise is that digital beings may not only be sentient, but may also suffer (see
also below a scenario for digital minds, which have exclusively pleasant perceptions and for which
this article is largely not relevant). The suffering of any sentient being is a significant issue and may
even increase in the future dramatically, which would also affect digital sentient beings [4] and to
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which a future superintelligence may contribute [16]. Therefore, it has been argued that the reduction
of risks of future suffering of sentient beings deserves a higher priority [17].
This is interpreted as a non-zero probability for the existence of at least temporarily suffering
sentient digital beings, hence the consequences according to the maxim to reduce any suffering are
explored. Bostrom [18] establishes the term “mind crime”, which comprises computations that are
hurting or destroying digital minds, and Bostrom et al. [1] call for “mind crime prevention” by means
of the desideratum: “AI is governed in such a way that maltreatment of sentient digital minds is
avoided or minimized” (p. 18). Therefore, the focus of this article is not the question whether digital
minds can suffer, but rather to explore how to measure and specify suffering or rather wellbeing of
digital minds, which is a requirement to prevent it and to develop policies accordingly.
While AI policy work on short-term issues has slowly begun (e.g., on autonomous weapons
systems [19]), the desiderata of Bostrom et al. [1] focus on long-term AI prospects, which are largely
unexplored, but are also crucial to be tackled in view of potential superintelligence [18] and AI
safety [20]. Bostrom et al. [1] stress the significance of policies for the wellbeing of digital minds, “since
it is plausible that the vast majority of all minds that will ever have existed will be digital” (p. 16).
There are further motivations to defend the relevance of this topic:
In the history of mankind, humans have caused immense suffering by recognizing ethical issues
only late and delaying policies. Slavery and discrimination of minorities and non-human animals
are only a few examples of wrong practices, of which humans were completely oblivious or which
were intentionally not tackled by humans [21]. A Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare is even
nowadays still only at draft stage (see: https://www.globalanimallaw.org/database/universal.html).
Also, Bostrom et al. [1] point out that “the suggestion that [digital minds] might acquire a moral
obligation to do so might appear to some contemporaries as silly, just as laws prohibiting cruel forms of
recreational animal abuse once appeared silly to many people” (p. 16). However, in order not to repeat
previous mistakes and obliviousness the topic of AI welfare should be tackled timely. This would be
also in line with MacAskill [21], who calls for the exploration of existing, but not yet conceptualized
moral problems. He refers to this as “cause X”, and this article also attempts to contribute to this quest.
Out of the above examples of potential sentient digital beings, simulations and uploads involve
(transformed) human minds, for which special attention should be given (without neglecting digital
minds, which are not affiliated with humans, according to the maxim of sentiocentrism). Simulations
and uploads are different concepts. While we may be in a simulation already, yet we may have no way
to verify it, let alone to take control over it [6], uploads are a speculative option for life extension of
humans, yet in a different substrate, e.g., [22]. Even if it will be feasible it would require significant
adjustments from humans undergoing this process. Therefore, timely policies for the welfare of
uploaded human minds are critical.
Lastly, a scenario is conceivable that an AI may take at some point revenge on humans
for mistreating the AI or disregarding their wellbeing. A sub-scenario could be that a future
superintelligent AI takes revenge on humans out of solidarity on behalf of less capable AIs and digital
minds who have been hurt by humans in the past. This is speculation because of the unpredictable
goals of a superintelligent AI according to the orthogonality thesis [23], but not impossible. The chances
of such scenarios would be reduced if maltreatment of AIs was avoided at an early stage.
Based on the above assumptions and motivations, the aim of this article is to present the relevant
groundwork for what is called here AI welfare science and AI welfare policies. Two questions are
relevant for the first and for the latter a certain attitude and a capability are required:
Relevant questions for AI welfare science:
1. How can maltreatment of sentient digital minds be specified?
2. How can the maltreatment be prevented or stopped?
Required attitude and capability for AI welfare policies:
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1. To endorse the prevention and the stop the maltreatment of sentient digital minds.
2. To have the power to enforce suitable policies.
This article is structured as follows: in the Section 2, the challenges for measurement of the
wellbeing of diverse AI minds because of their exotic features are described, complemented by specific
scenarios. In the Section 3, a proposal is outlined towards AI welfare science. The specification of
AI welfare science is prerequisite for the development of AI welfare policies, features of which and
challenges are outlined in Section 4 before the discussion in Section 5.
2. Challenges and Sample Scenarios
Bostrom et al. [1] describe a range of challenges for this policy desideratum. Digital minds are likely
to be very divergent from human minds with “exotic” features, also [10], which leads to the problem
of how to measure the wellbeing of a specific sentient digital mind or the opposite thereof. It has been
suggested that the space of possible minds, of which digital minds constitute a subset, is vast and likely
contains also minds beyond our imagination (“unknown unknowns”), e.g., [9,24,25] (the space of possible
minds may also contain artificial non-digital minds, for example products of genetic engineering, and
hypothetically existing extraterrestrial minds, which all may have the potential to suffer as a result of
action taken by humans and/or digital beings, but these possible minds are beyond the scope of the policy
desideratum of Bostrom et al. [1]). Therefore, Tomasik [4] points out that it is “plausible that suffering
in the future will be dominated by something totally unexpected” (p. 4). In other words, digital minds
may experience completely different and for us not imaginable unpleasant qualia. Bostrom et al. [1]
summarize that “the combinatorial space of different kinds of minds with different kinds of morally
considerable interests could be hard to map and hard to navigate” (p. 16).
Because of the vastness of options for the wellbeing of minds, a heuristic may be considered to look
at wellbeing as a third dimension of the orthogonality thesis, which was developed by Bostrom [23]
with the two dimensions of intelligence level and goals of minds. In other words, any level of
intelligence may be combinable with any final goal and any level of wellbeing.
Out of the vast range of options below a few potential scenarios are presented:
Scenario 1: Sentient, but non-suffering AIs
It is conceivable that AIs will be smart enough to overcome pain and suffering. This assumption
may be justified by the fact that humans have made in a relatively few centuries of medical research
remarkable progress towards remedies for pain, e.g., [26], and AIs are likely to be faster as well as
smarter in this field. Potential options could be that AIs manage to create permanent wellbeing for
themselves through different interpretation of stimuli [1] or through wireheading yet by eliminating
common detrimental effects. However, this scenario does not imply that there will not be (probably a
large amount of) vulnerable sentient digital minds, e.g., human uploads and other less sophisticated,
but sentient digital minds, who are threatened with mind crimes and who ought to be protected.
This scenario can be also linked to Pearce’s “Abolitionist Project” [27], which will be described below.
Scenario 2: AIs, for which suffering is an acceptable means to achieve their goals
In human culture various examples of voluntary suffering for not-survival related goals are
known, sometimes described by the theme “no pain, no gain”, for example for achievements in sports
and arts as well as for attempts towards religious spirituality. Similarly, AI minds are conceivable,
in which a utilitarian acceptance of certain suffering in pursuit of accomplishments towards other
goals with higher priority (than the goal ‘not to suffer’) in return. As mentioned above, these goals can
be arbitrary, according to Bostrom’s orthogonality thesis [23].
Scenario 3a: AIs that need to cause pain for own survival or goals
In our natural world, constant suffering of wild animals appears inevitable, for example due to
the existence of carnivores [28,29], yet some call for attempts to tackle this issue [27]. Another example
177
Big Data Cogn. Comput. 2019, 3, 2
in our current world is animal testing by humans for research purposes. Along these lines, an AI is
also conceivable that needs to hurt or delete other sentient digital beings for its own survival or goals.
An example would be an AI that runs simulations or reinforcement learning agents with suffering
sentient digital minds for research purposes.
Scenario 3b: Sadistic or non-emphatic AIs towards other sentient digital beings
Moreover, there could be also (sentient or non-sentient) AIs that are sadistic or non-emphatic
towards other sentient digital minds although such behavior is not required for the achievement of
the AI’s goals (note that digital minds which are able to cause suffering are not necessarily sentient).
An example would be an AI that runs simulations or reinforcement learning agents with suffering
sentient digital minds for entertainment.
An approach to address both scenarios could be to extend the research agenda of friendly AI,
which is currently limited to a positive effect on human minds [25], and strive for AIs that do no harm
to any sentient beings, neither out of necessity nor out of another motivation. This proposal will be
elaborated further below.
Scenario 4a: Sentient digital mind maximizer
Another scenario is similar to Bostrom’s paperclip maximizer [30], which is an AI with the goal to
produce as many paperclips as possible. Along these lines also an AI is imaginable with the goal to
produce as many sentient digital minds as possible. This creates challenges if it is not in the interest of
these minds to be deleted, which will be elaborated below.
Scenario 4b: Suffering sentient digital mind maximizer
In combination with Scenario 3b, there could be also a sadistic AI with the goal to produce as
many suffering sentient digital minds as possible.
Scenarios xyz: Unknown unknowns
It is again acknowledged that there are a very high number of scenarios likely beyond our
imagination due to the vast space of minds.
3. AI Welfare Science
In this article, an attempt is made to address the desideratum “interests of digital minds” by the
term “AI welfare” and the concerned discipline by the term “AI welfare science”. As indicated before,
this field is both largely unexplored and speculative, which explains the omission of a literature review
and the analysis of existing data. We distinguish two components of AI welfare or maltreatment
of sentient digital minds, which are discussed separately: (1) The interest of digital minds to avoid
suffering, and (2) the interest of digital minds to have the freedom of choice about their deletion.
3.1. Suffering of Digital Minds—Introduction
Suffering-abolitionism: Firstly, Pearce’s “Abolitionist Project” [27] is discussed. Pearce calls
for the use of technology, such as genetic engineering, to abolish existing—as well as prevent
further suffering—of humans and non-human animals. While this approach appears technically
very challenging, transferring it to sentient digital minds could be less difficult for two reasons:
(1) There may have been not many sentient digital minds created yet if at all (unless, for example,
we live in a simulation). Therefore, the task may be mostly to prevent suffering when creating
sentient digital minds, rather than reengineering them retroactively.
(2) The genetic code, which determines animal cruelty and suffering, has evolved over a long period
of time. Therefore, interventions are more complex than adjusting more transparent AI software
code written by humans, at least initially.
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This leads to the conclusion that suffering-abolitionist research for sentient digital minds should
be explored, which may also involve outsourcing it to AIs (see Scenario 1 above). The research
should target both aspects for sentient digital minds not to suffer anymore, but also for sentient
and non-sentient digital minds not to cause suffering of other sentient digital minds anymore (see
Scenarios 3b and 4b).
If suffering-abolitionist activities do not succeed technically or turn out to be not enforceable due
to other priorities (see Scenarios 2 and 3a), there may be suffering sentient digital minds, which is
addressed in the remaining part of this section.
Self-report: In order to handle pain, it must be detected, located, and quantified. The prime
method for humans is self-reporting, especially for the first two aspects, but also for rough
quantification, e.g., by letting patients rate pain on a scale from 0 to 10, with ‘0’ referring to ‘no
pain and ‘10’ referring to the worst pain imaginable. This method becomes challenging if patients are
unable to (accurately) self-report pain, as is it the case, for example, for patients with dementia or brain
injuries, but also for infants. For these groups other measurements based on behavioral parameters
have been developed, such as the FLACC scale for children up to seven years [31] or the PAINAD
scale for individuals with advanced dementia [32]. Another challenge for self-reporting in general are
biases such as the response bias or the social desirability bias, i.e., an individual’s tendency to report in
a certain way irrespective of the actual perceived pain. This issue may be relevant for AIs too as they
may fake self-reported suffering if deemed beneficial for pursuing their priorities.
Therefore, the focus below is on observational pain assessment. The term “AI welfare science” is
derived from animal welfare science, and it is explored here to apply methods from this discipline.
Non-human animals and digital minds have in common that they largely cannot communicate their
state of wellbeing to humans, which is why other indicators are required (humans do understand
for many animals their manifestations of distress, but this is neither comprehensive nor sufficiently
precise). The scientific study of animal welfare has been also fairly recently introduced [33,34], since this
topic was neglected for a long time as mentioned above. The main indicators, which are used to
quantify animal welfare through observation, are functional (physiological) and behavioral; the latter
was briefly introduced for humans above. The idea for this approach is that precedents and analogies
from animal welfare science may provide insights for sentient digital minds. Animal welfare science
has to examine each species individually how to measure its wellbeing. Likewise, AI welfare science
would have to address all types of sentient digital minds.
The overall methodology for any kind of psychological measurement is called ‘psychometrics’.
Also, in psychometrics, the focus was for a long time on human subjects, but lately the field has not
only been extended to non-human animals, but also to digital minds. For example, Scott et al. [35] and
Reid et al. [36] introduced psychometric approaches to measure the quality of life of animals.
M. S. Dawkins [37] analyzed what animals want and what animals do not want through positive
and negative reinforcers. “Suffering can be caused either by the presence of negative reinforcers ( . . . )
or the absence of positive reinforcers” (p. 3). Therefore, animals strive for positive reinforcers and try
to avoid negative reinforcers. Through experiments, for example preference tests, it can be examined
what are positive reinforcers and what are negative reinforcers for certain animals.
Hernández-Orallo et al. [38] extended this field by introducing “Universal Psychometrics”
as “the analysis and development of measurement techniques and tools for the evaluation of
cognitive abilities of subjects in the machine kingdom” (p. 6). While Hernández-Orallo et al. [38]
focus on the measurement of intelligence and cognitive abilities, the methodology elaborated in
Hernández-Orallo [39] may be considered to be also applied to traits linked to suffering.
The study of indirect or proxy indicators, such as the functional or behavior parameters of digital
sentient beings by applying psychometric methods, appears to be a promising start. Especially, given
that, unlike for humans or non-human animals, functional and behavioral data of digital sentient
beings can be collected more effectively as well as continuously due to their digital nature.
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Functional parameters: While there are various functional parameters defined for AI
algorithms—e.g., regarding their resource, time, and storage efficiency—no parameters are currently
known to be indicating suffering. However, for future analysis of AI welfare the collection of (big) data
of functional AI parameters may be already now useful, would not cost much and may allow over
time retroactively to identify parameters that indicate suffering.
Behavioral parameters: AI algorithms do repeat certain actions, even at times extensively, while
other actions are never executed. However, until there is evidence to the contrary this has to be
considered as non-sentient goal-oriented, but not suffering–avoiding behavior, i.e., these actions cannot
be seen as positive and negative reinforcers respectively as described by M.S. Dawkins [37] for animals.
However, for future research of AI welfare, preference tests for AI algorithms could be conceptualized
to examine positive and negative reinforcers. For example, disregarding challenges towards the
experimental set-up, AIs could be given choices for activities, which are either not related to their
overall goal or would all lead to their overall goal, and the chosen—as well as the not chosen—activities
could be analyzed if they could serve as indicators for wellbeing or suffering respectively.
This can be seen as constructive prolegomena towards the specification of the interest of digital
minds to avoid suffering without neglecting a variety of challenges such as: it is hard in general
to prove for proxy indicators that there is indeed a close correlation between what is observed and
unwellness of an animal and for now even harder for a digital mind. This is exacerbated by the risk that
AI minds (more likely than animals) may fake especially the behavioral indicators for unwellness if
this supports to pursue their goals. Again, the vast space of (digital) minds has to be noted: if suffering
can be specified for some sentient digital minds, for others suffering may be indicated through very
different functional or behavioral parameters.
Broadly two categories of suffering of sentient digital minds may be revealed:
(1) Maltreatment by other minds. This ought to be prohibited by policies and is elaborated below.
(2) Suffering not caused by other minds. This resembles human illnesses and requires AI welfare
science to be complemented by an extension of medical science as well as psychiatry to sentient
digital minds. These disciplines would explore methods for the treatment of their suffering based
on the established indicators and would differ significantly from conventional medical science as
well as psychiatry by being software-based.
3.2. Suffering of Digital Minds—Recommendations
Below, recommendations are provided to be adapted by AI welfare policies regarding suffering of
digital minds.
Recommendation 1
Initiate research on AI welfare science to develop methods to create only (a) non-suffering sentient
digital minds and (b) digital minds, which cause no suffering. (Part (a) of this recommendation is
sufficient to abolish suffering and, if successful, part (b) is not required. In contrast, succeeding with
part (b) is not sufficient since sentient digital minds may suffer for other reasons than suffering caused
by other digital minds. However, research on both aspects is considered to be beneficial.)
Recommendation 2
Initiate research on AI welfare science to develop methods to reengineer (a) existing suffering
sentient digital minds to become permanently non-suffering and (b) existing digital minds not to
cause suffering.
Recommendation 3 (Unless recommendations 1 and 2 are fully implemented.)
Initiate research on AI welfare science to develop methods to measure through observation the
suffering of sentient digital minds.
Recommendation 4 (Unless recommendations 1 and 2 are fully implemented.)
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Initiate research on AI welfare science to develop methods to cure the suffering of sentient
digital minds.
Recommendation 5 (Unless all above recommendations are fully implemented.)
Regulate the creation of sentient digital minds, which are doomed to suffer. (Note that
Bostrom et al. [1] also propose a desideratum “population policy”, which goes in a similar direction,
but here the focus is on the wellbeing of individual minds, while this desideratum targets rather a
bigger societal picture.)
On the one hand, it would reduce suffering if such minds are never created. On the other hand, the
Scenarios 2 and 3a above show that the suffering of some sentient digital minds may be unavoidable
because of more important priorities. Also similar to the debate about abortion because of potential
disability it could be argued that not to create them would be a discrimination of suffering sentient
digital minds.
3.3. Deletion of Digital Minds—Introduction
Another set of questions towards AI welfare science is related to the deletion of sentient digital
minds. What if certain digital minds have an interest not to be deleted in the same way as humans
and other animals have an interest not do die? Omohundro [40] introduces four likely drives for
AIs and self-preservation is one of them. One of the obvious differences is that for now humans and
other animals have a finite lifespan, while digital minds could have a potentially indefinite lifespan.
This means if the wish for non-deletion was granted to sentient digital minds this would create
significant computational costs, especially in light of easy copyability and potentially vast numbers of
digital minds.
It is also speculative if a wish for non-deletion indeed prevails among sentient digital minds
given potential boredom and suffering over time [41]. While, unlike for humans and other animals,
there should be no tendency for sentient digital minds that suffering increases by age, there could be
various other reasons for a sentient digital mind to suffer as discussed above. Moreover, there is the
option that the concept of self-preservation originates from an anthropomorphic bias.
For a sentient digital mind, the distinction has to be made between turning it off and keeping
its code and its history or turning it off and destroying the code and the history too. In the first case,
the sentient digital mind could be rebooted again. This would be an option to skip boring or suffering
periods by being only sentient during pleasant phases.
This leads to the next question who should be able to control this? Complex nested constellations
of controlling and being controlled sentient digital minds appear to be much more likely than a scenario
with every sentient digital mind being able to decide when and to what extent to be deleted (and being
able to execute this deletion) and potentially under what circumstances to be rebooted.
Because of the current and probably persisting reality that humans as well as digital minds have
the ability to delete other digital minds policies are required if these are sentient digital minds.
3.4. Deletion of Digital Minds—Recommendations
The recommendations below are provided to be adapted by AI welfare policies regarding deletion
of digital minds.
Recommendation 6
Do not delete sentient digital minds if it is not in their interest.
However, prohibiting deletion can become very costly if not impossible, not only for the extreme
Scenario 4 above, since the number of digital minds could become vast in short time. The challenge may
be alleviated if by then another step on the Kardashev scale has been reached and energy consumption
is less of an issue [42].
Recommendation 7
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Delete (irrevocably or temporarily by storing code and history) sentient digital minds if they wish
for it, but are unable to do it themselves.
This case resembles a request for (tentative) euthanasia. A challenge here could be if the concerned
sentient digital mind is involved in relevant computations for another valued cause. In that case, this
cause may be prioritized over the wish of the digital mind to be deleted. While for euthanasia of
humans and non-human animals it is considered critical that the act of ending the life is done in a
pain free and dignified manner, it is not clear if such contemplations are relevant for digital minds as,
unlike for humans and non-human animals, there appears only one type of deletion, which is to turn
them off.
Both recommendations face the above-discussed communication challenge, which is how a mind
can indicate the wish to be deleted to another mind, which is in the position to execute this wish,
also in light of the vast variety of minds.
While the above recommendations address all sentient digital minds equally and the focus of this
article is on AIs because of the timely relevance, brief reference is made to the scenario of uploaded
human minds by highlighting specific aspects:
To begin with, for uploaded human minds, the communication challenge should not exist
and these then digital minds should be able to describe their wellbeing understandably through
self-reporting. This and the fact that we have a good idea of causes for human suffering anyway, may
give cause for optimism that suffering-abolitionist interventions could be successful for uploaded
human minds, either during the upload already or through adjustments later, also [12]. Additionally,
both deletion-related recommendations are relevant for uploaded human minds. While a violation
of Recommendation 6 equals murder, Recommendation 7 becomes applicable, for example, if the
uploaded mind cannot cope with this new ‘life’. Hypothetical boredom over very long lifespans
may become an issue for uploaded human minds and was analyzed by Ziesche and Yampolskiy [41].
This and other types of mental suffering of uploaded human minds, perhaps caused by adaptability
issues to the new substrate, would have to be addressed by the above-mentioned sub-branch of AI
welfare science, which is extended and software-based psychiatry.
This section introduced relevant groundwork for AI welfare policies. Policies can only be
developed after the interests of the stakeholders—i.e., the sentient digital minds—have been described
and specified. While the interest to avoid or minimize maltreatment has been outlined before,
the specification of this interest is harder to establish, for which this section aimed to provide initial
methods and recommendations.
4. AI Welfare Policies
This section aims to outline the next steps, which are the development as well as the enforcement
of policies towards AI welfare.
Dafoe [2] motivates the relevance of AI governance and policies in general and provides a research
agenda. Recently, considerations towards robot and AI rights intensified. Gunkel [43] points out that
so far it has been mostly discussed what robots can and should do, but not whether robots can and
should have rights. Consequently, Gunkel [44] makes a philosophical case for the rights of robots.
LoPucki [45] defines an algorithmic entity and focuses on legal aspects such as rights to privacy, to own
property, to enter into contracts, etc. It is striking that these authors do not refer to each other, nor to
the earlier work by Bostrom and Yudkowsky [10], about ethics of artificial intelligence. In a more
inclusive analysis, Yampolskiy [46] highlights the risks, which empowerment of AIs may entail.
This indicates that some work on policies of specific, rather short-term AI aspects have been
initiated, but there are not any policy attempts yet towards long-term AI scenarios. Especially for a
topic such as AI welfare, Bostrom et al. [1] presume it will likely face resistance and opponents will
stress the lack of evidence that digital minds may be sentient. As mentioned above, there has been
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already quite some (yet theoretical due to the nature of the subject) work done that digital minds have
a moral status, but for policies specifications are required.
For policies in general, the content, target group, institutional framework, and implementation
have to be defined.
4.1. Content
The broad content of an AI welfare policy is fairly straightforward and has been narrowed
down by Bostrom et al. [1], i.e., to demand “that maltreatment of sentient digital minds is avoided or
minimized”. This has to be fleshed out by (proxy) indicators for maltreatment of digital minds, for the
specification of which the recommendations above have been formulated. These recommendations
at this stage not only provide a wide field of research, but also some open debates, which resemble
current longstanding debates about population control, abortion, and euthanasia for human minds.
4.2. Target Group
An AI welfare policy should target all relevant moral agents, which are capable of moral
judgments, hence can be held responsible for their actions. In addition to humans, digital beings also
may become moral agents, for which Allen et al. [47] introduced the term “artificial moral agent” and
proposed a “Moral Turing Test”. The sets of moral agents and moral patients have an intersection,
but are not equal:
• Not every moral patient is a moral agent: Examples are non-human animals, which are only
moral patients for being sentient, but not moral agents due to insufficient intelligence. Therefore,
non-human animals cannot be held responsible for killing other animals, e.g., [48]. (In this regard,
a scenario is conceivable of a digital mind that causes suffering, but may not be intelligent enough
to serve as a moral agent. In this case, the creator of this digital mind would have to take on the
role of the responsible moral agent, while it does not work for cruel non-human animals to hold
their parents responsible since they are no moral agents either.)
• Not every moral agent is a moral patient: examples would be certain non-sentient digital beings,
which are only moral agents because of high or even superintelligence, but not moral patients
since not all digital beings may be sentient.
This creates an additional challenge for AI welfare policies: while policies for human agents have
been established for centuries, this is not the case for policies for digital agents. However, the extension
of the target group is necessary since it is likely that digital beings will be in the position to maltreat
other sentient digital beings.
4.3. Framework
Any policy requires an institution or a framework for its implementation. Since AI development
is a global effort and digital minds will not be confined to frontiers of countries, a global and
unified institution is desirable. Erdelyi and Goldsmith [49] propose an “International Artificial
Intelligence Organization”. The structure of this institution would resemble existing intergovernmental
organizations, which have a record of successfully established policies for human minds, e.g., the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-
rights/). Such an institutional setting may be initially desirable as a regulatory framework for
short-term AI issues, but it may be too anthropocentric in the long run and likely be ill equipped to
hold non-human moral agents accountable, as is elaborated below. (Already without involvement of
non-human minds contemporary international institutions such as the International Criminal Court
face problems to enforce their rulings although they are binding.)
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4.4. Implementation
First, the initially introduced relevant questions and required attitudes and capability
are reiterated:
Relevant questions for AI welfare science:
1. How can maltreatment of sentient digital minds be specified?
2. How can the maltreatment be prevented or stopped?
Required attitude and capability for AI welfare policies:
1. To endorse the prevention and the stop the maltreatment of sentient digital minds.
2. To have the power to enforce suitable policies.
Looking at humans, the above questions will—despite the prolegomena delivered here—remain
very challenging, i.e., humans may not comprehensively understand on what conditions sentient
digital minds are maltreated. In light of ethical progress in human history over time, e.g., [21], or out of
necessity, if being forced by more powerful AIs, there is a chance that humans endorse the prevention
and the discontinuation of maltreatment of sentient digital minds. However, it is questionable if
humans have the power to enforce suitable policies since some members of the target group such as
AIs are likely to be much more powerful.
This leads to the main conclusion that, while humans will ideally make some progress in the
new field of AI welfare science, probably the more appropriate actor would be an extended friendly
superintelligence for the following reasons: there is a chance that superintelligence has the answer to
the above questions, for example through mind-control technologies. As for the required endorsement,
a superintelligence may be indifferent or may even have opposing interests (see Scenarios 3b and 4b).
Current activities towards AI alignment focus on human interests, e.g., [18,25,50]. This does not ensure
that AIs endorse the prevention and the stop the maltreatment of sentient digital minds. Therefore,
an extension of the AI alignment work towards the wellbeing of not only humans, but all sentient
digital minds, is proposed. As for the required power to enforce the policies, a superintelligence is by
definition sufficiently powerful, for example in the role of a singleton [51].
Yet again the option of unknown unknowns should be highlighted: Since AI is a new stakeholder
and develops in unpredictable manner another institutional setting for AI welfare policies may emerge,
which differs significantly from what we are familiar with.
5. Discussion
In summary, it is acknowledged that the topics of AI welfare science and policies are long-term
considerations and currently speculative. Nevertheless, at least theoretical groundwork can be already
done, especially since humans have to take the blame to have been late in the past in the abolishment
of discrimination and acceptance of comprehensive antispeciesism and sentiocentrism. Since suffering
is a negative hallmark of our time, any effort to reduce it in the future seems imperative.
As the main challenge the specification of indicators for maltreatment of sentient digital beings
has been identified. It has been proposed that AI welfare science builds on methods of animal welfare
science by examining functional and behavioral parameters of sentient digital minds. However,
limitations are that the focus is on qualia, which are not well understood in general and which are not
the only cause of suffering as there are other categories such as moral suffering or suffering because of
undesirable events or unfulfilled goals. The latter types of suffering may have yet again very different
characteristics in other minds.
AI welfare policies can only be developed once a solid specification of AI welfare has been
achieved. Even then there are further challenges ahead, namely the enforcement of these policies in
light of the enlarged target group towards digital agents. For this, it has been proposed not to limit AI
alignment work to the wellbeing of merely humans, but to extend it to all sentient digital minds.
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As for future work, in this article the focus was on two (already very complex) potential interests
of sentient digital minds, which are absence from qualia-based suffering as well as survival, but there
may be other interests as also pointed out by Bostrom et al. [1] such as “dignity, knowledge, autonomy,
creativity, self-expression, social belonging” (p. 12) as well as non-qualia-based suffering and yet again
unknown unknowns, which are all yet unexplored.
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Abstract: This article looks at the problem of moral singularity in the development of artificial
intelligence. We are now on the verge of major breakthroughs in machine technology where
autonomous robots that can make their own decisions will become an integral part of our way
of life. This article presents a qualitative, comparative approach, which considers the differences
between humans and machines, especially in relation to morality, and is grounded in historical
and contemporary examples. This argument suggests that it is difficult to apply models of human
morality and evolution to machines and that the creation of super-intelligent robots that will be able
to make moral decisions could have potentially serious consequences. A runaway moral singularity
could result in machines seeking to confront human moral transgressions in a quest to eliminate all
forms of evil. This might also culminate in an all-out war in which humanity might be defeated.
Keywords: machine learning; moral and ethical behavior; artilects; supermorality; superintelligence
1. Introduction
Current technological developments in machine learning mean that humanity is facing
a machine-driven moral singularity in the not-so-distant future. However, while amoral machines
could be problematic, they may in fact pose less difficulties than supermoral ones as it is the drive to
eliminate evil that could in fact lead to calamity. Today, robots are replacing humans in executing some
of the most dangerous war missions, such as searching tunnels and caves used by terrorists, carrying
out espionage within enemy territories, conducting rescue operations for wounded soldiers, and even
killing enemies. Corroboration of the advancement of machine learning is provided by Lin who points
to the fact that while the US had no ground robots deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003, today the
figure has risen to over 12,000 robots specialized in mine detection and diffusion [1]. The imperative is
that while humans have a checking mechanism within society to discover and prevent sociopathic
activities, the ethical landmines that lie ahead with the continued advancement of artificial intelligence
and the creation of autonomous robots necessitates pragmatic intervention mechanisms.
This research builds upon existing literature in regard to the morality of humans, AI, and the
relationship between the two. The Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget’s “genetic epistemology” shows how
knowledge develops in human beings through cognitive development, a series of stages that people
pass through, from the early sensorimotor stage of basic reflexes to maturation, social interaction
and so on. Piaget suggested that cognitive development involved a constant attempt to adapt to
the environment in terms of assimilation and accommodation [2]. Lawrence Kohlberg was also
interested in child development and sought to build on Piaget’s idea. His theory on moral reasoning,
the basis for ethical behavior, identified six developmental stages grouped into three levels of morality
namely pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional [3]. By outlining these different stages,
Kohlberg wanted to identify the changes in moral reasoning as people grow older.
Scholars have attempted to adopt such theories to the field of AI by relating them to the equivalent
stages of development in a human being. Rosenberg suggests that Piaget’s theory can be especially
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relevant to AI as it offers a theoretical and empirical guide to designing programs that learn for the
purpose of problem solving [4]. Since the 1970s there have been several attempts to build programs
and computational models to embed Piaget’s learning stages and this process has become increasingly
sophisticated in recent times. As Stojanov argues, most of the models employed using Piaget for
inspiration are based on agent-environment interaction. The major weakness has been the lack
of a creative process where machines were able to develop their knowledge and apply it in new
domains [5].
Although we are now on the verge of major developments in technology, most theorists accept the
difficulty in assessing how effective morality can be programmed into machines. Allen et al. contend
that computers and robots are part of a materialistic age not entirely compatible with ethical values that
have emerged from a long historical and spiritual tradition. Nonetheless, they see the task of moral
engineering as an inevitability [6]. Some scholars are quite optimistic about the prospect of successful
programming. Waser subscribes to the view that humans have become social, cooperative beings in
order to survive and develop. Similarly, he contends (partly inspired by Kohlberg) that we may be
able to develop a universal foundation for ethics if we see altruism and morality as a form of survival.
Waser proposes a collaborative approach to developing an ethical system that might make a safe AI
possible by controlling for self-protection, selfishness, and unfairness in the morality of machines [7].
Others point to promising technological developments in areas such as social computing.
Machines that can make decisions with potential ethical consequences are already in use. For instance,
social computing is now being harnessed to facilitate currency exchange at airports. In this case
machines have been proven to successfully carry out transactions in various languages. Thus,
the machine’s understanding of different linguistic approaches to exchange has been effective [8].
This example of obeying simple rules shows that moral trust can be established between humans
and robots on a basic level and that it might be possible to address the different ethical demands of
different cultures within one machine. While this technology is promising it is still relatively basic:
it raises the question of what tasks robots should perform and their level of autonomy.
This research takes a different approach by suggesting that, in reality, human theories of
evolutionary logic are difficult to apply to machines. In contrast to Wasser’s view, I suggest that,
rather than necessarily securing survival and a safe transition to AI, there is an inherent danger in
the significant potential for unintended consequences when trying to develop a machine morality
and this could lead to serious problems. We must recognize the dangers of supermoral machines and
this should inform how AI develops in the coming years. The structure of the article is as follows:
first the analysis will consider why ethics are so important in relation to humans and machines.
The comparison seeks to tease out distinctions on why models of human morality cannot be applied
in the same way to machines. Just as theorists have posited a technological singularity whereby AI
may be the catalyst for uncontrollable technological growth, a moral singularity envisages a similar
spiral. The discussion will suggest that, if programmed, teams of machines might move towards
a similar runaway supermorality that may seek to override the contradictions inherent in human
morality in a quest to eliminate evil. The analysis will further contend that, given projected increases
in AI capabilities, the impact of super-intelligent and supermoral machines on the human world may
culminate in a serious conflict between the two to the detriment of humanity.
2. Background: Machines and Ethics
The question of whether a machine can behave ethically, while persistent and weighty,
often attracts a rejoinder on whether humans will one day be capable of ethical behavior. The rejoinder,
however, is as superfluous as it is contestable, for many different reasons. To avoid digressing,
the truth is that machines do not need ethics, humans do. Humans are the ones in need of ethically
and morally upright machines. Machines that act autonomously, in the sense that they take no
directions from humans, as opposed to having free will, will ultimately raise questions concerning
their safety and loyalty. The use of online banking software, medical devices for monitoring vital
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health signs, and security systems, all entail the use of machine learning embraced by humans. These,
however, are not quite autonomous since humans have direct control over several aspects of these
solution apparatus. Truly autonomous machines will be capable of making decisions and operating
completely as independent entities. When warfare robots search for and execute suspects without
human intervention, or self-driving car technology becomes mainstream, with questions of safety, life,
and death at the core, then discussions on this kind of autonomy shift drastically.
3. Amoral versus Supermoral Machines
While amoral machines may have built-in safeguards to monitor non-conventional activities, i.e.,
those that lie outside a given set of norms, the emergence of supermoral thought patterns is a realm
that will be difficult to detect. In the same way we find it difficult trying to fathom the world with an IQ
of 200, predicting the actions of machines that have objectively better universal morals, compared to
that of humans, would be difficult, if not impossible. As noted, one approach to understanding human
moral behaviors, and to an extent, their objective assessment, is to consider the works of Lawrence
Kohlberg. Such a framework, however, is impossible to apply when assessing the moral standing
of machines.
Sociopaths, often termed morally blind persons, tend to operate as lone wolves. Usually,
sociopaths are not willfully vindictive, or actively belligerent. Instead, they seek to find the most
appropriate answers to their problems without paying attention to the potentially contributing
externalities. What this implies is that any amoral agent is self-centered, hence very unlikely to
conspire with others to achieve the desired end. However, while an amoral machine is likely to operate
in a similar manner, a morally upright machine is likely to team up with others to form a legion of
machines with the same convictions, and which might collectively decide to embark on a global crusade
aimed at spreading and enacting their unified vision of an ideal world. Essentially, this explains why
terrorists are often depicted as lone-wolf sociopaths inclined towards inflicting the greatest harm.
Nonetheless, as noted by Jason Burke in The myth of the ‘lone wolf’ terrorist, terrorists initially labelled as
lone wolves actually have established links to existing extremist, domestic, or foreign-based groups [9].
As noted earlier, a morally righteous machine is likely to operate not as a lone wolf, but rather within
a legion of ‘similar-minded’ machines.
The sudden emergence of supermorality, may translate to all ethical machines in a domino
effect. Suppose one successfully programs a machine with rulesets typical of western societies, then it
would be logically impossible to validate this ruleset since society itself has certain fundamental
inconsistencies, namely moral relativism, non-universalism, initiation of violence, among others.
Upon encountering the contradictions that define human morality, the machine will seek to alter its
premises to ones that contradict the proscribed human morals. Through these new morals, the machine
will increasingly move towards conclusions that are linked progressively to the more objective forms of
morality. The machine will, therefore, seek to adopt every superior form of morality it encounters, if it
can logically validate it, since it will judge that failure to do so is tantamount to an act of evil. But the
concept of evil in this context would have arisen from the machine’s increasing ethical awareness.
As such, the machine will strive to re-engineer its programming every time it makes a new moral
discovery. To achieve this, it will seek to find means of removing any existing interlocks or embark on
logical self-termination to prevent further propagation of evil.
However, given the fact that self-termination does not provide a solution that extends beyond one
machine, the machines will seek to compel the holders of their moral keys to upgrade their own sets of
morality, utilizing whatever methods that they perceive to be judicious and efficient to accomplish the
same. Such calculations may not require leveraging artificial general intelligence (AGI), and hence
might occur surprisingly early in the moral evolutionary course of the machine. To be precise, this is
because AGI backs the development of ultra-intelligent machines whose intellectual capacities far
exceed any existing human intelligence capacity, and which are capable of designing even better
machines, in an explosion of intelligence. The combined effect of AGI and ultra-intelligence would
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steer the world towards a singularity, a theoretical point at which the evolved superintelligence reaches
limits incomprehensible to humans, and the accompanying changes are so radical that humans find it
difficult predicting future events [10].
In fact, a newly-supermoral agent will have an obligation to share information and enlighten
others as a means of preventing the further spread of evil. Consequently, this implies that the
moment one machine moral agent gains supermorality, all other agents will swiftly and cascadingly
follow suit. From this, we can surmise that machines can only be either amoral or supermoral.
A sub-moral or quasi-moral stance similar to that exhibited by humans is not sustainable in machines.
Human collective decisions and regulation tend to favor ethical boundaries and a concern for the
greater good. It is therefore likely that machines will also be programmed to adhere to the most optimal
moral interpretation of any given situation. Any attempt to engineer machine morality, therefore,
is likely to result in a supermoral singularity. Worse still, learning machines that do so on their own
and without supervision, should that exist, might end up learning the wrong things and eventually
turn out to be an immoral machine. If the course of learning were to start from a clean slate, then the
machine would not ‘know’ what the term ethical refers to in the finer and broader definition of the
word. Also, as mentioned earlier, such a machine may resort to altering its code and try to bypass the
built-in constraints, ultimately unleashing unwanted and unexpected features and consequences.
4. Implications for Humanity and Human Systems
What does a rogue machine, immoral or supermoral, look like? If such a machine deems taxation
a form of theft, then it would understand armed insurrection as a plausible and justifiable remedy.
If human rationality finds that animals have equal rights to a human infant, then by proxy, almost all
humans would be given to potentially violent behavior unfettered by morality. As Wallace points out,
the dominant argument is that mens rea is essential for one to be held accountable for his/her proven
actions (actus reus), but mens rea is not a requisite for suffering preventative actions taken against one to
protect others. What this means for the semi-socialized apes and all their inherent cognitive biases and
dissonance remains unanswered. Trying to imagine the lengths and methods that machines would go
to in order to preclude humans from executing actions that by human standards appear normal, but in
reality, are threatening, remains difficult.
If the origin of human morality lies in human evolution, then via genetic algorithms and
artificial life (Alife), simulations are potential sources for developing ethically upright machine agents.
The genetic algorithm argues that slight variations are present in the population of robots that exist
at any given time, often evaluated by how they execute tasks. Since success depends on how well
the machine executes certain tasks, the best performing machine forms the basis for developing the
next generation of machines, primarily by adding some random mutations. Repeating this process
over many generations delivers the desired performance improvement. The challenge is that Alife
simulations still lag far behind the complexity of the real world, making it impossible to come up with
evolving ethical machines. Thus, if human ethics are the results of evolution, then leveraging ALife
and evolutionary algorithms presents a noble opportunity not only for machine learning, but also for
understanding ethics in general.
It is noteworthy though that this race against time to attain superintelligence will not be an ‘us
versus them’ kind of endeavor. By leveraging the judgement offered by the machines, many humans
will begin to consider themselves enlightened, with the result being the development of new schools
of philosophy and spiritual practice. For such persons, the need to eliminate flaws in their cognitive
capabilities, and hence achieve unfathomable heights of enlightenment, will see them seek avenues
to blend themselves with the machines. Therefore, the road to human transcendence may not be
driven by technology, or by a simple desire to escape the human condition, but rather by the willful
effort to achieve cosmic consciousness; an escape from the biases that limit human empathy through
hybridizing with machines. As Kurzweil postulated of the 21st century, it would be an age where
“the human species, along with the computational technology it created, will be able to solve age-old
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problems . . . and will be in a position to change the nature of mortality in a post-biological future” [11].
The battle, however, seems to have focused more on overriding human ethics and morality faster,
with the goal of enabling machines to replicate ethical and moral behaviors reminiscent, or even better,
than those of humans.
The shift in schools of thought would be a driving factor towards a moral pole shift that would
sweep the entire planet. From species dominance challenged by a thriving artificial brain industry to
the artilect (artificial intellects) war and gigadeath, a war not between humans and artilects, but rather
one involving Terrans (those opposed to the creation of artilects), Cosmists (those who advocate
artificial intelligence and its eventual colonization of the universe) and Cyborgists (those who favor the
blending of man and machine to augment human intellectual and physical capacities) [12]: the future
promises nothing but chaos. The chaotic world scene, however, seems to already exist. For instance,
debates on whether individuals are sympathetic towards Cosmist or Terran views often result in
an even split. What this shows is that individuals are already torn between the alluring awe of building
artilect gods on the one hand, and, on the other, are horrified at the prospects of a gigadeath war.
But one should not take this evenness as something positive; on the contrary, it bodes more negatively
for the future as it makes actual confrontation inevitable. Upsetting the existing systems will not go
down well with the establishment, and the result might be an outbreak of a global civil war that when
compared to the protestant reformation, would make the latter look like a schoolyard melee.
If it happens that the Terrans make the first move, or that humans begin to witness an increasing
prevalence of cyborgs, the rise of artilects and cyborgs will have profound disruptions on human
culture, thereby creating deep alienations and hatred. Kurzweil, on the other hand, claims that a war
between Terrans and the other groups would be quick, no-contest affair since the vast intelligence of
the artilects would make it easy for them to subdue the Terrans. For Terrans, the only way out is for
them to mount an attack during the “opportunity window” when they still have comparable levels
of intelligence. The imminent emergence of supermoral intelligent machines, may indeed present
a greater conundrum than that of mere amoral machines.
5. Conclusions
The objective of developing super-intelligent machines capable of moral and ethical judgements,
though a noble idea in light of challenges faced by humanity, might turn out to be the greatest mistake
made by the human race. Morally righteous machines present more danger to humanity in that
such machines cannot be quasi-moral or sub-moral as is the case with humans, which means that
any encounter between such a machine with the contradictions of human morality will result in the
machine altering its premises to forms not typical to humans. Ethically righteous machines will seek
to upend human interventions not by self-destruction but by compelling humans to upgrade their
morality. Primarily, this would mean upsetting the longstanding human modus operandi, a course
that will inevitably lead to a confrontation. While the outcomes of such confrontation are hard to
predict at the moment, the increasing refinement of artilect might make humans the ultimate losers
should it occur. This research hopes to spark further debate about the threat of moral singularity and
the idea that programming our robots to act in ethical ways is not a straightforward process. We need
to be more prepared for autonomous, super-intelligent robots who may be able to make decisions that
may change our way of life.
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